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This thesis is composed of three essays on power system planning models, which 
are models that identify what assets of transmission, generation, storage, and demand-man-
agement would be beneficial to invest (or retire) over a multidecadal time horizon for large 
geographic regions.  In the first essay, I propose a framework to systematically evaluate 
the economic benefits of enhancements to planning models, facilitating meaningful com-
parisons among model enhancements. I test the framework in a transmission expansion 
planning (TEP) context for the western U.S. and compare four enhancements: (1) consid-
eration of multiple scenarios of long-run policy, economy, and technology scenarios, (2) 
refined representations of short-run operational variability due to demand and variable en-
ergy resources, (3) refined power flow modeling, and (4) inclusion of generation unit com-
mitment costs and constraints. Results show that the consideration of long-run uncertainties 
provides the most benefits, while benefits from the other three enhancements are relatively 
small.  
The interaction between storage and transmission can be both complementary and 
substitutive.  In the second essay, to quantify the benefits of considering this interaction in 
TEP, I enhance the TEP model with storage expansion capability and test it in a planning 
context for the western U.S.  Results show that the benefits of anticipating storage expan-
sion in TEP increase when the assumed cost of building storage decreases but are sensitive 
to assumed carbon prices.  Compared to the total value that storage can bring to the power 
system, the value of anticipating storage expansion in TEP can be significant, showing a 




In the third essay, I use the TEP model to test the effectiveness of different border 
carbon adjustment policies in the western U.S. power system, in which California is a uni-
laterally regulates carbon emissions.  The results show that charging electricity imports 
based on the facility-specific emission rate of the import contract can lead to substantial 
emissions leakage and even increases in total system emissions.  Meanwhile, assuming the 
same emission rate across all electricity imports can partially mitigate leakage and result 
in small system-wide emissions reductions.  Finally, basing the import emission rate on the 
marginal emission rate external to the carbon pricing regime can encourage a system-wide 
emission reduction, achieving the best economic efficiency. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and Problem 
At 3:00 PM, on September 4th, 1882, Thomas Edison and his associates flipped the 
switch at his Pearl Street Station and started to generate and deliver electricity to consumers 
in a small area of lower Manhattan, NY.  This event marked the Pearl Street Station as the 
first generation-to-end-use power system in history (Glover et al., 2011).  Since then, power 
systems have evolved in many ways: direct current (DC) to alternating current (AC), higher 
voltages and capacities, encompassing larger regions and providing reliable, cheap 
electricity to almost every corner of the globe.  Electricity has become the lifeblood of our 
civilization, and electrification has been called the most important engineering 
achievement of the 20th century by the National Academy of Engineering (National 
Academy of Engineering, 2018). 
Due to ever-increasing demand as well as public yearning for a cleaner environment, 
power systems are constantly expanding and changing their generation technologies.  Due 
to the gigantic size and complexity of power systems, planning for their expansion requires 
extremely careful consideration and often relies on powerful computerized models.  Power 
system expansion planning models are a family of well-utilized and researched 
optimization models/frameworks that inform the planner where, when, and what kind of 
asset (transmission, generation, and, in the future, storage) is the optimal choice to be built 
so that the power system can reliably and sustainably meet demand at the lowest possible 




Power generation, storage, and use technologies are constantly evolving and 
growing in complexity, as are the systems that interconnect and coordinate them.  Thus 
there exists much demand for and research on better power system planning models.  To 
the planners, nevertheless, several questions still persist: What, exactly, is a better planning 
model?  How can we value, in economic terms, the extent to which one planning model 
performs better than another?  Does more model complexity equate to better performance? 
The role of storage in power system planning models is crucial, and a defining 
characteristic of those models.  Electricity has differentiated itself from other commodities 
such as oil by the high cost of storage and, accordingly, power system planners and 
electrical engineers have designed and developed the power system to maintain a minute-
by-minute and even second-by-second balance of generation and consumption.  With the 
plummeting cost of large-scale energy storage, such a restriction is fading.  For a 
transmission planner, the question to be answered is: How will decreasing costs of storage 
technology affect the transmission expansion planning?  Meanwhile for the potential 
investors of energy storage technologies, however, the reversed question is also intriguing: 
How will the transmission expansion planning affect the profitability of the storage 
technology?  
The deregulation of the electricity sectors started in South America in the 1990s 
and has spread to the rest of the globe in the past two decades (Hobbs and Oren, 2019).  
This process unbundled vertically integrated utilities into different market participants: 
generation companies whose prices would be lightly regulated, transmission system 
operators who would operate the system and provide transmission services on a “common 




consumers, and distribution utilities who would build and operate the low voltage grid.  
Among all of the multifaceted impacts, one is particularly important to power system 
planners: planning of transmission and generation is no longer the responsibility of one 
central entity, as transmission planners are to make plans for transmission expansion, and 
generation companies take responsibility for generation investments. 
The decentralization of planning is a conceptual challenge for investment modeling, 
as a model for transmission investment has to make assumptions about where generation 
investment under the control of generators will be sited, and generation planners have to 
make assumptions about the availability of grid capacity to convey their power to buyers.  
This has stimulated a whole new area of research into “proactive” planning models that 
plan transmission explicitly considering the possible reaction of generator investments in 
terms of where, when, and what type of generation investment will occur   (Sauma and 
Oren, 2006).  In particular, they model subproblems of generation expansion and dispatch 
as the market-based reaction to a given transmission expansion plan.  The simplest 
approach, which is adopted in this thesis, is to assume that the generation sector is 
competitive and makes investment decisions based on the marginal value of power to the 
system at different locations (termed “locational marginal pricing”), e.g., van der Weijde 
and Hobbs (2012) and  Spyrou et al. (2017). These models can be formulated as single 
optimization models, which I prove in the Appendix A.  Alternatively, if there are market 
imperfections, such as strategic generation companies that can exercise market power, 
more complex bilevel models such as, for example, Pozo et al. (2013), have been proposed.   
If we assume that transmission is planned by a benevolent central authority that is 




the reaction of a competitive generation sector to those policies as well as transmission 
prices, the basic proactive planning model described above can be conceptually extended 
into a policy assessment tool.  This extends the basic principle of Samuelson (1952), who 
showed how a market benefits-maximizing optimization model is equivalent to a 
simulation of a competitive market.  By altering the design of policies, their effect upon 
optimal transmission plans and the competitive generation sector can be assessed (Hobbs, 
1995; Hogan, 2002), answering questions like What is the impact of a certain policy on the 
power sector’s economic efficiency and environmental impacts? How will individual 
market participants react to this policy, and how is their welfare or profits affected? In this 
vein, I will use my power system planning tool to investigate important questions about 
carbon pricing policy. 
Pricing carbon emissions, in particular emissions from power systems, has become 
an important strategy to combat climate change. Due to the political system, carbon pricing 
activities in the United States are often local, i.e., at a multistate- or even single-state-level. 
In an interconnected power system, if electricity generated in one place becomes more 
expensive because of carbon pricing, consumers can just buy electricity elsewhere. Carbon 
emissions, though, also leak elsewhere. At the national-level, emissions may not change at 
all. Nevertheless, What can a local emission regulator do to mitigate such emissions 
leakage? Can he choose to tax or price the carbon flowing on the state boundary? How 
will this action affect the power system and the resulting emissions? 
1.2 Scope 
The first part of this thesis addresses the development and economic valuation of 




to render it “better” (more realistic); most of them come with heavier computational bur-
dens and result in a longer solving time.  Just like a forecast model is useless if it needs 10 
minutes to forecast the future 10 minutes away, a planning model can lose its value if it 
takes months or years  to provide a plan.  Comparing and choosing a valuable enhancement 
to a planning model is thus imperative. I ask the following questions that have never been 
systematically answered: What, exactly, is a better planning model? How can we value, in 
economic terms, the extent to which one planning model performs better than another? 
Does more model complexity equate to better performance? 
To answer these questions, I developed a framework called the “Value of Model 
Enhancements” to systematically quantify the economic benefits to add any enhancement, 
for instance, higher temporal resolution, in the planning model. As a demonstration, I tested 
this framework to evaluate the benefits of four enhancements to a planning model of the 
western United States: the addition of unit commitment modeling, the addition of accurate 
power flow modeling, the refinement of higher temporal resolution, and the consideration 
long-term uncertainty. 
The second part of my thesis is to answer the following two questions: How will 
the merging storage technology affect traditional power system planning, and in turn, how 
will traditional power system planning affect the storage profitability? With my estab-
lished evaluation framework in Chapter 3, I further enhance the existing planning model 
with battery storage expansion functionality and quantify the value of such enhancement 
(in Chapter 4). As an illustration, I provide numerical results for the power system planning 




The third part of my thesis involves answering: What can a local emission regulator 
do to mitigate carbon leakage? Can he choose to tax or price the carbon flowing on the 
state boundary? How will this action affect the power system and the resulting emissions? 
I limited my scope to one potential approach: the border tax adjustment on carbon emission 
(Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007), also known as border carbon adjustment (BCA). With a further 
enhancement in the planning model to include better carbon policy representation, in Chap-
ter 5 and 6, I comprehensively assess the impact of different BCA schemes of the California 
carbon emission trading system on the western power system by reviewing local and sys-
tem-wide emissions, generation production, and consumer cost. 
I organize the remainder of the thesis as follows. In Chapter 2, a comprehensive 
view of the Johns Hopkins Stochastic Multistage Integrated Network Expansion (JHS-
MINE) tool is given, including the modeling rationale, notation, formulation, and equation 
explanation.  This tool serves the Chapters 3-5, present the main results of this dissertation. 
Each is organized with its own chapter introduction, literature review, formulation/theory 
development, experiment design, numerical results, and conclusion.  Chapter 7 concludes 
this thesis. The database of the thesis involves millions of entries, and part of it is proprie-
tary, and it is thus not reproduced int this thesis; however, the important procedures for the 




Chapter 2 Johns Hopkins Stochastic Multistage 
Integrated Network Expansion (JHSMINE) 
Planning Model1 
2.1 Chapter Summary and Introduction 
In this chapter, I demonstrate the general structure and detailed formulation of the 
Johns Hopkins Stochastic Multistage Integrated Network Expansion (JHSMINE) planning 
model.  JHSMINE is a long-term Transmission-Generation-Storage expansion planning 
model based on stochastic programming and it shares the goal of other power system plan-
ning models, which is to help the power system planner to answer the question of the three 
“W’s”: when and where to add what kind of facilities into the grid so that the social welfare 
(a metric of market efficiency) is maximized. 
JHSMINE evaluates the performance of alternative designs and operations using 
the objective of societal welfare (or societal cost, if assuming perfect inelastic demand and 
a constant value of the lost load.)  This performance is estimated by JHSMINE’s detailed 
generation, transmission, and storage operation modeling, as well as renewable energy pol-
icy and power system reliability requirements. JHSMINE’s generation operation modeling 
includes decision variables and constraints for unit commitment and dispatch.  As for trans-
mission operation modeling, JHSMINE includes the linearization of ac power flows (i.e., 
the DC OPF model, described later in this chapter).  Storage operation includes the charge, 
discharge, and state-of-charge management decision variables and constraints.  JHSMINE 
includes detailed renewable energy policy modeling, which involves renewable portfolio 
 
1 This chapter is in part based on previous works in which I paricipated, including Ho et al. (2016) and Hobbs 




standards (RPS) fulfillment constraints and renewable energy credit trading. For reliability 
of the power system, JHSMINE models operating reserves, resource adequacy requirement 
as well as flowgate limits.  In short, JHSMINE adopts a bottom-up engineering-economic 
approach. 
JHSMINE is also featured by its capability to model long-term uncertainties, as 
well as short-term risks.  Here, long-term uncertainties refer to uncertain system conditions 
set by factors that are usually on a yearly or larger time scale: for example, the electricity 
demand set by the economic growth and policies that promote energy efficiency.  Long-
term uncertainties modeled in JHSMINE are exogenous, and I will discuss them in the 
following sections of this Chapter.  Short-term risks, on the order hand, are uncertain sys-
tem conditions that occur on a sub-yearly time scale: for instance, hourly wind variability 
and forecast uncertainty.  Notably, short-term uncertainties are sometimes endogenous; to 
wit, the wind uncertainty stems from both the newly installed wind capacity (a decision 
variable) and wind profiles (an exogenous parameter). 
To handle uncertainty, JHSMINE adopts the approach of scenario-based stochastic 
programming; imagine a scenario tree where each tree node associates with a marginal 
probability and a cost.  Stochastic programming is to minimize the expected cost of the 
whole tree.  In the same manner, JHSMINE picks the optimal set of facilities to install so 
that the probability-weighted sum of scenario-specific system costs is minimized.   
This chapter is organized as follows.  Initially, I present the development process 
and the general structure of JHSMINE. Then, I define the JHSMINE nomenclature, after 




2.2 The General Structure of JHSMINE 
A prototype of JHSMINE first appeared in van der Weijde and Hobbs (2012) for 
the U.K. power system and was then applied to the power systems of Western U.S. in 
(Munoz et al., 2014) with the enhancement of DC OPF power flow modeling.  Both and 
later versions of JHSMINE are based on the idea of “proactive” transmission planning: the 
transmission planner in JHSMINE stands as a societal welfare maximizer and selects the 
best set of transmission lines while anticipating the reactions from other market participants 
in the power sector (Sauma and Oren, 2006; Sauma and Oren, 2007).  The justification of 
“proactive” transmission planning relies on multiple assumptions, such as the perfect com-
petition among generation companies, full knowledge of the cost function of generation 
and capacity expansion, etc.  For a more comprehensive review of required assumptions, I 
refer readers to Krishnan et al. (2015) and Spyrou et al. (2017). 
The model team at Johns Hopkins University later enhanced the model with renew-
able energy credit trading (Ho et al., 2016) and unit commitment (Kasina et al., 2013) and 
then officially named the model as JHSMINE; a full formulation is provided in Xu and 
Hobbs (2019) and Xu and Hobbs (2017).  I, here in this thesis, refined JHSMINE by ex-
panding it from two-stage to multi-stage and adding the modeling of storage operation (Xu 
and Hobbs, 2018).  In this chapter, I present the latest version of JHSMINE.   
Since the very first beginning of the JHSMINE development (van der Weijde and 
Hobbs, 2012), the structure of it has been composed of three things: a planning horizon, a 
set of operation simulations, and a scenario tree.  A planning horizon defines (1) how in-
vestment decisions made in the previous years will affect the years after and (2) how JHS-




system operation within the planning horizon: it answers the question of given the existing 
and new facilities and other system conditions (e.g., load and fuel price), how the system 
will be operated to achieve the minimal system cost; also, operation simulation also gener-
ates the operation cost cash flow as well as the investment cash flow.  A scenario tree is a 
stochastic extension of the planning horizon, and it defines the relationship between “here 
and now” decisions, the resolution of long-run uncertainties, and “wait and see” decisions.  
In the remainder of this section, I will provide details concerning the planning horizon, 
operation simulations, and the scenario tree. 
2.2.1 Planning Horizon 
A planning horizon of JHSMINE is composed of a set of decision-making time 
points and operation simulation intervals.  An example is shown in Figure 2.1: the square 
shows one  decision-making point, and the gray boxes show three operation simulation 
intervals.  One operation simulation interval can include more than one year, but JHSMINE 
assumes that all years within one interval are identical; to wit, see Figure 2.1 and observe 
that (1) each operation interval has three years, (2) operation cost cashflows (black dashed 
arrows) occur at the end of each year, and (3) operation cost cashflows within each opera-
tion intervals are identical in length.  For a certain facility (e.g., a transmission line), JHS-
MINE makes an expansion/retirement decision at a decision-making point, and this deci-
sion will realize (i.e., commissioned or decommissioned) in the system after the decision 
lead time2; the solid arrow in the upper part of Figure 2.1 shows investment decisions made 
at the decision-making point will be available to the system at year y3.  Such a commission 
 
2 Lead time is the time between the issue time of the decision and the realization of the decision; such a lead 




(or decommission) introduce an overnight cost (or salvage revenue) at the beginning of 
year y3, which is represented by the red dashed arrow in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1. The example diagram of the JHSMINE planning horizon.  The red arrow 
stands for the occurrence of the capital cost, while the black dashed arrows stand for the 
occurrences of operation costs. 
 
A special case may emerge: a decision is made, but its lead time ends between y2 
and y3 (the dashed arrow in the upper part of Figure 2.1).  To comply with the assumption 
of identical cashflows within operation simulation intervals, JHSMINE pushes the realiza-
tion of such decision to the beginning of the next operation simulation interval; to visualize, 
from the middle of y2 and y3 to the beginning of y3 in Figure 2.1.  All of the cash flows, 
including overnight costs of facility construction and system operation cost (fuel cost, op-
eration and maintenance costs, etc.), are then discounted back to the beginning of the plan-
ning horizon, yielding the net present value of the system cost. 
2.2.2 Operation Simulations 
The core of JHSMINE is the operation simulation intervals (the gray boxes in Fig-
ure 2.1), for they define the performance of the investment decisions.  As mentioned in the 
previous section, each operation simulation interval can include one or more years; JHS-




operation year.  In this section, I provide a general review of the operations simulated by 
JHSMINE; I will show detailed formulation starting from Section 2.3. 
Within each operation year, JHSMINE simulates participant activities down to the 
hourly level.  Table 2.1 summaries the participants and their activities modeled in JHS-
MINE. The participants include the independent system operator (ISO), load-serving enti-
ties (LSEs), generation companies, and storage companies.  Government and other partic-
ipants such as fuel suppliers, construction companies are exogenous to JHSMINE. 
 
Table 2.1. Power Sector Participants and Activities Modeled in JHSMINE. Cell contents 
show whether a participant (top row) is a buyer/seller or arbitrager of each commod-

















Arbitrager Buyer Seller Buyer/Seller - - 
Spinning Re-
serve 
- Buyer Seller Seller - - 
Resource 
Adequacy 
- Buyer Seller Seller - - 
Renewable 
Credit 




















Buyer - Buyer Buyer - Seller 
*: Government is the supplier of alternative compliance credit  
**: LSE is a consumer of carbon allowance or a subject to the carbon tax when the load-based 





For electricity (2nd row of Table 2.1), JHSMINE assumes that (1) LSEs, Generation 
companies, Storage companies trade electricity at the load marginal price settled by ISO, 
and (2) demand functions are purely inelastic (i.e., fixed load).  The ISO is responsible for 
the unit commitment and economic dispatch and operates the transmission system.  For 
ancillary services (3rd row of Table 2.1), JHSMINE currently only models the spinning 
reserve market.3   
The annual resource adequacy requirement (or planning reserve, 4th row of Table 
2.1) of each load-serving entity is modeled in JHSMINE.  The state-level renewable port-
folio standards (RPS) and carbon price/tax are modeled (5th and 6th rows of Table 2.1).  The 
RPS is modeled at the load end, meaning that LSE needs to buy renewable energy credit 
(RECs) from generators to meet the requirement.  Each generator needs to buy emission 
allowances (or pay the carbon tax) if applicable.   
To provide the commodities and services, generation and storage companies need 
to pay the fuel cost, operation, and maintenance cost, and startup cost if applicable; these 
payments are received by entities outside of JHSMINE, such as natural gas producers (7th 
row of Table 2.1). Similarly, the parties who receive revenues from constructing transmis-
sion lines (from the ISO), generators (from generation companies), and storage facilities 
(from storage companies) are also external to JHSMINE (8th row of Table 2.1). 
The objective function of JHSMINE is the summation of the welfare of all endog-
enous market participants (the first four columns of Table 2.1).  Since the load is purely 
inelastic, the welfare of the LSE is the negative of its payments for energy and other 
 
3 Spinning reserve market is the market where, on behalf of LSEs, ISO purchases the reserved capacities 
from running (thus, “spinning”) generators who promise that the purchased capacities can be readily ramped-
up (e.g., in 10 mins) to fulfill an extra net load caused by contingencies.  An example is CAISO’s spinning 




commodities. Thus, each of the rows of Table 2.1 will sum to zero; to pick the electricity 
market as an example, the net of LSEs’ payments, generation companies’ revenues, storage 
companies’ revenues, and the ISO’s congestion rent will be zero.  Furthermore, because 
the welfare of the government and other players are exogenous to JHSMINE, the summa-
tion of the first four columns is just the summation of the gray boxes in Table 2.1.  In other 
words, for each operation year, the cash flow happens at the end of the year is: 
 Operation Cost = Fixed O&M Cost + Variable O&M Cost + Fuel Cost + Start-up Cost 
+ RPS non-Compliance Penalty + Emission Allowance Payment  
The investment cost happens at the beginning of operation simulation intervals is: 
Investment Cost = Expansion Cost – Salvage Revenue 
2.2.3 Scenario Tree 
After the planning horizon and operation simulations are defined, I can expand the 
planning horizon to a scenario tree by adding a scenario-axis in JHSMINE.  A node of the 
scenario tree can be defined as a pair of scenario and year; scenario tree nodes representing 
the operation simulation interval are referred to as the operation node and represented as 
(scenario, the first year of operation simulation interval.)  And the long-run uncertainty 
parameters (Table 2.2) are realized in each scenario tree nodes. For example, a scenario 
tree node can have the following entries in the year 2020, the cost of building a solar farm 





Table 2.2. Default Available Long-run Uncertainty Parameters in JHSMINE 
Long-run Uncertainties Description 
Carbon Policies 
State-level carbon price/tax in each operation simulation in-
terval 
Fuel Price 
Fuel price (gas, coal, etc.) in each operation simulation in-
terval 
Generation Build Cost Cost of building new generators 
Generation Commission Availability of existing generators  
Intermittent resource Availabil-
ity 
The hydroelectric power availability (e.g., Wet, dry year, 
etc.), wind, and solar. 
Line Build Cost Cost of new transmission lines 
Line Commission Availability of existing transmission lines 
Load Load conditions (high/medium/low load growth, etc.) 
RPS 
State-level RPS policy aggressiveness (higher/lower than 
the base case requirement) 
Storage Build Cost Cost of new storage facilities 
Storage Commission Availability of existing storages 
 
I explain some useful notation here. The nodes are connected by the branches of 
the scenario tree, and if a node A can be tracked backward temporally to another node B, 
the latter will be an ancestor node to node A, and the node A is a descendant node to node 
B.  The decision made in the ancestor node will affect all its descendant nodes.  A pair of 
an ancestor node and a descendant node that are adjacent in a scenario tree are also called 
the parent node and the child node.  Scenario tree branches must not cross; thus any node 
can have only one parent node.  In particular, the first node of the scenario tree (the ancestor 






Figure 2.2. Example diagram of the JHSMINE scenario tree. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Example diagram of the JHSMINE scenario tree (Classic view). 
 
Figure 2.2 shows an example of a JHSMINE scenario tree and Figure 2.3 shows a 
version of the same scenario tree following the style in Clemen and Reilly (1999): each 
decision node (square boxes) and each gray box (operation simulation interval) can be 




coincident with the beginning of simulation intervals.) In this example, the base case 
branches twice where the chance nodes are (yellow circles): the first branch is between y1 
and y2 while the second branch is between y2 and y3. Note that the first decision made in 
the base case will be realized in all three scenarios, while the second decision made in the 
base case will only be realized in the base case and scenario 2.  This scenario tree structure 
also prevents the decision made in scenario 1 from affecting scenario 2.  The branches of 
the scenario tree must not cross: for example, there will be no decision affecting arrow of 
scenarios 1 or 2 that then links back to the base case scenario.  The probability of each 
operation simulation interval is calculated as the product of 1) the probability of the parent 
node and 2) the transition probability from the parent node to the child node. 
With the three major components of JHSMINE discussed, now I am ready to pre-
sent the detailed formulation of JHSMINE, starting with the nomenclature. 
2.3  Nomenclature 
2.3.1 Sets 
A Balancing authority areas, index a. 
E Energy storage technologies, index e. 
F Fuel types, index f. 
G Generation technologies, index g. 
H Hours, index h. 
I Buses, index i. 
J Energy storages, index j. 
K Generators, index k. 




P Path/Flowgates, index p. 
R Reserve sharing groups, index r. 
S Scenarios, index s. 
W States/Provinces, index w. 
Y Years, index y. 
2.3.2 Subsets 
Ar Balancing Authority Areas that are members of reserve sharing group r. 
Iw Buses that are geographically in the state w. 
Ia Buses that belong to the balancing authority area a. 
Ja Energy storage facilities that belong to the balancing authority area a.  
Je Energy storage facilities that belong to the energy storage technology e.  
Jf Energy storage facilities that use fuel f to generate electricity. 
Ji  Energy storage facilities that are connected to the bus i . 
Jw Energy storage facilities that belong to the state w. 
Ka Generators that belong to the balancing authority area a. 
Kf  Generators that use fuel f to generate electricity. 
Kg Generators that belong to the generation technology g.  
Ki  Generators that are connected to the bus i. 
Kw Generators that belongs to the state w. 
2.3.3 Parameters 
CTAXs,y,w  Carbon price or tax of state w in the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $/ton. 




DAy Accumulative discounting factor of year y to the beginning of the planning 
horizon.  
ECOMs,y,j  Commission status the storage facility j, unitless. 
EECPj  Energy capacity of the storage j, unit: MWh. 
EELCCa,e Expected load-carrying capability specified by balancing area a for the en-
ergy storage technology e, unitless.  
EERj  Emission rate of the storage facility j, unit: metric ton CO2e/MWh. 
EEXCs,y,j  Expansion cost of the storage facility j in scenario tree node (s,y), Unit: $.  
EFOMj   Fixed O&M cost of the storage j, unit: $/MW-year. 
EGCPj Generating capacity of the storage j, unit: MW. 
EGEFj   Generating efficiency of the storage j, unitless. 
EHRj  Heat rate of the storage j, unit: MMBTU/MWh. 
ELEDj  Lead year of investment decision of the storage j, unit: year.  
EPCPj  Pumping capacity of the storage j, unit: MW. 
EPEFj  Pumping efficiency of the storage j, unit: fraction. 
ESALs,y,j,s’,y’  Salvage revenue of storage facility j if expanded in the scenario tree node  
(s’,y’) and retired in node (s,y), unit: $. 
EVOMj  Variable O&M cost of the storage j, unit: $/MWh. 
FCs,y,h,f Price of the fuel f at hour h in scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $/MMBTU. 
GCOMs,y,k  Commission status of the generator k in scenario tree node (s,y), unitless. 
GELCCa,g Expected load-carrying capability specified by balancing area a for genera-
tion technology g, unitless. 




GEXCs,y,k The expansion cost of the generator k in scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
GFOMk  Fixed operating and maintenance cost of the generator k, unit: $/MW-year. 
GFORk Forced outage rate of the generator k , unitless. 
GHAVs,y,k,h Hourly availability of the generator k , unitless. 
GHRk Average heat rate of generator k, unit: MMBTU/MWh. 
GLEDk  Lead year of the investment decision of the generator k, unit: year. 
GMDTk  Minimum downtime of the generator k, unit: hour. 
GMINk Minimum run as a fraction of the capacity, unitless. 
GMUTk  Minimum uptime of the generator k, unit: hour. 
GNPLk Nameplate capacity of the generator k, unit: MW.  
GPORk Planned outage rate of the generator k, unitless. 
GRPRk One-hour ramp rate as a fraction of the capacity, unitless. 
GSALs,y,k,s’,y’ The salvage revenue of the generator k if it is expanded in scenario tree node 
(s’,y’) and retired in the node (s,y), unit: $. 
GSPk Spinning reserve cap as a fraction of the capacity, unitless. 
GSUCk Start-up cost of generator k per unit of the capacity, unit: $/MW. 
GVOMk Variable operating and maintenance cost of the generator k, unit: $/MWh. 
HWy,h # of hours represented by hour h in year y, unit: hour. 
IRPSs,y,w  Instate RPS of state w, unitless. 
LBl  Line susceptance of the transmission line l, unit: p.u.  
LBIl,i  Line-bus incidence matrix. 1 if bus i is the to-bus of line l; -1 if bus i is the 
from-bus of line l; 0 otherwise, unitless.  




LCOMs,y,l  Commission status used for the existing transmission line l, unitless. 
LEXCs,y,l  Expansion cost of the transmission line l in the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: 
$. 
LLEDl  Lead year of investment decision of the transmission line l, unit: year.  
LOADs,y,h,i  Bus-level load; i.e., electricity demand, unit: MW. 
LSALs,y,l,s’,y’  Salvage revenue of the transmission line l if it is built in the scenario tree 
node (s’,y’) and retired in the node (s,y), unit: $. 
LTMl  Line rating (or the thermal limit) of the transmission line l, unit: MW. 
PBASE Base power, unit MW. 
PBDp Existing limit of the path/flowgate p in the backward direction, unit: MW. 
PBDEp,l  Expansion on the backward limit of path p if the line l is built, unit: MW. 
PEAKs,y,r Peak demand of reserve sharing group in the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: 
MW.  
PFDp  Existing limit of the path/flowgate p in the forward direction, unit: MW. 
PFDEp,l  Expansion on the forward limit of path p if the line l is built, unit: MW. 
PLIp,l Path-line incidence matrix. 1 if the transmission line l is part of the path p 
and flows in the same direction as p; -1 if the transmission line l  is part of 
the path p and flows in the opposite direction; 0 otherwise, unitless.  
RACPw  Alternative compliance penalty for RPS of state w, unit: $/MWh  
REw,g  Renewable eligibility; 1 of the technology g is considered as renewable in 
the state w, unitless.  
RMSPr  Spinning reserve margin of the reserve sharing group r, unitless. 




RPSs,y,w  Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) of state w in scenario tree node (s,y), 
unitless. 
RPSOs,y,w  Other RPS of state w, unitless. 
RPSSs,y,w  Solar RPS of state w for solar, unitless. 
RPSWs,y,w  Wind RPS of state w, unitless. 
SDOIs,y,s’,y’ Decision operation incident. 1 if the node (s,y) is a descendant node of 
(s’,y’), unitless.  
SPs,y Scenario probability, unitless. 
VOLL Value of lost load, unit: $/MWh. 
2.3.4 Special Notation 
(s0,y0) The root node of the scenario tree. 
(s1,y1) The first operation node. 
(sp,yp) The previous operation node. 
Pre(y) The previous operation year, 
2.3.5 Variables  
2.3.5.1 Expansion and Retirement Variables 
eexps,y,j  Storage expansion decision, 1 if an expansion decision is made for the stor-
age j in (s,y), binary, unitless.  
eincexps,y,j  Storage incremental expansion, 1 if the storage j becomes commissioned in 
(s,y), binary, unitless. 
eincrets,y,j,s’,y’  Storage incremental retirement, 1 if the storage j that became commissioned 




erets,y,j,s’,y’  Storage retirement decision, 1 if a retirement decision is made in (s,y) for 
the storage j that becomes online in (s’,y’), binary, unitless. 
estats,y,j  Storage commission status, 1 if the storage j is in commission in (s,y), binary, 
unitless. 
gexps,y,k Generator expansion decision, 1 if an expansion decision is made in the 
scenario tree node (s,y), binary, unitless. 
gincexps,y,k  Generator incremental expansion, 1 if the generator k starts to be commis-
sioned in (s,y), binary, unitless. 
gincrets,y,k,s’,y’  Generator incremental retirement, 1 if the generator k that became online in 
(s’,y’) is decommissioned in (s,y), binary, unitless. 
grets,y,k,s’,y’  Generator retirement decision, 1 if a retirement decision is made for gener-
ator k in (s,y) if it is online in (s’,y’), binary, unitless. 
gstats,y,k  Generator commission status, 1 if the generator k is in commission in the 
scenario tree node (s,y), binary, unitless.  
lexps,y,l  Transmission line expansion decision, 1 if an expansion decision for trans-
mission line l is made in (s,y), binary, unitless. 
lincexps,y,l  Transmission line incremental expansion, 1 if the transmission line l be-
comes commissioned in (s,y), binary, unitless. 
lincrets,y,l,s’,y’  Transmission line incremental retirement, 1 if the transmission line l that 





lrets,y,l,s’,y’  Transmission line retirement decision, 1 if a retirement decision is made in 
(s,y) for the transmission line l that becomes commissioned in (s’,y’), binary, 
unitless. 
lstats,y,l  Transmission line commission status, 1 if the transmission line l is in com-
mission in the scenario tree node (s,y), binary, unitless. 
2.3.5.2 Operation Variables 
cpfs,y,g,h,w1,w2  Energy credit of the technology g flowing from the state w1 to the state w2 
at the hour h.  
echgs,y,h,j  Discharge of the storage j at the hour h, nonnegative, unit: MW. 
ediss,y,h,j  Discharge of the storage j at the hour h, nonnegative, unit: MW. 
elevs,y,h,j  Energy level of the storage j at the beginning of hour h, nonnegative, unit: 
MWh. 
eorss,y,h,j  Operating (spinning-) reserve provided by the storage j at the hour h, 
nonnegative, unit: MW. 
gopts,y,h,k  Power output of the generator k at the hour h, nonnegative, unit: MW. 
gopstats,y,h,k Operating status of the generator k is on at hour h, binary, unitless. 
gorss,y,h,k  Operating (spinning-) reserve of the generator k at the hour h , nonnegative, 
unit: MW. 
gpmins,y,h,k  Effective minimum run capacity of the generator k at hour h, nonnegative, 
unit: MW. 
gsdns,y,h,k  Shut-down action of the generator k at the beginning of the hour h , binary, 




gsups,y,h,k  Start-up action of the generator k at the beginning of the hour h, binary, 
unitless.   
pas,y,h,i  Phase angle of the bus i at the hour h, unrestricted, unit: rad. 
pfs,y,h,l Power flow on the transmission line l at the hour h, unrestricted, unit: MW. 
nloads,y,h,i  Load shedding at bus i at the hour h, nonnegative, unit: MWh. 
norpss,y,h,w Non-compliance with other RPS policy, unit: MW, nonnegative. 
nrpss,y,h,w  Non-compliance with RPS policy, unit: MW, nonnegative. 
nsrpss,y,h,w Non-compliance with Solar RPS policy, unit: MW, nonnegative. 
nwrpss,y,h,w Non-compliance with Wind RPS policy, unit: MW, nonnegative. 
2.3.5.3 Objective Function Variables 
obj Objective function, unit: $. 
invcs,y Investment cost occurs at the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
oprcs,y Operation cost occurs at the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
fomcs,y Fixed O&M cost occurs at the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
fuels,y Fuel cost occurs at the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
vomcs,y Variable cost occurs at the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
stucs,y Start-up cost occurs at the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
ctaxs,y Carbon tax payment occurs at the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
volls,y Lost load cost occurs at the scenario tree node (s,y), unit: $. 
rpscs,y Cost of renewable portfolio standards non-compliance penalty, occurs at the 




2.4  Formulation 
In this section, I demonstrate the formulation of JHSMINE.  In Section 2.4.1, I 
show the objective function of JHSMINE, which is to minimize the probability-weighted 
system cost.  Also, how JHSMINE discounts the investment cost and the operation cost are 
thereby discussed.  In the following Section 2.4.2, I show the expansion constraints of 
JHSMINE, which keep track of the availabilities of generation, transmission, and storage 
facilities in the system, and they also keep track of the newly commissioned or retired 
facilities so that expansion cost can be calculated.  
Then, in Sections 2.4.3 to 2.4.7, I show the operation constraints if JHSMINE, 
which model the generation unit commitment and dispatch, the transmission and storage 
operation, the fulfillment of renewable portfolio policy, and finally, the fulfillment of reli-
ability obligations such as operating reserves, planning reserves, and flowgate limits. Table 
2.3 shows an overview of operation constraints. 
 
Table 2.3. JHSMINE operation constraints and associated market participants 
Resolu-
tion 
Constraints (Section #) Market Participants/Market 
Clearing 
Hourly Kirchhoff’s Voltage Laws, Thermal limits, (Sec-
tion 2.4.4), Flowgate limits (Section 2.4.7) 
ISO 
Hourly Capacity limits, spinning reserve capacity limits, 
unit commitment (Section 2.4.3) 
Generation Companies 
Hourly Storage charge/discharge capacity limits, state of 
charge management (Section 2.4.5) 
Storage Companies 
Hourly Kirchhoff’s Current Laws (Section 2.4.4) Market Clearing: Electricity 
Hourly Renewable energy credit gathering and distribu-
tion (Section 2.4.6) 
Market Clearing: REC  
Hourly Spinning Reserve Constraints (Section 2.4.7) Market Clearing: Spinning 
Reserve 
Yearly RPS (Section 2.4.6) Load Serving Entities 






2.4.1 Objective Functions 
The objective function of JHSMINE is to minimize Eq. (2.1): the probability-
weighted system cost discounted back to the Net Present Value. Two terms constitute the 
system costs: investment cost invc, and operation cost oprc, and both realize at the scenario 
tree node (s,y). 
 
( )
( ), , ,
,
Minimize s y y s y y s y
s y
obj SP D invc DA oprc=   +    (2.1) 
Notably, the investment cost occurs at the time when the expansion is online, rather 
than the time when the decision is made and JHSMINE discount the investment cost back 
to the beginning of the planning horizon using the following parameter: 




= +   
Here is an example.  Suppose the origin year of the planning horizon is 2018, the 
interest rate is 5%, and a transmission line cost of $1 (overnight cost) is online in the year 
2034.  The present value of the cost of this transmission line is $1/(1+5%)2034-2018 = $0.458. 
The oprc of Eq. (2.1) is the operation cost of the operation node (s,y); y is the first 
year of each operation simulation interval; JHSMINE assumes that the operation condition 
(e.g., load, policies, fuel price, etc.) of operation node will repeat until the next operation 
simulation interval.  All cash flows for operations are assumed to be end-of-year flows, 
and the discounting formulas are defined accordingly as:4  
 ( ) ( )
1
1/ 1 = 1, ,
yY
t
y y y y
t
DA D D P Y 
=
 




4 Here, Yy is the length of the operation simulation interval and P(1, Yy, δ) is the annuity-to-present-value 
formula. The DAy formula first discounts all end-of-year operation costs to the beginning of the operation 




Let us look at an example.  Suppose one operation simulation interval is from 2034 
to 2065 (32 years).  A $1 operation cost will happen at the end of each year of this operation 
simulation interval, and the present value (at 2034) these cash flows is P($1,32,5%) = 
$15.80; thus the present value discounted at the beginning of planning horizon is $15.80 × 
0.458 = $7.24. 
In summary, Eq. (2.1) is the expected system cost discounted to the origin of the 
planning horizon.  In the following two subsections, I demonstrate the detailed calculation 
of the expansion cost and the operation cost. 
2.4.1.1 Investment Cost 
JHSMINE calculates the investment cost of new facilities using equation Eq. (2.2), 
which is, in fact, the net of (1) the expansion cost due to facilities that are newly commis-
sioned and (2) the salvage revenue for facilities that are newly retired.  Specifically, the 
salvage cost not only depends on when the retirement happens but also when the facility 
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invc GEXC gincexp GSAL gincret
LEXC lincexp LSAL
EECL eincexp ESAL eincret
lincret
=  − 
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2.4.1.2 Operation Cost 
JHSMINE calculates the operation cost using equation Eq. (2.3), which is com-
posed of seven terms: (1) the fixed operation and maintenance (O&M) cost of generation 
and storage facilities; i.e., Eq. (2.4), (2) the variable O&M cost of generation and storage 




(2.6), (4) the start-up cost from generation unit commitment; i.e., Eq. (2.7), (5) the carbon 
tax/allowance payment due to generation and storage operations; i.e., Eq. (2.8), (6) value 
of lost load; i.e., Eq. (2.9), and finally, (7) noncompliance penalty of renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS); i.e., Eq. (2.10).  
 
, , , , , , , ,s y s y s y s y s y s y s y s yoprc fomc vomc fuelc stup ctax rpsc voll= + + + + + +  (2.3) 
 , , , , ,s y k k s y k j j s y j
k j
fomc GFOM GNPL gstat EFOM EGCP estat=   +     (2.4) 
 
, , , , , , , ,s y y h k s y h k j s y h j
h k j
vomc HW GVOM gopt EVOM edis
 
=   +  
 
    (2.5) 
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voll HW VOLL nload
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=   
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   (2.9) 
 , , , , ,s y y h w s y w h
h w
rpsc HW RACP nrps
 
=   
 
   (2.10) 
2.4.2 Expansion Constraints 
Constraints (2.11) to (2.25) are investment constraints, which connect the expan-
sion/retirement decisions and the availability of the facilities.  Table 2.4 lists different in-
vestment modes of the facilities in JHSMINE; facilities with different investment modes 




Table 2.4. Invest mode of facilities in JHSMINE 
Invest Mode Description 
Candidate Facili-
ties 
Expandable candidate facilities, expansion variables and retirement varia-
ble and status variables are defined 
Existing Facili-
ties – Economic 
Retirement 
Existing facilities that can be actively retired by model if they are not eco-
nomical to be kept commissioned in the system, only retirement variables 
and status variables are defined  
Existing Facili-
ties – Forced Re-
tirement 
Existing facilities that are forced to be retired or kept commissioned (spec-
ify by the planner), only status variables are defined and fixed using com-
mission status parameters 
 
The logics of expansion constraints for generation, storage, and transmission are 
identical in structure, and thus, only the generation constraints are explained here.  A major 
characteristic of this modeling approach is that every expansion or retirement decision is 
modeled through binary variables and can be relaxed if needed; a similar approach was 
first proposed in Pereira et al. (2005). 
Constraint (2.11) states: the status of each generation facility in each operation node 
equals its availability in the previous operation node (or in short, its previous status) plus 
any incremental expansion and minus any incremental retirement.  Specifically, for the first 
operation node (s1,y1), the previous status is set by the parameter GCOMs0,y0,k; in other 
words, the node previous to the first operation node is the origin of the scenario tree. 
The constraint (2.12) is defined for generators that are subject to economic retire-
ment mode, stating that the generator must be retired before the commission schedule pro-
vided by the user.  Constraints (2.13) and (2.14) calculate the incremental expansion and 
retirement: the incremental expansion in a scenario tree node (s,y) equals to the expansion 
decisions that pass the lead time, but are not yet realized; also this decision must be made 
in an ancestor node to the current node; i.e., SDOIs,y,s’’,y’’ = 1.  And finally, Constraint (2.15) 




(the sum of all realized retirement decisions since the beginning of planning horizon) can-
not be higher than the incremental expansion, in other words, JHSMINE cannot retire a 
plant that is not built.  Note that all investment decision variables can be relaxed as long as 
the operation constraints allow (see Sections 2.4.3 to 2.4.7.) 
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2.4.3 Generation Operation 
2.4.3.1  Generation Dispatch 
 ( ) ( ), , , 1 1h k h k h k k k k kgopt gors GHAV GPOR GFOR GNPL gstat+   −  −  
 (2.26) 
 ( ) ( )1 1h k k k k kgors GSP GPOR GFOR GNPL gstat  −  −    (2.27) 
The constraint (2.26) is the capacity limit of generators and (2.27) is the spinning reserve 
capacity limit.  The capacity limit of the spinning reserve is usually defined as the 10-min 
ramp rate since the spinning reserve requires a 10-min response time. 
2.4.3.2  Generation Unit commitment 
The unit commitment constraints in JHSMINE are expanded based on the “Tight 
Relaxed Unit Commitment” (TRUC) Constraints in Kasina (2017); for classic unit com-
mitment without generation expansion, I refer readers to some seminal articles as Baldick 




status, start-up, and shut-down variables, can be relaxed; in the meanwhile, each unit com-
mitment constraint is still physically meaningful.  In this subsection, for each constraint, I 
first discuss the meaning of this constraint if unit commitment variables are binary, and 
then explain the physical meaning of it if unit commitment variables are relaxed. I made 
two assumptions in this subsection: 1) I assume start-up and shut-down movements happen 
at the beginning of the hour specified by the subscript (referred as the current hour in this 
section), and 2) unit commitment is modeled as an ouroboros (snake-biting-it-tail) style: if 
the cycle length one day, the hour after the 24th  hour of the day is the 1st hour of the same 
day. 
Constraints (2.28) to (2.33) are operating status constraints of generators that are 
subject to unit commitment. Constraint (2.28) states that the generator cannot be “on” if it 
is not built. Constraint (2.29) calculates the start-up and shut-down variables and (2.30) 
calculates the minimum running capacity. Constraint (2.31) states the output of the gener-
ator must be higher than the minimum running capacity. And finally, constraints (2.32) and 
(2.33) limit the total output and the spinning reserve at the current hour.  
The relaxation of Constraints (2.28) to (2.33) is intuitive: the meaning of the oper-
ating status variable expands to “how much fraction of the nameplate capacity is on”; sim-
ilarly, the relaxed start-up and shut-down variables mean “how much fraction of the name-
plate capacity is started-up and shut-down.” In a relaxed context, the nameplate capacity 
can be “on” up to the expanded amount (Constraint (2.28)).  The minimum run limit, which 
is a continuous variable now, is calculated in (2.30). 
 
, 0h k kgopstat gstat−   (2.28) 
 
, 1, , ,h k h k h k h kgopstat gopstat gsup gsdn−− = −  (2.29) 





, ,h k h kgpmin gopt   (2.31) 
 ( ) ( ), , ,1 1h k h k k k k h kgopt gors GFOR GPOR GNPL gopstat+  −  −     (2.32) 
 ( ) ( ), ,1 1h k k k k k h kgors GSP GFOR GPOR GNPL gopstat  −  −    (2.33) 
Constraints (2.34) and (2.35) are the ramp rate up and down limit constraints.  Spe-
cifically, the constraint (2.34) states: If the generator is just started-up at (the beginning of) 
the current hour, the ramp-up limit at this hour is zero because the operating status in the 
previous hour was “off.” Similarly, if a generator is going to be shut-down at the current 
hour, the constraint (2.35) will limit the output in the previous hour to be at the minimum 
run; in other words, the generator must be ready for such a shut-down move.  
The relaxation of these two constraints is also intuitive. Constraint (2.34) states the 
ramp-up limit of the current hour is set by the ramp capacity of the previous hour because 
the newly started up (if any) capacity is not yet ready to ramp-up.  Please note that there 
can be a difference between the minimum runs of these two consecutive hours because of 
the variable relaxation. Similarly, constraint (2.35) states the ramp-down limit is set by the 
ramp capacity of the current hour because the newly shut-down capacity (if any) was al-
ready at the  minimum run in the previous hour and cannot provide the ramping capability. 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, , , 1, 1,
1,1 1
h k h k h k h k h k
k k k k h k
gors gopt gpmin gopt gpmin
GRPR GPOR GFOR GNPL gopstat
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−
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  −  −  
 (2.34) 
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 −  −  −  
 (2.35) 
Constraints (2.36) and (2.37), respectively, limit the output during the start-up and 
shut-down hours. For example, the constraint (2.36) states that if the generator is “off” in 
the previous hour, the output above minimum run in the current hour is zero (0); in other 




Similarly, constraint (2.37) states if the generator is “off” in the current hour, the output of 
the previous hour must be at minimum run capacity. 
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− − −+ −
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 (2.37) 
In a binary context, it is noticeable that (1) constraints (2.34) and (2.36) are identi-
cal if there is a start-up at the current hour since the right-hand sides are both zero; (2) if 
there is a shut-down at the current hour, constraint (2.34) and (2.36) will not be active; (3) 
if there is no start-up (or shut-down) movement, constraint (2.36) will not bind.  A similar 
relationship between constraints (2.35) and (2.37) can be found: (1) if there is a shut-down 
at the current hour, constraints (2.35) and (2.37) are identical because the right-hand sides 
are both zero; (2) if there is a start-up, both constraints will not be active; (3) if there is no 
start-up or shut-down movement, constraint (2.37) will bind.  In summary, in a binary con-
text, constraints (2.36) and (2.37) are “redundant” in the optimal solution, but they serve 
as tight constraints (or cuts) in the branch-and-cut algorithm of solving mixed-integer pro-
gramming to reduce the distance between the convex hull and the linear searching space. 
However, constraints (2.36) and (2.37) bear physical meaning if unit commitment 
variables are relaxed. Constraint (2.36) states: in the current hour, the output above the 
minimum run is limited by the “variable output range” in the previous hour. The variable 
output range is defined as:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,1 1 1k k k k h kGPOR GFOR GMIN GNPL gopstat−  −  −     
In other words, the newly started-up capacity, if any, cannot contribute to the “var-




tells a similar story: in the previous hour, the output above the minimum run is limited by 
the “variable output range” in the current hour; in other words, the newly shut-down ca-
pacity will be operated at minimum run already in the previous hour. 
Constraints (2.38) and (2.39) are, respectively, the minimum uptime and minimum 
downtime limits. If any start-up or shut-down decision is made within the minimum 
down/uptime window, the generator must stay “on” or “off” in correspondence. The relax-
ation meaning of these two constraints are as follows: Any fractional start-up decision that 
is made within the minimum uptime window will move up the lower limit at which the 
generator can be operated; any fractional shut-down decision that is made within the min-

















 −    (2.39) 
2.4.4 Transmission Operation 
This subsection discusses the transmission operation constraints.  The constraint 
(2.40) is the power flow upper limit; naturally, if a transmission line is not commissioned, 
the power flow on this line is fixed to zero. 
 , ,h l l h lpf LTM lstatus    (2.40) 
Constraint (2.41) is the B-theta version of Direct Circuit Optimal Power Flow 
(DCOPF) constraint: if a transmission line is close in the network, its power flow must be 
equal to the product of (1) the phase angle difference between both ends of the transmission 




this DC OPF is a linearized version of Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law (Glover et al., 2011).  This 
constraint is also known as the disjunctive constraint of DC OPF proposed in Bahiense et 
al. (2001); for a detailed explanation of the disjunctive constraint, see Winston et al. (2003).  
 ( ), , , 1h l l l i h i l l
i
pf PBASE LB LBI pa LBM lstatus
 
+     − 
 
   (2.41) 
Constraint (2.41) deserves extra attention: if a transmission line is open, then this 
constraint becomes the limitation on the phase angle difference of both ends: 
 , ,
l








To avoid selecting overly large Big-M parameters, which will, in turn, results an 
ill-conditioned coefficient matrix of the problem, JHSMINE selects Big-M parameters us-
ing the following formula, which utilizes one of core assumptions of DC OPF5: the phase 
angle differences between two ends should not be overly large; in this case, limited at π/6.6 
 
6
l lLBM PBASE LB

=  . 
And. finally, the constraint (2.42) is the node electricity balance, also known as 
Kirchhoff’s Current Law. This constraint requires the total injection into the node equals 
the total load withdrawal. 
 ( ), , , , , , ,
i i
h k h j h j l i h l h i h i
k K j J l
gopt edis echg LBI pf nload LOAD
 
+ − + + =    
 (2.42) 
 
5 Assumptions of the DC OPF include negligible resistance, stable voltages at both ends measured at a per 
unit system, and the small phase angle difference between two ends of the transmission line.  
6 Nevertheless, using this formula also means to limit the phase angle between nodes even if no line is built, 
which is benign if there is an existing line in the corridor; i.e., JHSMINE is performing reinforcement expan-
sion. If there is no existing line in between (JHSMINE is planning for new lines), this formula might be 




2.4.5 Storage Operation 
This section demonstrates the storage operation constraints; similar approaches can 
be found in Wogrin and Gayme (2015). Constraints (2.43), (2.44), and (2.45) are the charg-
ing, discharging capacity limits, and the energy capacity limit of the storage.  
 
,h j j jechg EPCP estat    (2.43) 
 
, ,h j h j j jedis eors EGCP estat+     (2.44) 
 
,h j j jelev EECP estat    (2.45) 
Constraint (2.47) combines constraints (2.43) and (2.44) into one, and it limits the 
possibility of charge and discharge happens simultaneously.  For example, if the charge is 
zero, this constraint becomes (2.46); if the discharge and spinning reserve is zero, this con-
straint becomes (2.44); and finally, if in any case, discharge and charge are both non-zero, 
they will limit each other. 
 ( ), , ,j h j j h j h j j j jEGCP echg EPCP edis eors EGCP EPCP estat +  +      (2.47) 
The constraint (2.48) is the energy transition constraint and constraint (2.49) re-
quires that the energy in the storage is able to serve one hour of discharge and a half-hour 
of spinning reserve activation.   
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2.4.6 Interstate Energy Credit Trading and Renewable Portfolio Standards 
This subsection demonstrates the modeling of interstate energy credit trading, and 




renewable energy trading modeling can be found in Ho et al. (2016) and Xu and Hobbs 
(2017).  In the current version of JHSMINE, the energy credit trading is on the state-level, 
hourly-level, and per technology.  For example, there can be 1 MW Biomass energy credit 
flow from Oregon to California at the hour h. 
Constraint (2.50) aggregates the energy credit of technology g generated at hour h 
to the state-level (w) and then distributes the aggregated energy credits to different states 
(w’).  For instance, if w = w’, the value of cpfsolar,1,w,w’ is the amount of solar energy credit 
sold from generators in state w to local LSEs.  
 , , , , '
'g w
h k g h w w
k K K w
gopt cpf
 
=    (2.50) 
Many states of the U.S. have adopted the Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) 
policy on the demand side, requiring the LSE to serve its load with a minimum share of 
renewable energy.  Since LSEs are not the owners of renewable generation, they buy en-
ergy credit from the generators through variable cpf.   
The constraint (2.51) is the general RPS requirement: it requires that the amount of 
purchased renewable credits has to be higher than the RPS requirement of each state.  Im-
portantly, the renewable energy credits that are used to comply with the RPS requirement 
must be identified as renewable by the government.  For example, the hydropower from 
large dams is not considered as renewable in California, and the hydropower imported in 
California cannot be used for California RPS compliance; in the JHSMINE, this is by spec-
ifying RECA,Hydro = 0.  Furthermore, not any imported renewable credit is eligible to fulfill 
the RPS requirement: for instance, in JHSMINE, the default assumption is that energy 
credits imported from a state without RPS are not eligible to fulfill the RPS of other states; 
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  (2.51) 
The constraint (2.52) is the instate RPS requirement. Some states require that the 
part of the RPS requirement needs to be satisfied using the in-state generation, where the 
energy credit from outside does not count. 
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  (2.52) 
Constraints (2.53) to (2.55) are the RPS carve-outs modeled in JHSMINE.  RPS 
carve-out is the special RPS requirement set aside for particular technologies, such as wind, 
solar, and other renewables. 
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  (2.55) 
Constraints (2.56) and (2.57) set the upper limits of the alternative non-compliance 




 ( ), , ,
w




 −   (2.56) 
 
, , , ,w h w h w h w hnsrps nwrps norps nrps+ +    (2.57) 
2.4.7 Reliability Modeling 
In this section, I demonstrate the reliability requirements modeled in JHSMINE: 
the spinning reserve, the resource adequacy requirement (also known as the planning re-
serve), and the transmission flowgate limits.  In JHSMINE, the spinning reserve and re-
source adequacy are modeled at the reserve sharing group level, which is constituted by 
different balancing authority areas.7 
Constraint (2.58) modeled the hourly spinning reserve requirement.  In JHSMINE, 
I assume that the storage can provide additional spinning reserves by stopping charging.  
Constraint (2.59) models the resource adequacy requirement.  
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  (2.59) 
Constraints (2.60) and (2.61) are the flowgate limit (also known as the path limit) 
in the forward and backward directions.  Note that a transmission line expansion can make 
the flowgate limits larger. 
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7 For instance, there are more than 30 balancing authority areas in WECC and they modeled them as 4 reserve 
sharing groups, where 3 of them are NREC registered groups: Northwest Power Pool (NWPP), Rock Moun-




 , , ,p l h l p p l l
l l
PLI pf PBD PBDE lstat
 
 − + 
 
    (2.61) 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I provided the rationale, development history, general overview, 
and, most importantly, the detailed formulation of JHSMINE.  In short, the demonstration 
here serves as a mathematical foundation of the following chapters, where I generated the 
respective results using JHSMINE with different settings or minor modifications. Thus, in 







Chapter 3 Value of Model Enhancements: Quantifying 
the Benefit of Improved Transmission 
Planning Models8  
3.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter, as aforementioned in Chapter 1, focuses on answering the following 
questions: What, exactly, is a better planning model? How can we value, in economic terms, 
the extent to which one planning model performs better than another?  As an attempt to 
answer these questions, in this chapter, I propose a framework to quantify the value of 
model enhancements (VOME) in transmission planning models; as an illustration, I applied 
it to a case study of the large-scale, long-term planning of the Western Electricity Coordi-
nating Council (WECC) system.   
The VOME, which is closely related to the concept of the value of information from 
decision analysis, quantifies the probability-weighted improvement in the system perfor-
mance resulting from changes in decisions that result from model enhancements.  The 
WECC case study, in this chapter, shows the practicality to quantify VOME and illustrates 
the type of insights that can be obtained.  I compare the values of four types of model 
enhancements.  The results show major benefits from considering long-run uncertainty us-
ing multiple scenarios of technology, policy, and economics; these benefits are as much as 
14% of total benefits of new transmission built in the first ten years.  But less benefit (< 
2%) is obtained from more temporal granularity within the year (24 to 48 time-slices), more 
complex transmission network representations (from transshipment to DC OPF power flow 
modeling), and inclusion of generator unit commitment constraints and costs.  Power 
 




system planners can apply this framework to quantify the value of model enhancements in 
any planning context, such as integrated resource planning. 
3.2 Special Notations 
C(x) Expected present worth of system cost of making decision x, based on the 
model with all enhancements.  
Ei(ω) Binary parameter: if Ei(ω*) = 1, then enhancement i is included in the 
model with setting ω*; if zero, then the enhancement is excluded.  For in-
stance, if there are three candidate enhancements, then E1(ω*) = 1, E2(ω*) 
= 0, E3(ω*) = 1 indicates a model with only Enhancements 1 and 3 imple-
mented. 
I Set of enhancements, index by i and j. 
xω Optimal first stage transmission investments (“decision”) from a model 
with enhancements setting specified by ω; E.g., xω*, where E1(ω*) = 1, 
E2(ω*) = 0, E3(ω*) = 1 indicates investments from a model with only En-
hancements 1 and 3 implemented. 
x0 Decision of no transmission investments in the first stage. 
x1 Optimal decision from the model with all enhancements; i.e., Ei(ω*) = 1 for 
all i. 
ω Model enhancement setting, describing what enhancements are included in 
the model formulation. 





Grid reinforcements are a large part of the cost of integrating renewable energy 
(Kahn, 2010).  This cost is often justified by the contributions those reinforcements make 
to a cost-efficient, reliable, and sustainable power system by delivering renewables and 
reducing congestion. But they should be planned carefully to maximize those benefits and 
avoid unnecessary expenses. 
Planning processes for transmission are necessarily complex.  Permitting and con-
struction take on the order of a decade.  This fact, together with the long life of transmission 
assets and large policy, technology, and economic uncertainties, means that benefit calcu-
lations must analyze how grid investments will perform under many different scenarios 
(Gorenstin et al., 1993).  Also, planning should consider the entire system and all alterna-
tives for an entire region at once, because a network reinforcement in one location can 
strongly affect the benefits of new lines elsewhere.  Further, although many power markets 
have unbundled transmission from generation, grid planners need to consider how genera-
tion mix and siting are affected by where and when lines are added. This is called “proac-
tive” transmission planning (Sauma and Oren, 2006).  
In summary, transmission expansion planning (TEP) models are complex because 
they need to consider entire regions, multiple decades of costs (Sawey and Zinn, 1977), 
generation-transmission investment interactions (Sauma and Oren, 2006), and uncertainty 
in fundamental drivers (Gorenstin et al., 1993; Hobbs et al., 2016), as well as numerous 
technical and economic details. 
However, models for transmission planning cannot be arbitrarily complex because 




hardware improve, planners can add features to planning models to make them more real-
istic, but not all desired features can be accommodated.  Thus, planners always face trade-
offs when they consider which model enhancements to implement.  For instance, if a model 
has 8760 operating periods/yr, a 40-yr horizon, 10 long-run scenarios, 1000 candidate gen-
erators, and 500 candidate transmission lines, model size can easily grow to several billions 
of variables and constraints.  Thus, a planner must choose which features of the real system 
to represent, which to omit, and what approximations to use.  Choosing which features to 
include in a model is difficult and should ideally consider how much transmission plans 
would improve as a result of alternative model enhancements. 
On the other hand, the need for TEP model enhancements has motivated the devel-
opment of an extensive rich literature on the topic (see the review in Section 3.4.)  But 
which model enhancements would most improve transmission plans? This paper is con-
cerned with the question: Can we quantify an economic index to meaningfully compare the 
value that alternative model enhancements might provide to transmission planning? To the 
best knowledge of my knowledge, a systematic and quantifiable framework to provide such 
information has not been proposed. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general, systematic framework for quan-
tifying the economic value of model enhancements (VOME).  The goal is not to propose 
new technical or economic enhancements per se to TEP models; rather, the framework is 
intended to provide a meaningful economic index to enable planners to systematically com-
pare and select possible enhancements, considering how they would improve the cost of 




the economic value of alternative enhancements of models for energy investment planning 
together with a practical procedure for quantifying that value. 
As an illustration, I apply this framework to the Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council (WECC) using a realistic 300-bus network (Ho et al., 2016) based on WECC’s 
2024 Common Case database (WECC, 2014a). For the first time, the benefits of consider-
ing improved representations of long-term uncertainty and short-term variability are sys-
tematically quantified and compared.  Two other enhancements are also valued in eco-
nomic terms: alternative network representations and inclusion of unit commitment con-
straints and costs.  The case study illustrates, in concrete terms, the types of useful insights 
and recommendations that can be obtained from applying the framework. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Initially, in Section 3.4, I briefly review some 
enhancements that have been proposed for transmission planning models and related mod-
els.  Then in Section 3.5, a systematic framework for calculating the value of model en-
hancements (VOME) is presented.  In Section 3.6, I describe the base planning model, the 
WECC case study environment, and the tested enhancements.  In Section 3.7, I summarize 
illustrative insights regarding which enhancements have the most value in order to demon-
strate the usefulness of VOME, and Section 3.8 concludes this chapter. 
3.4 Background 
Researchers and software vendors have recommended various enhancements to 
power system planning optimization models (Table 1) with the goal of providing useful 
information and better performing plans.  In this section, I summarize some of the enhance-
ments that have been proposed in recent years (detailed reviews can be found in Krishnan 




categories ranging from uncertainty treatment to the consideration of generation and trans-
mission coordination.  While the surveyed literature offers theoretical and case study-based 
arguments for the value of individual enhancements, careful comparisons across categories 
are rare.  For example, no one has quantified whether transmission plans would be more 
improved by consideration of a wider range of long-term uncertainties (load-growth, etc.) 
or by including finer short-term variability resolution (wind and solar availability).  This 
review highlights the need for a practical framework to make this type of comparison. 
3.4.1 Long-term uncertainties  
This enhancement recognizes long-run uncertainties in the fundamental drivers of 
the economic value of transmission additions, such as generation capacity mix, load growth, 
technology improvements, or policy, rather than considering just one “deterministic” or 
“base case” scenario (Munoz et al., 2014).  Since restructuring has separated the responsi-
bilities for expansion and transmission planning in many markets, some researchers have 
demonstrated that the generation mix can be usefully treated as uncertainties faced by trans-
mission planners, such as in de la Torre et al. (2008).  However, others have argued that 
generation siting and the mix should not be defined as scenarios, but rather as variables in 
a co-optimization that respond to the transmission grid configuration (Sauma and Oren, 
2006).  A rich pool of tools has been developed to enable consideration of uncertainty 
within TEP.  Many of these tools are applicable both to long-run uncertainties and short-
run variability, discussed next.  Two of the most widely cited methods are scenario-based 
stochastic programming (Baringo and Conejo, 2012; de la Torre et al., 2008; Ding et al., 
2018; Gu et al., 2012; Majidi-Qadikolai and Baldick, 2016; Munoz et al., 2014; Sun et al., 




and Wang, 2016; Jabr, 2013; Moreira et al., 2017; Ruiz and Conejo, 2015).  Other tools for 
modeling long-run uncertainties in planning include chance-constrained programming 
(Sharaf and Berg, 1984), conditional value at risk (CVaR) constraints (Munoz et al., 2017), 
adaptive programming (Mejia-Giraldo and McCalley, 2014), and most recently, robust 
(data-driven) stochastic programming (Bagheri et al., 2017).  Simpler heuristic methods 
also attempt to identify plans that are “robust” to an uncertain future.  Examples are MISO’s 
“Multi-Value Projects” (MISO, 2010) and the CAISO’s “least regret investments” (CAISO, 
2004), which identify network investments that are attractive under most scenarios. 
 
Table 3.1. Some Proposed Enhancements to Transmission Models 
Category Examples 
1. Long-term uncertainty considera-
tion 
Deterministic; multiple scenarios concerning genera-
tion capacity; load growth, policy, fuel prices, etc.  
2. Short-term uncertainty/variability 
consideration (operating hours) 
More hours/yr; load duration curve vs. chronological 
hours 
3. Long-term temporal granularity 
(investment stages) 
Static; dynamic: more than one investment stage over 
the planning horizon 
4. Generation representation Generation dispatch, with/without unit commitment 
5. Spatial granularity Number of nodes in the network; bus aggregation level 
6. Network representation 
Pipes-and-bubbles; hybrid DC; DC OPF; linearized 




8. Security and others N-K security, extreme events  
 
3.4.2 Short-term uncertainty/variability (operating hours) 
I define short-term uncertainties as uncertain variables with a time scale of minutes 
to months.  For example, with the increasing penetration of the hard-to-predict intermittent 
power, e.g., wind and solar, researchers have treated their availability as uncertainties, as 




uncertainty/variability means more operating hours (or time slices) in the power flow sim-
ulation; equivalently, it means more short-term scenarios.  
It has been argued that having more operating hours per year in a transmission 
model is more important than representing Kirchhoff’s voltage law (Ventyx Corporation, 
2005).  However, others who have studied the impact of more temporal granularity on 
generation expansion (Mai et al., 2015) have concluded that adding dispatch periods slows 
down computations while having a little apparent effect on generation expansion decisions.   
3.4.3 Long-term temporal granularity 
Though many TEP models are based on a single investment decision stage (“one-
shot” or “static” planning) (Fang and Hill, 2003), dynamic TEP models (Sawey and Zinn, 
1977) have gained increasing popularity due to improved computational abilities and the 
need for plans to include timing of investments.  For readers who are interested in dynamic 
TEP models, a graphical illustration is provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
3.4.4 Generation representation 
Planning models can also be enhanced by more realistic models of generator costs 
and constraints.  Notably, unit commitment modeling can be added to expansion models, 
replacing traditional load-duration curve/merit-order methods.  In the context of generation 
expansion planning, representations of commitment, and ramp constraints, which limit 
generation flexibility, can improve estimates of the cost of integrating variable renewables 
(Palmintier and Webster, 2011).  TEP models typically drop unit commitment constraints, 
and generators are only limited by their capacity or resource availability, e.g., wind, solar, 
and hydro.  As one exception, Ho et al. (2016) implemented linearized unit commitment 




limiting the flexibility of generators has more impact on transmission economics in systems 
with slow baseload units. 
3.4.5 Spatial granularity 
Finer geographical representation or more network nodes is another potential en-
hancement.  Krishnan and Cole (2016) showed that more spatial aggregation could penal-
ize photovoltaics since it mixes solar resources of good and bad quality; such fidelity loss 
may introduce the loss of the benefit from diversifying the solar or wind resource within 
an area.  Most recently, Lumbreras et al. (2017) used a zonal model to guide nodal trans-
mission expansion; however, the loss of fidelity was not discussed. 
3.4.6 Network representation 
The “pipes-and-bubbles” (transshipment) networks used in many planning models 
have been proposed to be replaced by more realistic but practical to solve approximations 
of power flow, such as the DC OPF (Bahiense et al., 2001); for a mathematical represen-
tation, see Section 2.4.4.  However, as Mai et al. (2015) show, in a large-scale system, DC 
OPF modeling can dramatically slow solution times and may have little impact on invest-
ment recommendations, compared to transshipment networks that lack Kirchhoff’s voltage 
law.  An intermediate level of complexity is the hybrid power flow (Romero et al., 2002); 
there, existing AC line flows are modeled using angle difference/flow relationships (as in 
the linearized DC load flow), but all new lines are modeled as if they are DC circuits whose 
flows are controllable (as in pipes-and-bubbles models) and whose capacity can be added 
in continuous amounts.  Other improvements could include linearized AC power flow 
(Zhang et al., 2013), high-voltage DC power flow (Torbaghan et al., 2015), and consider-




capabilities, TEP optimization models with full AC power flow can only be solved by 
meta-heuristic (Zhao et al., 2011) or constructive heuristic methods (Rider et al., 2007).  
3.4.7 Transmission-generation-storage investment coordination 
Transmission optimization models traditionally treat generation investment loca-
tions and types as exogenous “build-out” scenarios (Chen et al., 2014; Chen and Wang, 
2016; Fang and Hill, 2003; Garces et al., 2009; Jabr, 2013; Ruiz and Conejo, 2015; Sharaf 
and Berg, 1984). This is termed “reactive” planning.  However, proactive transmission 
planning (Sauma and Oren, 2006), which considers how generation investment decision 
might be affected by grid reinforcements, can lead to less costly plans because they con-
sider how grid reinforcements can lead to savings in both capital and operating costs of 
generation (Spyrou et al., 2017).  
In the simplest proactive models, generation markets are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive, which allows proactive transmission planning to be modeled using a single 
“co-optimization” model (Munoz et al., 2014; Sauma and Oren, 2006; Spyrou et al., 2017).  
If instead, generators behave strategically, multi-level transmission planning models9 can 
be used (Baringo and Conejo, 2012; Jenabi et al., 2013; Maurovich-Horvat et al., 2015; 
Pozo et al., 2013; Sauma and Oren, 2006), but are much more computationally intensive.  
Recently, researchers started to add storage investment as an option into TEP in 
order to capture the interactions (substitution and complementary relationships) between 
 
9 A multi-level problem usually adopts the rationale that the upper-level player(s) optimize its own objective 
with the knowledge of lower-level problems: optimality conditions, or more generally, the reaction strategies 
of lower-level players given the value of the upper-level decision.  For instance, in a three-level TEP problem 
proposed by Pozo et al. (2013), the third (lowest) level player is the ISO who maintains market clearing given 
the transmission topology and generation capacities; the second (middle) level is composed of the generation 
companies that are maximizing profits by expanding capacities; the first (top) level player is the transmission 




transmission and storage investment (Qiu et al., 2017; Xu and Hobbs, 2020). Researchers 
have also expanded the scope of TEP beyond the electricity sector to include the represen-
tations of upstream gas network constraints (Ding et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2016); for instance, 
Barati et al. (2015) showed the inclusion of upstream gas network and its expansion deci-
sions could introduce more transmission expansion. 
3.4.8 Security and Other Enhancements 
These include proposals to incorporate N-1 security constraints (Majidi-Qadikolai 
and Baldick, 2016), N-K security constraints10 (Moreira et al., 2015), and extreme events 
such as blackouts (Shortle et al., 2014) and earthquakes (Romero et al., 2013). 
3.5 Value of Model Enhancements (VOME)  
For the enhancements mentioned in Section 3.4, their impacts on solutions to TEP 
optimization models have often been assessed through sensitivity analyses (Ho et al., 2016; 
Krishnan and Cole, 2016; Mai et al., 2015; Shawhan et al., 2014).  These analyses usually 
focus on changes in decisions (such as locations or amounts of investments) rather than on 
the improvement in the economic performance of recommended plans, i.e., the improve-
ment in expected costs if solutions from the more sophisticated model were to be 
implemented.  In one exception, the cost savings resulting from proactive transmission 
planning were investigated in (Spyrou et al., 2017), but they were not compared to the 
value of other kinds of enhancements.  
 
10 These problems model N-K (including N-1 or N-1-1) as constraints to maintain the operation feasibility 
under N-K contingencies, which refer to the contingencies where the system suddenly loses K facilities (gen-




To the best of my knowledge, a systematic framework for researchers and planners 
to compare the economic value of alternative modeling enhancements has not been 
proposed previously. The contribution of this work is to present such a framework to pri-
oritize model improvement efforts and to illustrate its potential usefulness through a real-
istic case study. 
In this section, I first define the value of model enhancements. I then propose a 
framework for implementing this idea in transmission optimization modeling.  Finally, a 
metric is proposed that compares VOME to the overall benefits of transmission expansion, 
which is useful for gauging the practical significance of VOME. 
3.5.1 Definition of VOME 
VOME is a close analogy to the idea of the “expected value of perfect information” 
(EVPI) from decision analysis. EVPI is the most that a planner is willing to pay for perfect 
information, equal to the probability-weighted (expected) improvement in the performance 
of the optimal solution if perfect information is provided about future conditions.  
Here is a simple example of EVPI. Suppose a decision-maker (DM) needs to select 
one from two choices, A and B, to prepare for an uncertain future of two equally possible 
scenarios S1 and S2. A cost of 1 will occur if the DM chooses A while S1 happens, and we 
note this as CS1,A = 1.  Then, suppose we have CS2,A = 1, CS1,B = 0.5, CS2,B = 2. Naturally, 
choice A will invoke an expected cost of 1, and choice B an expected cost of 1.25; if DM 
is risk-neutral, he will choose A as it costs less.  However, if a fortune teller can tell DM 
what will surely happen before DM making a choice, DM will choose A while he knows 




amount of money that this DM is willing to pay for this fortune teller, i.e., perfect infor-
mation, is thus 1.25 – 0.75 = 0.5. 
Similarly, VOME can be stated as: what are we willing to pay for elaborating a 
planning model in a specified way? This is the expected improvement in the performance 
of the resulting decision.  Another way to look at VOME is the deterioration in the solution 
if the model is simplified, i.e., how much solution performance is sacrificed, in expectation, 
if a particular simplification is made, i.e., an enhancement is omitted. 
The idea as follows. Imagine a DM builds a model, and the model indicates that 
some plan xA is optimal. Then, the DM enhances the model by improving the realism of 
the constraints or objective and then gets a different plan xB back instead. Finally, imagine 
for now that the DM can test the performance of alternative plans before implementing 
them by using a sophisticated and highly realistic simulation model. This simulation shows 
xA would have a “true” expected cost of C(xA), while decision xB’s “true” cost is C(xB) (I 
put the “true” into quotes because the actual expected cost cannot be known, but this is the 
best estimate that can be obtained.  These “true” costs are, of course, subject to uncertainty 
because of the inability to consider all possible scenarios and because the probabilities used 
are themselves uncertain.  Further, any estimate of such costs is itself subject to error be-
cause of model and data limitations even in the most sophisticated model.) The VOME of 
this enhancement (more constraints) is then calculated as C(xA) - C(xB), which is the de-
crease in “true” cost resulting from using the enhanced model to make decisions.  





1) Sometimes an enhancement involves combining information from several sources. 
For example, we can have a model A1 based on one set of n operating hours/yr, 
and a model A2 based on a different set of n hours/yr. Combining the information, 
we have model B with 2n hours. Then the cost improvement can be calculated in 
two ways: (C(xA1) - C(xB)) and (C(xA2) - C(xB)). Which should we use? 
2) There are usually multiple enhancements available. For instance, if there are 2 kinds 
of enhancements, from A to B (e.g., fewer to more operating hours) and from C to 
D (e.g., from a simple to a more sophisticated network), then there are 4 types of 
models (what we call “enhancement settings” ω): AC, BC, AD, BD. This also 
means that there are at least two ways of calculating the savings of using B rather 
than A: (C(xAC) - C(xBC)) and (C(xAD) - C(xBD)). Which should we use? 
3) The “true” cost C(x) may be hard to evaluate, involving a complex or difficult to 
compute model, as it should ideally be capable of simultaneously evaluating all 
enhancements under investigation. How should C(x) be estimated? 
To address these difficulties, I propose the approach below: 
1) When the enhancement involves combining information from more than one source, 
we  can calculate a weighted average of the improvements. For instance, consider 
the enhancement mentioned above, in which two sets of hours, each of size n, are 
combined into a 2n hour set. Since each set contributes half of the information, we 
set the weights to 0.5. In that case, the value of this enhancement is ((0.5C(xA1) + 
0.5C(xA2))-C(xB)). A similar idea is applied to assess the enhancement from deter-
ministic to stochastic planning. For example, consider two possible scenarios with 




both scenarios and their probabilities gives a plan xs.  Then, the value of this en-
hancement is ((p2C(x1) + p2C(x2))-C(xs)). This is the same as the definition of the 
expected cost of ignoring uncertainty (ECIU) (also known as the value of the sto-
chastic solution) in classical decision analysis (Birge and Louveaux, 2011). 
2) When calculating the VOME for one enhancement when others are also under con-
sideration, we calculate the incremental impact given every possible combination 
of the other enhancements. That is, we compare solutions from two models at a 
time, where only the enhancement of interest i is changed, and all other model fea-
tures are the same. This results in Ni pairs of decisions (thus Ni cost differences), 
where Ni equals the number of all possible permutations of other enhancements; 
e.g., if there are 3 other possible enhancements, each either being present or absent, 
then there are Ni = 2
3 = 8 possible combinations of those features. Then we average 
these Ni cost differences. 
3) We define the “true” system cost C(x) as the best obtainable estimate of the cost of 
making decision x. This can be done by fixing x in the most sophisticated model 
that can be solved and optimizing over other variables again. 
With these assumptions, VOME can be formulated as follows: 












   = −
    (3.1) 
In this formulation, x is the decision (here, the immediate or first-stage transmission 
investment) obtained by a model with formulation setting ω. The set Ωi is composed of all 
the pairs of model formulations (ω0, ω1) in which:  
1) Ei(ω0) = 0, Ei(ω1) = 1; i.e., the two model formulations being compared are with-




2) Ej(ω0) = Ej(ω1), for all j ≠ i; i.e., enhancements other than i are the same in the two 
models whose costs are compared.  
In other words, Ωi is the set of all possible pairs of models involving permutations 
of enhancements other than i. Ni is the number of model pairs within Ωi. The expectation 
operator accounts for both the possibility of multiple long-run scenarios (each with an as-
sumed probability) and the weighting of multiple sets of information, as described under 
the first difficulty above. 
Note that this section has focused on the theoretical calculation of the VOME, 
which in general requires that models with every possible combination of enhancements 
need to be solved. For instance, if one has three (3) candidate enhancements for his model 
and they are not mutually exclusive, he will need to solve the model and test the solution 
at least 8 times to fully calculate the VOME for each enhancement; 16 if he has four (4) 
enhancements.  In practice, this might not be practical. Thus, I provide suggestions for the 
practical utilization of VOME in transmission planning in the conclusion discussion of 
Section 3.8. 
3.5.2 VOME calculation in Transmission Planning 
Before I implement VOME for transmission planning models, I lay out three basic 
assumptions of the VOME calculation procedure. 
First, all my transmission planning models are in the form of transmission-genera-
tion co-optimization (Sauma and Oren, 2006). Thus, the optimal transmission plan antici-
pates how generator investment and spot markets will react to grid changes, under the as-




Second, I take the viewpoint of a transmission planner and am interested in the cost 
of making mistakes in the first stage (immediate or “here and now”) transmission invest-
ment decisions.  I define x, for the application in this chapter, as the first stage transmission 
investments, and when calculating C(x), I allow the most sophisticated model to choose 
the second stage transmission investments, as well as all generation decisions. This as-
sumption is based on the recognition that a transmission system only commits to first stage 
(immediate) decisions and has the flexibility to deviate from the solution’s second stage 
recommendations later when there is better information.  Thus, this VOME is the value of 
the model enhancement just for immediate transmission investments.  
Finally, in calculating C(x), I assume that generation investors make decisions with 
full information on how the grid design would affect prices, based on the information that 
would be provided by a model with all enhancements, even if transmission plans x are 
based on more naïve assumptions from a simpler model.  This can be viewed as the com-
petitive energy market’s reaction to grid reinforcements x, in which generators use the most 
sophisticated possible model to project prices, even if the transmission planner is naive. 
Alternative assumptions are possible when calculating VOME.  For instance, oli-
gopoly could be assumed instead of competitive energy markets.  Or first stage generation 
investments could also be included in x, in which case VOME would quantify the value of 
better models for combined transmission-generation planning.   
Combining all three assumptions, I calculate VOME following the procedure in the 
flowchart in Figure 3.1, where: 
1) x is the first-stage transmission investment from a model with an assumed set of 




modeling generates a plan x showing lines A and B are to be built in the first ten 
years; a TEP model with DC OPF generates a plan x’ showing C and D are to be 
built. 
2) C(x) is the “true” system cost obtained by simulating the optimal generation deci-
sions and second-stage transmission investments in response to x. Following the 
example above, in the model with DC OPF, I fix the first-stage decision as building 
A and B and re-run the model; I record the resulted objective function as C(x). This 
simulates the reaction of the markets toward the expansion decision of building A 
and B. Then, I plug in the plan x’, C and D, and re-run the model to get C(x’). 
3) VOME for an enhancement is then obtained by (3.1). In the simple example above, 






Figure 3.1. Procedure for calculating VOME in multistage transmission planning 
 
3.5.3 A Benefit Metric for Transmission Planning 
To place VOME in context, I compare it to the overall benefit of building new 
transmission. If VOME for one model feature is a significant fraction of the total benefit 
of adding transmission, then I conclude that such enhancement is potentially important to 
include in the model.  
The benefit of the additional transmission capacity is calculated as follows. Assume 
that it is feasible to build no lines at all in the first stage and let x0 stand for this null plan. 
The resulting null plan cost (NPC) will be C(x0). Then I can define any other plan x’s net 





For example, if building no lines in the near term will result in a system cost of 
$790B, and an alternative plan A will result in a cost of $770B, the benefit of this plan is 
$790B – $770B = $20B. 
By defining “true” cost C(x) as the cost from the most sophisticated model, i.e., 
with all enhancements, I can define the best possible plan cost (OPC) as C(x1), where x1 is 
the optimal first stage transmission solution from that model.  I can then define the upper 
bound of economic benefit (UPB) from new lines as UPB = NPC – OPC.  For example, if 
building the optimal plan from the most enhanced model will result in a present worth of 
$750B, the upper bound of the economic benefit from building transmission in the first 
stage is UPB = $790B – $750B = $40B.  Assuming that the most sophisticated optimization 
model correctly solves, no other first stage plan x can yield a lower value of C() than C(x1), 
since, by definition, x1 is the optimal solution of that model. 
Any plan x, other than the optimal plan x1, might achieve some but not all possible 
benefits. Thus, I can define the proportion of possible benefits that are realized by building 
x (“economic benefit recovery”) as BR(x) = NB(x) / UPB. For example, plan A would re-
alize $20B/$40B = 50% of the total possible benefit. Of course, a better plan (thus a better 
TEP model) should result in more net benefits.  
The BR(x) is intended to be a relative metric that is useful to compare different 
transmission plans.  One reason for normalizing it with respect to transmission benefits is 
because the change in the overall objective function resulting from transmission investment 
is usually a small part of total system cost, which is typically one to two orders of magni-




operating costs. Such a relative index is also useful for comparing VOME across different 
planning problems. 
However, the calculation of VOME, which can be undertaken by following the flow 
chart Figure 3.1, does not require the use of the benefit recovery metric defined here.  Ra-
ther, this metric is a simple means to help the reader interpret the significance of the bene-
fits of enhancement, i.e., VOME. 
3.6 Experimental Design 
3.6.1 Overview 
I now describe how I implemented VOME in a realistic transmission planning study.  
I provide results from this study in Section 3.7; these results illustrate the types of insights 
that can be obtained concerning the economic value of improved model features and iden-
tify long-run uncertainties as the most beneficial enhancements among those considered 
here.  First, I briefly describe the basic model for the VOME calculation, and then I give 
an overview of the enhancements I investigated. I then summarize the case study environ-
ment, which is a 300-bus network for WECC. Finally, I describe how the four enhance-
ments are added to the model. 
3.6.2 Summary of Basic Planning Model 
The basic planning model is the Johns Hopkins Stochastic Multi‐Stage Integrated 
Network Expansion (JHSMINE), whose mathematical formulation can be found in Chap-
ter 2.  In this chapter, a two-stage version of JHSMINE is used (Xu and Hobbs, 2017) 
(Figure 3.2, where one of the scenarios is explicitly shown), in which first-stage (here-and-




investments that will be online in year 10, while recourse decisions are new transmis-
sion/generation investments that come online in year 20, as well as optimal generation dis-
patch and power flows in years 10 and 20, the latter being used to estimate costs in years 
after 20.  
The objective function is the net present value of the system cost, which is com-
posed of discounted cash flow in each operating year (year 10 and year 20 in Figure 3.2).  
The cash flows include the overnight cost of building generation and transmission assets, 
as well as the system operating cost, including unit commitment and dispatch expenses.  
These decisions are subject to network, unit commitment, and other constraints.  Renewa-
ble portfolio standards and renewable credit trading are also modeled.  Uncertainties can 
be handled through multiple scenarios, each with a different set of year 10 and year 20 
model parameters.  Examples include capital cost uncertainties caused by technology ad-
vances (i.e., scenarios of objective function coefficients), load/peak growth uncertainty 
(represented by scenarios of right-hand sides of constraints), and policy uncertainties, such 
as carbon prices. 
 
 





3.6.3 Case Study Environment: 300-bus WECC system 
Here, I discuss four sets of assumptions: network reduction, existing generation 
mix, new generation investments, and network investment possibilities.  
First, the system is a reduction I performed of the WECC Common Case 2024 net-
work, generators, and loads (WECC, 2014a) (details in Ho et al. (2016), Zhu and Tylavsky 
(2018), and I abstractly reproduced the method in Appendix B).  The reduced network 
includes 328 nodes and 530 lines (Figure 3.3), in which 249 of the nodes are preserved 
existing nodes in the original network (230 kV or above), while 244 lines (red lines in 
Figure 3.3) are preserved existing lines from the original network. The preserved paths 
divide the whole network into 26 regions (WECC, 2013b). 
 
 





Second, the system includes 544 existing generators of 16 types distributed among 
249 existing nodes (for the generation aggregation procedure, see Appendix C).  Third, the 
other 79 nodes are designed as candidate sites for generation expansion.  26 of the 79 nodes 
are location-irrelevant conventional generation expansion sites in each of the 26 regions 
just mentioned.  The remaining 53 nodes in the network are candidate sites for renewable 
investment (green triangles in Figure 3.3).  Their locations and potential capacities are de-
rived from data from Western Governors' Association and U.S. Dept. of Energy (2009).  
Four types of renewables (wind, utility-level solar, geothermal, and biofuels) can be con-
structed along with two types of conventional generation (gas combined cycle and com-
bustion turbines).  Capital costs assumptions vary based on the location of candidate sites 
(which state each candidate is located); they are available at E3 and WECC (2014). 
Finally, transmission investment candidates can be divided into two categories: 
backbone reinforcements and renewable access.  Backbone reinforcements are defined as 
having the characteristics of the existing line with the largest capacity in a given WECC 
transmission path; the path data are at WECC (2013b).  Such lines relieve congestion and 
path limits: the amount of increased path limit is identical to the line that the candidate is 
mirroring.  Here is a simple example, suppose a path with a 1000 MW limit be composed 
of two lines with 900 MW and 300 MW thermal limits, respectively.  I will design a can-
didate mimicking the line with 900 MW, the larger of the two; if built, this candidate will 
increase the path limit by 1000 MW ∙ 900 MW /(900 MW + 300 MW) =  750 MW.  Radial 
renewable access lines connect renewable developments to the closest nodes in the existing 




2014a) have been brought online by 2024, all transmission investment variables in my 
model are incremental over and above the Common Case.  
3.6.4 Candidate Model Enhancements 
 I compare the economic value of four possible model enhancements using VOME: 
adding generation unit commitment constraints, adding more hours (i.e., load slices) into 
operation simulation, adding DC OPF modeling in the power flow modeling, and finally, 
adding stochasticity by considering multiple long-run scenarios. 
3.6.4.1 Generating Unit Commitment  
This enhancement consists of replacing the basic load-duration-curve-based repre-
sentation of system dispatch (in which a year’s hourly loads are grouped into nonchrono-
logical “load slices” of similar hours, and no operating constraints link generation dispatch 
variables in different slices.)  This enables the model to consider limits upon generation 
flexibility, such as start-up costs, minimum running capacity, and ramp limits, which I 
collectively refer to as unit commitment constraints. This enhancement would penalize 
slow-moving steam generators relative to single and combined cycle plants. Such limits 
are relevant to transmission planning because, for example, delivery of distant renewables 
will be less valuable if their fluctuating output cannot be fully used by the grid.  
In my model, this enhancement is modeling by defining a new continuous decision 
variable as the in-operation minimum run capacity (in MW), and linearizing every set of 




and shutdown time) around it (Kasina et al., 2013).11  The effect of linearized unit commit-
ment is two-fold: fewer binary variables, thus speeding up solution times; and enabling the 
model to include generation capacities as decision variables. Only thermal generation tech-
nologies are subject to these flexibility constraints. 
3.6.4.2 Network Modelling  
More physically realistic models of power flows will help the TEP model to char-
acterize better how grid reinforcements affect transmission capability, dispatch, and, ulti-
mately, costs.   
The basic model is a pipes-and-bubbles (P&B, or transshipment) power flow model 
that does not enforce Kirchhoff’s voltage law; to wit, only constraints (2.40) and (2.42) of 
Section 2.4.4 are implemented.  This model can be enhanced by implementing a linearized 
DC power flow model using a “B-theta” formulation, which includes the voltage law by 
explicitly modeling phase angles, but assumes unit voltage and negligible resistance 
(Glover et al., 2011).  Flow on a line equals the phase angle difference across the line 
divided by impedance; I enforce this for new lines by disjunctive constraints (Bahiense et 
al., 2001) that use 0-1 variables to represent absence/presence of the line; to see the con-
straint, I refer readers to the constraint (2.41) of Section 2.4.4. An intermediate level of 
enhancement is hybrid flow modeling (Romero et al., 2002), as defined in Section 3.4, 
above.  I evaluate both enhancements: from “Pipes and Bubbles” to “Hybrid power flow” 
and from “Hybrid power flow” to “DC OPF.” 
 
11 This unit commitment formulation is documented in Ho et al. (2016) and Xu and Hobbs (2017), while the 
one presented in Chapter 2 is an refined version based on Kasina (2017), where the unit commitment variable 




3.6.4.3 More Short-Run (Within-Year) Temporal Granularity 
This enhancement consists of increasing the number of load slides or distinct hours 
considered in the operating model from 24 to 48. 
Computational limits mean that it is not possible to model 8760 hours/year in a 
multi-decadal transmission optimization model, even without any other enhancements; this 
necessitates the aggregation of hours into a smaller number of distinct operating periods. 
More periods/year can yield a better representation of load and renewable temporal distri-
butions and correlations.  
The two 24-hour sets are generated using a methodology combining clustering 
(James et al., 2013) and random sampling. First, based on the 8760-hourly profiles of load 
and intermittent resources availability (e.g., hydroelectricity, wind, solar, etc.), the 8760 
hours are grouped into 24 clusters, each of which has a different size (Nc, c = 1 … 24). 
Second, one hour from each cluster is randomly selected to generate a single sample hour-
set, and this step is repeated 80,000 times. When using a 24-hour sample in the TEP model, 
each hour is assumed to be repeated Nc times. Finally, two mutually exclusive 24-hour 
samples are selected.  Each sample set of hours is chosen by minimizing the deviation of 
first and second moments of all profiles between the 24-hour sample sets and the original 
8760-hourly data while constraining the sampled coincident peak to be at least 85% of the 
peak of 8760-hourly data.  The 48-hour set is the union of these two 24-hour sets, with the 







Figure 3.4. WECC-wide load duration curves (LDCs) for different hour sets in the year 
2024 
 
3.6.4.4 Stochasticity: Multiple Long-Run Scenarios  
This enhancement consists of extending the JHSMINE from a deterministic TEP 
planning to a stochastic TEP planning by adding five (5) long-run scenarios. 
Reasons for considering long-run uncertainty are discussed in the introduction and 
the literature review (Sections 3.2 and 3.3, above) and in more detail in Lumbreras and 




programming (Birge and Louveaux, 2011).  This method uses an expected cost objective 
to decide which the first-stage investment commitments (“here-and-now” decisions) to 
make before it is known how uncertainties such as load growth will be resolved while 
making “wait-and-see” (or second-stage) decisions afterward.  Although, as mentioned in 
the literature review, there are other uncertainty planning methods, stochastic programming 
has the advantage of representing system adaptations over time as well as the state-of-
knowledge when commitments are made. Further, the objective (MIN expected cost) is 
consistent with the definition of C(x) used by VOME. 
I quantify the value of considering long-run uncertainties in the case study by con-
sidering the first stage transmission decisions x that are made considering either each of 5 
scenarios separately (deterministic model) or jointly in an enhanced model (stochastic pro-
gramming, with 5 second-stage scenarios).  In the latter model, I assume the 5 scenarios 
are equally likely.  Parameters values for these five scenarios ( 
Table 3.2) are either directly from WECC’s 2013 study cases (WECC, 2013a) or 
developed with the help of a WECC technical advisory group (Ho et al., 2016).  As an 
example of the long-run scenario definitions, the load duration curves of different hour-
sets in different scenarios in 2024 is shown in Figure 3.4.  Note that the 48-hour approxi-
mations are visibly better approximations of the full 8760-hour LDCs, which are also 





Table 3.2. Values of Uncertain Variables by Scenario 
Scenario: Base W1 W2 W3 W4 
Gas Price (% change from base) 0 +86 0 0 -51 
Carbon Price ($/ton) 58 58 113 33 113 
Load Growth (%/year) 1.13 3.20 3.20 -0.91 -0.91 
Peak Growth (%/year) 1.28 2.64 2.64 -0.37 -0.37 
State RPS (% change) 0 0 +50 0 +50 
Federal RPS (% of Load) 0 0 +15 0 +15 
Wind Capital Cost (% change) 0 +7.5 -18.3 +7.5 -18.3 
Geothermal Capital Cost (% change) 0 0 -15 0 0 
Solar Capital Cost (% change) 0 0 -28.7 +30 0 
 
 
3.6.4.5 Summary of Experimental Design 
For the above four enhancements, two groups of experiments were undertaken as 
follows.  In the first group, the effect of generator unit commitment (the first enhancement) 
is investigated by itself, with the model including stochasticity (5 scenarios) but only the 
pipe-and-bubbles network.  Then, in the second group of experiments, the other three en-
hancements (temporal granularity, network representation, and stochasticity) are compared 
together.  Unit commitment is analyzed in a separate experiment, mainly because it requires 
sequential hourly data.  This requirement, which requires representative days instead of 
hours, renders the planning model with other features, especially DC OPF, computationally 
intractable.  On the other hand, the three days (72 hours) I used in the unit commitment 
analysis are not as accurate a representation of cross-region load and renewable output 





In this section, I show the outcomes of the VOME experiments for the case study 
WECC system.  First, I summarize model sizes and computation times to help the reader 
appreciate the “curse of dimensionality” that arises from attempts to include all possible 
enhancements.  Then I show the VOME for adding unit commitment variables, costs, and 
constraints to the planning model and, finally, compare the values of VOME across the 
enhancements of increased temporal granularity, improved network representation, and in-
clusion of long-run uncertainties via multiple scenarios.  
3.7.1 Model Size and Computation Time Comparison 
First, in Table 3.3 and  
Table 3.4, I display the change in model size and solution times under alternative 
enhancements. 
 
Table 3.3. Model Size and Solution Time with Various Enhancements (Deterministic / 
Single Scenario Cases) 
 
Deterministic (14 candidate backbone lines x 2 stages) 
Network P&B Hybrid DC OPF P&B Hybrid DC OPF 
# Hours (Load Slices) 24 24 24 48 48 48 
# Constraints (million) 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.46 0.51 0.52 
# Variables (million) 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.36 0.36 0.36 






Table 3.4. Model Size and Solution Time with Various Enhancements (Stochastic / Five 
Second Stage Scenarios) 
 
Stochastic (Same Candidates, 5 WECC scenarios) 






No UC With UC 
# Hours (Load Slices) 24 24 24 48 48 48 72 72 
# Constraints (million) 1.15 1.25 1.26 2.25 2.49 2.51 4.97 17.5 
# Variables (million) 0.90 0.93 0.93 1.74 1.86 1.86 4.19 7.61 
Solution Time (Hours) 0.06  1.97  15.46  0.25  13.49  34.67  0.77  25.8  
 
All these models are mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs) and are solved to a 
MILP gap of 10-4 (relative to the objective function value) to avoid possible biases in my 
conclusions introduced by large gaps. All models were solved on a workstation with an 
Intel® Core™ i7-5930K CPU and 32 GB of core memory using solver CPLEX 12.6.3. All 
solution times shown here are averages, since, for example, there are 10 deterministic runs 
using the P&B network together one of the two 24-hour sets (5 scenarios times 2 sets of 24 
hours), for which the average solution time is 30 seconds. 
In summary, model size dramatically affects solution times.  Only about 30 seconds 
are needed to generate an optimal plan for the most simplified model, while more than one 
day was required to solve a model with the most enhancements. 
3.7.2 First Group of Experiments: VOME of Unit Commitment 
In this part of the analysis, first-stage plans are generated from two planning models, 
both with the stochasticity enhancement (5 scenarios, see Section 3.6.4.4), but one without 




network was assumed to be P&B for computation tractability. The same three days were 
considered per year (72 hours/year) in both models.  
Since the planning model that includes unit commitment is closer to reality, the 
calculation of C(x) is performed with both unit commitment and stochasticity.  That is, 
“true” cost C(x) for a given set of first-stage transmission investments, x, is calculated by 
optimizing all the other decision variables while including first-stage generation invest-
ments, unit commitment, and 5 second-stage scenarios and associated second-stage gener-
ation and transmission investment and operating variables. The resulting cost of transmis-
sion plans and their benefits is shown below in  
Table 3.5.  The “true” cost C(x0) of the null plan x0 (no first stage transmission other 
than the WECC Common Case lines) is NPC = $890.38B (2014 present worth). In contrast, 
with about $3.18B of first-stage transmission investment x resulting from the unit commit-
ment model with 5 scenarios, the system’s “true” cost C(x1) is $35.39B lower, which I treat 
as the upper bound UPB of the net benefit of transmission.  
In contrast, if unit commitment is not included, more renewable interconnection 
transmission is constructed, with a higher total first stage transmission investment ($3.52B), 
and a C(x) that is $35.28B lower than NPC. Thus, the model enhanced with unit commit-
ment gave a more conservative plan x, whose benefits are $0.11B billion higher (= 
$35.39B-$35.28B) than the x resulting from the model without unit commitment. This is 






Table 3.5.  First Experiment Group: Costs and Expected Benefits of First Stage Trans-
mission Plans Generated by Model without/with Unit Commitment Enhancement (billion 
2014 US$). 
Planning Model No Unit Commitment With Unit Commitment 
Backbone Transmission 0.80 0.80 
Renewable Transmission  2.72 2.38 
“True” Cost C(x) 855.11 854.99 
Net Benefit (NB(x)) relative to null plan 35.28 35.39 
Benefit recovery BR(x) 99.7% 100% 
Null plan cost (NPC)12  890.38 
 
3.7.3 Second Group of Experiments: VOME of Temporal Granularity, Power Flow 
Representation, and Stochasticity 
While estimating the VOME of the three other enhancements, the impracticality of 
solving a unit commitment model together with all three other enhancements means that 
each model in this section omits unit commitment (i.e., assumes that generators can be 
ramped up and down without restriction and can be freely started up or shut down).  
Also, for the same reason, requirements for spinning reserves, which would double 
the number of operating variables for conventional generators, are not modeled in this 
section;13 for the formulation, I refer readers to Section 2.4.7 of Chapter 2.  Nevertheless, 
the inclusion of generation spinning reserves can be viewed as an enhancement of TEP, 
and therefore can be investigated by VOME as well.  The results showed a nearly negligible 
VOME of $0.007B (0.02% of the $35.39B benefit of transmission) for including spinning 
reserves compared to the VOME for UC of $0.11B (0.32%).  In summary, the unit 
 
12 This null plan cost is based on the three days modeled in the first group of analyses; as these three days are 
different from the 24/48 load slices used in the second group of analyses, the null plan cost and other cost 
values of the latter are thus different from the first group. 




commitment modeling and the spinning reserve modeling are not modeled in the second 
group of analyses. 
 
Figure 3.5. The conceptual framework for VOME calculation of Temporal Granularity, 
Network Representation, and Stochasticity 
 
Figure 3.5 is a visualization of how I implemented the definition of VOME from 
Section 3.5 in this experiment.  Let the origin of the three-dimensional plot represent the 
outcome of a highly simplified model with just a P&B network, 24 operating hours/year, 
and a single long-term scenario.  Then one can imagine enhancing the planning model 
along any or all of three dimensions, anticipating that the enhancement(s) will generate a 
more beneficial first-stage transmission plan x.  Each node in the diagram represents one 
possible model formulation (a combination of enhancements), for which I obtain the first-




set of assumptions (linearized DC network, 48 hours/year, and stochasticity with 5 scenar-
ios).  Then I calculate the differences between adjacent nodes, which is equivalent to cal-
culating the cost savings resulting from enhancing the model in one direction. The average 
of cost differences (across the four to six arrows with the same color) is the VOME for the 
enhancement represented by the direction of the arrow, i.e., Eq. (3.1), above. 
Table 3.6 shows the benefits achieved by different plans obtained by comparing 
their “true” cost C(x) to that of the null plan C(x0); Figure 3.6 is a visualization of Table 
3.6 by adding results on Figure 3.5. The upper bound of benefit is UPB = $40.58B (the 
value of the plan from the model with all enhancements, last entry in the next-to-last row). 
(Note that this differs slightly from the UPB for the model with unit commitment in the 
previous section.)  
Several trends are noticeable in Table 3.6. First, deterministic models (especially 
based on scenario W3) often perform poorly relative to stochastic models. The benefits of 
plans generated by stochastic models are consistently higher than plans from the five de-
terministic models (one per scenario) in the same row. The large variation among the five 
deterministic models in each row shows that choosing the wrong scenario for planning can 
result in large regret. On average, stochastic plans achieved $5.59B more benefits com-
pared to deterministic plans, which represents 13.8% of the maximum benefits of first-





Table 3.6. Net Benefits NB(x) of First-Stage Transmission x Generated by Different Mod-
els (Billion 2014US$) 
Power Flow/ Hour Set 
Deterministic (Single Scenario) Plans Stochastic 
Base W1 W2 W3 W4 Avg.  
P&B/24-Set 1 36.84 37.91 38.40 21.93 34.75 33.97 39.67 
P&B/24-Set 2 38.56 38.53 38.94 22.39 36.28 34.94 39.74 
P&B/48 hours 38.45 38.19 38.60 23.48 35.89 34.92 39.87 
Hybrid/24-Set 1 37.54 38.47 38.81 19.60 35.71 34.03 39.66 
Hybrid/24-Set 2 38.98 38.81 39.17 17.44 35.95 34.07 40.17 
Hybrid/48 hours 39.43 38.59 38.94 20.36 36.30 34.72 40.46 
DCOPF/24-Set 1 37.69 38.87 38.92 19.64 35.17 34.06 39.79 
DCOPF/24-Set 2 39.02 39.19 39.30 17.40 36.16 34.21 40.24 
DCOPF/48 hours 39.48 39.04 39.06 19.79 36.32 34.74 40.58 











Second, for the enhancements of temporal granularity and power flow representa-
tion, the improvements in “true” cost are consistently small, and their sign can vary.  For 
example, on average, for a model with deterministic and 48-hour enhancement, “true” ben-
efits decrease when hybrid power flow is modeled instead of P&B power flow, resulting 




An individual model enhancement can result in negative benefits (worse plans) be-
cause (1) plan x is only part of the solution, and (2) adding just some of a set of missing 
constraints does not necessarily lead to better values of a subset of the decision variables 
(e.g., x). To visualize, see Figure 3.7 for a two-variable optimization.  Initially, imagine 
two models: a full model, of which the feasible region is colored grey in Figure 3.7, and a 
base model with two missing constraints, Con1 and Con2; furthermore, imagine an objec-
tive function with a maximizing direction indicated by the blue arrow.  The first observa-
tion is intuitive: the optimal solution is (x*, y*), and the objective function is O(x*). The 
base model, however, yields a different solution of (xa, ya); by fixing x = xa and solving the 
full optimization again, I obtain a solution of (xa, ya) and an objective function O(xa).  
 
  





Suppose that I enhance the model by adding Con1, and this new model yields an 
“enhanced” solution of (xb, yb); by fixing x = xb and solving the full optimization again, I 
gain a solution of (xb, yb) and an objective function of O(xb).  Apparently, O(xb) is worse 
than O(xa): this enhancement has a negative value. 
Hybrid transmission modeling provides an example of negative VOME: it may dis-
tort plans by exaggerating the benefits of new lines (which are modeled as controllable DC 
lines whether or not they are actually AC) relative to existing AC circuits that are subject 
to Kirchhoff’s voltage law; On the other hand, however, when stochasticity is considered, 
the benefit of adding hours is always positive. The third trend is that a simple stochastic 
model (P&B network/24 hours) can achieve most (98%) of the potential benefit.  
 
Table 3.7. VOME for Three Enhancements (Stochasticity, Hours, Network) and Associ-







to Hybrid Network 
Transmission: Hybrid Net-
work to DCOPF 
VOME ($) 5.59 0.50 0.049 0.080 
Fraction of total 
benefit 
13.8% 1.24% 0.121% 0.198% 
Max ($) 5.88 0.68 0.59 0.12 
Min ($) 4.95 0.17 -0.41 0.014 
 
 
The results from Table 3.6 are used to derive the VOME values (Table 3.7). Con-
sistent with the trends just discussed, the inclusion of multiple scenarios (stochasticity) is 
the most valuable enhancement by over an order of magnitude. Its value of $5.59B (present 
worth) is also far greater than the VOME of including unit commitment ($0.11B) and spin-




Of course, for other planning problems, the relative value of these enhancements 
may be quite different; for instance, for a system with many slow-moving coal plants and 
a much higher renewable penetration, the number of hours and inclusion of unit commit-
ment would likely have a significantly increased VOME.  The conclusion of this section is 
not that long-run stochasticity is necessarily more important than other enhancements, but 
that TEP model improvements can have large tangible benefits in general, and that those 
benefits can be estimated. 
3.8 Conclusions and Limitations 
This paper has presented a framework to calculate the economic value of model 
enhancements (VOME), in terms of the expected improvement in the probability-weighted 
present worth of system costs resulting from changes in immediate transmission invest-
ments.  I apply the concept to a large-scale, long-term planning model for the WECC trans-
mission network.  Four types of enhancements, including stochasticity (multiple long-run 
scenarios), finer temporal granularity (operating hours), improved network modeling, and 
inclusion of unit commitment costs and constraints, are compared.  
I now return to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter: Can we quantify 
an economic index to meaningfully compare the value that alternative model enhancements 
might provide to transmission planning?  The answer, provided by the VOME methodol-
ogy, is yes.  The results for this particular case show major benefits from considering long-
run uncertainty using multiple scenarios of technology, policy, and economics, but less 
benefit from the other potential enhancements.  These benefits are as large as 13.8% (ap-




2015 and 2024 over and above the lines already included in the WECC Common Case 
(WECC, 2014a). 
These results imply that considering long-run uncertainties is potentially highly 
beneficial in transmission planning. To the best of knowledge of the authors, this is the first 
time that the benefits of considering long-term uncertainty versus short-term variability or 
other model enhancements have been systematically quantified and compared in the con-
text of transmission planning or in any physical infrastructure planning model, for that 
matter.  This quantification framework and its result is particularly important in power 
systems with rapidly increasing renewable penetration and can be informative for planners 
who must trade off the number of futures and the number of hours to consider.  However, 
only the stochastic programming technique for representing long-run uncertainties is dis-
cussed in this paper.  Therefore, applying the VOME framework to compare and evaluate 
plan improvements resulting from other uncertainty-based planning techniques, e.g., ro-
bustness optimization, is a desirable extension of this research.  
The results also imply that a simple model with a small set of hours and a pipes-
and-bubbles power flow simulation can potentially yield a plan that achieves most of the 
potential economic benefits.  On the other hand, deterministic (single scenario) planning 
based on the wrong scenario concerning future policy, economics, or technology can result 
in a huge economic regret. These results suggest the following practical approach to opti-
mizing network reinforcements: start with a plan generated by optimizing a simple sto-
chastic model and then use it as a starting point for a heuristic search for a better set of 





However, these VOME results do not necessarily apply to other regions or planning 
problems.  Furthermore, they may become outdated even for WECC as conditions and 
computational capabilities change over the next few years. Inherently, VOME calculated 
today depends on the planning alternatives available (generation and transmission candi-
dates); it also depends on the  current view of the technological, economic, and policy 
developments in the future, and what model enhancements are feasible also play has a 
factor of VOME.  And all of these are likely to change rapidly in the future, just as they 
have in the recent past. Thus, several years from now, the system and our models of it can 
be very different from now.  Since VOME depends on the system and modeling assump-
tions, this implies that the VOME calculated in the next planning cycle can depart signifi-
cantly from today’s values. For example, if several WECC states adopt California’s 100% 
renewables target, a VOME calculation in the future might show a much higher value for 
adding representative hours than what we would calculate today. 
Nonetheless, the results indicate that systematically quantifying the economic value 
of model improvements is practical.  The applications of VOME are not limited to the 
enhancements discussed in this work.  For example, enhancement of TEP models by con-
sidering distributed energy resources (including generation, demand response, and storage) 
is appealing, given the increasing importance of those resources.  Other potential enhance-
ments might result in significant improvements of plans; examples include improved net-
work reductions or explicit N-1 (or N-K) contingency constraints.  Although some papers 
have shown how such network model enhancements can change operations or investment 
plans as well as cost estimates, and compared those changes to other model enhancements 




enhancements.  Finally, VOME can provide useful insights not only for users of transmis-
sion planning models but also for other types of planning optimization problems in power 
and other infrastructure systems. 
VOME can also be a very beneficial tool in transmission expansion processes that 
regularly update plans, e.g., the CAISO’s annual transmission expansion planning process 
(CAISO).  To provide guidance on improving planning models, a VOME analysis could 
be conducted after planning is complete each year, in which an optimal plan has been gen-
erated from some model with some enhancements.  Such a VOME analysis can help plan-
ners gain insights on the current plan and its robustness to assumptions, while at the same 
time providing information on how to improve TEP models for the next plan update. In 
other words, VOME can show which enhancements would be beneficial to the current TEP 
and, therefore, should be considered for inclusion in the next planning cycle. For example, 
if the consideration of the long-run scenarios has significantly higher VOME than other 
candidate features in, say, the year 2019 plan, planners should put more effort into defining 
and enriching long-run scenarios in subsequent plans while preparing for the next planning 
cycle, say, 2021. 
As explained in Section 3.5, VOME is, in theory, best quantified by developing and 
solving a TEP model for every combination of investigated enhancements.  This would 
generally require a great deal of effort, and it may not even be feasible to solve some of the 
more complex models.  However, a useful and meaningful indication of the VOME can be 
obtained by considering a subset of the possible combinations of enhancements.  For ex-
ample, if the solution for the red dot in Figure 3.5 (representing the model with all possible 




with the three arrows connected to the red dot will also be unobtainable (each representing 
adding one individual enhancement to the TEP).  Nonetheless, we can still obtain an esti-
mate of VOME using the other model runs (i.e., the other arrows), albeit with a possible 
sacrifice of accuracy.  For instance, the value of including KVL constraints relative to the 
hybrid load flow model can be quantified through comparisons of three pairs of runs (three 
arrows shown in Figure 3.5), omitting the fourth arrow that connects a hybrid model with 
the red dot.  Thus, calculating VOME can be practical even if the most complex models 




Chapter 4 Transmission Planning and Co-optimization 
with Market-Based Generation and Storage 
Investment14 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
I enhanced the JHSMINE used in Chapter 3 by adding the storage expansion and 
operation module to recognize how storage investments, as well as supply investment, will 
respond to the changed network.  I formulated the model as a mixed-integer linear program 
that co-optimizes transmission-generation-storage expansion (see Section 2.4.5 of Chapter 
2 for detailed formulation); in an unbundled market context, the usage of such a model by 
transmission owners is termed “proactive” or “anticipative” transmission expansion plan-
ning (TEP).  Using a case study of planning for the Western Electricity Coordinating Coun-
cil (WECC) in the U.S., I demonstrate how the inclusion of battery storage co-optimization 
will change the TEP solution, and I quantify the economic benefit of such co-optimization; 
such quantification is based on the VOME framework that I proposed in Chapter 3.  The 
results show, first, that optimizing while accounting for storage expansion will help TEP 
avoid overbuilding lines in some cases and underbuilding lines in others, while generation 
and storage are sited and sized more efficiently.  This implies that storage and transmission 
sometimes are substitutes, and sometimes are complements in the WECC region.  Second, 
the results indicate that proactive recognition that storage siting will react to network ex-
pansion will result in additional transmission benefits.  This benefit increases as the cost of 
battery storage is reduced, but changes nonmonotonically with respect to the assumed cost 
 
14 A condensed version of this chapter will appear in Xu and Hobbs (2020), the formulation part of which is 




of carbon emissions.  Finally, my results show that transmission planning process can con-
siderably impact the total value brought by battery storage installation to the system; to wit, 
compared to the transmission expansion plan with the anticipation of storage expansion, 
the naïve transmission expansion plan generated without such an anticipation will lower 
the value of storage to the system by up to 27%, with an average of 14%. 
4.2 Chapter Introduction 
The benefits of optimal transmission expansion planning (TEP) are not limited to 
adding lines to already congested corridors in order to lower fuel costs through a more 
efficient dispatch of the existing generation fleet.  This is because the amount and location 
of generation investment, as well as its dispatch, might shift to take advantage of changes 
in network capabilities, and these shifts will, in general, unfold over the multidecadal life-
time of the transmission assets.  In sum, transmission investment will change not only op-
erating costs of generation, but also investment costs.  Thus, a TEP planner should antici-
pate changes in generation plant siting, amounts, and mixes, as discussed in Chapter 3.  The 
traditional approach of evaluating the economic benefits of transmission just by valuing 
the resulting savings in operating costs results in distorted estimates of the benefits of trans-
mission reinforcements and potentially suboptimal grid expansion decisions (CAISO, 2004; 
MISO, 2010; Spyrou et al., 2017).   
Transmission generation expansion co-optimization tools (also called “proactive” 
planning methods) are designed for this job: they help TEP planners to plan transmission 
in a proactive manner so that transmission planners are able to select the lines anticipating 




investment costs (Krishnan et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2013b; Sauma and Oren, 2006; Sauma 
and Oren, 2007).   
Several generation-transmission co-optimization models have been published and 
are being tested by regional transmission agencies.  Most are formulated as optimizations 
that minimize the total capital and operating cost of the joint transmission-generation sys-
tem, or as maximizing net market benefits (value of energy consumption minus those costs).  
The assumption of most such models is that the underlying generation market is perfectly 
competitive with no major market failures (which is equivalent to net market benefits max-
imization for just generation,) and that the transmission planner’s objective is also to max-
imize net market benefits (van der Weijde and Hobbs, 2012).  Thus, the bi-level structure 
of decision making in the market (transmission acting as a “Stackelberg leader” with re-
spect to generation followers) reduces to a convenient-to-solve single-level optimization.   
Other co-optimization models, however, recognize that serious imperfections exist 
in the generation market (externalities, subsidies, market power, regulated prices), so that 
instead, an explicitly bi-level optimization approach is called for.  Such problems are in-
herently more difficult to solve, but progress has been made recently (Pozo et al., 2013; 
Tohidi et al., 2017). 
In addition to market failures in generation markets, another challenge (or oppor-
tunity) to TEP is the rise of new types of supply technologies, as well as storage and de-
mand response.  The challenges of a load growth together with renewables could be met 
with a greatly expanded grid, but storage and demand technologies hold the promise of 
lowering the cost of renewables integration and also being less costly in at least some cases 




and storage seem functionally compete and substitute each other.  This substitution rela-
tionship was identified by Bustos et al. (2018), Neetzow et al. (2018), and Xu and Hobbs 
(2018), however, the relationship can also be complementary.  A proactive TEP should, 
therefore, anticipate the response of investments in new technologies.  This is the focus of 
this chapter; in particular, I expand least-cost types of co-optimization models to include 
storage as well as transmission and generation.  With the cost of energy storage plummeting 
rapidly, consideration of storage might greatly affect TEP.  
As mentioned above, as definite yes-or-no answer to the question whether the re-
lationship between transmission and storage is complementary or substitutive is not avail-
able and it depends on the system characteristics (Bustos et al., 2018; Neetzow et al., 2018; 
Xu and Hobbs, 2018); thus it may be more appropriate to ask this question: How will 
decreasing costs of storage technology affect the transmission expansion planning? How 
much benefit can we get in transmission expansion planning by anticipating how storage 
will be expanded in response?  From the point of view of potential storage investors, the 
reversing question is also intriguing: How will the transmission expansion planning affect 
the profitability of the storage technology? How much potential benefit is lost because the 
transmission planner naively ignores the possibility of storage expansion? These questions, 
to the best of my knowledge, have never been raised nor answered, and I will provide my 
approach and answers to these questions in this chapter. 
I organize the remainder of this chapter as follows.  In Section 4.3, I provide some 
background: First, the interactions of transmission and generation and the complications 
posed by storage; second, a historical view of co-optimization of transmission and genera-




storage expansion in TEP.  In Section 4.4, I present a case study for the WECC regions. I 
then conclude this chapter in Section 4.5.  For the formulation of this work, I refer readers 
to Chapter 2 of this thesis, for specifically the storage formulation, see Section 2.4.5. 
4.3 Background 
4.3.1 Interactions among Transmission, Generation and Storage  
In classic microeconomics, e.g., (Varian, 2009), people characterize interactions 
between two goods with the words “complementary” or “substitutive,” which is, in turn, 
formally defined by the cross-price elasticity.  The cross-price elasticity of two goods is 
calculated as the relative increase of consumption of one good divided by the relative in-
crease in the price of another, ceteris paribus.  Intuitively, the sign of cross-price elasticity 
tells us a story: a negative cross-price elasticity means an increase of the price of one will 
decrease the consumption of another, and they are complementary; they are thus substitu-
tive if the cross-price elasticity is positive.  The definition of complements and substitutes 
can also extended to the power system planning context: if the drop of capital cost of one 
asset (e.g., storage technology) will encourage the market to build more transmission line 
capacity, I can say that they are substitutes to each other.15  The reason behind the number 
can be that they are functionally competing each other. 
Generation and transmission expansions interact in complex ways.  Fundamentally, 
they can be complements (investment in one increases the market value of the investment 
in another) or substitutes (investment in one lowers the market value of the other).  Trans-
mission is valuable just because of its capability to deliver electricity from a cheap resource 
 




to the demand, avoiding turning on an expensive local generation; thus, transmission in-
vestment is a complement to the remote resource, but a substitute for the local one.  As 
specific examples, transmission and generation complement each other in cases such as 
mine-mouth coal power plants and wind farms that are distant from load centers: cheap 
power is only valuable when deliverable.  The opposite can also be true: when local gen-
eration, such as gas turbines or rooftop solar panels, became cheap, it diminishes the value 
of new transmission into a load pocket, and thus generation and transmission become sub-
stitutes. 
The rise of electricity storage, especially distributed storage in the form of batteries, 
is making this story more complicated. First, storage can both compete with and comple-
ment generation. Storage can compete with conventional generation, for instance, in meet-
ing peak loads.  Regulators encourage this competition: Order No. 841 (FERC, 2018) from 
the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission requires that independent system opera-
tors adjust their rules and market software so that storage can compete with the generation 
in the energy, ancillary service, and installed capacity markets. The fast ramping response 
of electric storage implies that storage and generation may compete fiercely in reliability 
markets as the cost of storage decreases. However, storage, because of its fundamental 
ability to shift supply from one time period to another, can be a complement to generation 
with less operational flexibility (e.g., base-loaded thermal plants) or intermittent availabil-
ity (e.g., variable renewable energy, VRE).  Indeed, pumped storage plants were often jus-
tified in the 1960s and 1970s because of this complementarity with nuclear plants, which 
are most efficient when running flat out for all hours (Rehman et al., 2015).  Nowadays, 




essential to achieving the very high renewable penetrations that are the targets in some 
jurisdictions (e.g., 100% in Hawaii and California). 
Storage also interacts with the transmission, but in a somewhat subtler way: they 
are both arbitragers of the energy, with the transmission arbitraging over space and storage 
doing so over time.  They can both facilitate higher penetrations of VRE (Bustos et al., 
2018; Neetzow et al., 2018). A better interconnection can help in the following way: at a 
certain point in time, unexpected under-generation of VRE in one place can be made up by 
transmission delivering available production from another plant (e.g., another VRE) from 
hundreds of km away.  This may, for instance, avoid starting-up or ramping of local gen-
erators that is perhaps both costly and polluting. On the other hand, storage can also resolve 
local shortfalls by, in effect, delivering cheap output of a plant that was produced several 
hours or even days or months ago (e.g., from wind or hydro energy that would have other-
wise been curtailed or “spilled”). 
Transmission and storage are not always competing. As a simple case, we can im-
agine a distant wind farm might be more economical because of a bundled storage facility, 
and hence a transmission project also becomes valuable.  On the other hand, this nearby 
storage could enable a transmission facility to be downsized and still deliver the same 
amount of VRE production (Neetzow et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2018b). 
Overall, the interactions between transmission, generation, and storage will 
strongly affect the economic value of transmission reinforcements.  Hence, from the per-
spective of the transmission planner, a planning model with the ability to capture the above 
substitutive and complementary interactions becomes valuable and informative.  We shall 




4.3.2 Using Co-optimization to Support Transmission Expansion Planning 
Co-optimization of transmission and generation planning is not a new topic. The 
mathematics problems describing siting generation and transmission together can be dated 
back at least to the 1970s (Anderson, 1972; Sawey and Zinn, 1977; Turvey and Anderson, 
1977).  However, the meaning of co-optimization of transmission and generation expan-
sion changed with time went by, and a major milestone was the deregulation of the power 
sectors in Europe and the U.S. 
“Co-optimization” used to mean co-planning of just generation and transmission.  
When most of the power industry was still vertical integrated, generation planners and 
transmission planners were able to work together: generation expansion plans were first 
developed and handed to the transmission planners, transmission plan was then developed, 
and may or may not be handed back to the generation planners for more iterations.  In this 
iterative manner, the interaction between generation and transmission and was at least par-
tially accounted for by these vertically integrated monopolies; in the work of Spyrou et al. 
(2017), authors quantified the value of such iteration. 
The meaning of co-optimization has enriched since the deregulation of the power 
industry in Europe and the U.S in the 1990s.  In the newly established markets, the planning 
of transmission and generation expansions are separated and respectively performed by 
grid owners/transmission system operators (TSOs)/regional transmission organizations 
(RTOs) and generation companies. Without the full co-operation of the generation planners 
and, at the same time, lacking tools to anticipate how generation siting would respond to 
grid changes, many transmission planners have been forced to treat the locations and 




have to assume scenarios in which the generation siting is known and then plan the trans-
mission expansion based on the scenarios.  This is called “reactive” transmission expansion 
planning: transmission planners react to generation expansion.  
In contrast to “reactive” transmission expansion planning, “proactive” transmission 
expansion planning anticipates how generation investors will choose the sites, types, sizes, 
and timing of changes in their assets in reaction to the network plan, and then chooses the 
best set of transmission expansion projects (Hirst and Kirby, 2002; Sauma and Oren, 2006; 
Sauma and Oren, 2007).  From the point of view of game theory, the game between trans-
mission and generation is a bi-level or “Stackelberg” game.  The transmission planner is a 
leader who optimizes subject to the anticipated reactions of a set of generation investors 
who are competitive or Nash players who do not anticipate how the grid plan would change 
in response to generation decisions.  It is natural to place the transmission in the role of a 
leader because transmission assets generally take much longer to plan and build than the 
natural gas-fired or renewable generating assets that constitute most or all of the generation 
additions in North America and Europe today.  Although outside of the scope of this chap-
ter, I refer readers that are interested in “proactive” transmission expansion models formu-
lated explicitly as bi-level or multi-level games to Gonzalez-Romero et al. (2019); Jenabi 
et al. (2013); Jin and Ryan (2014a, 2014b); Pozo et al. (2013); Sauma and Oren (2006); 
Tohidi et al. (2017). 
Transmission and generation co-optimization models can be seen as one of several 
types of “proactive” transmission expansion planning models if planners make the strong 




• The transmission expansion planner has the objective of maximizing market 
surplus (what the economists call “market efficiency” or “societal wel-
fare”).16  This is defined as the sum of surpluses accrued by all market par-
ties, including profits earned by each resource and storage, transmission 
congestion surplus minus incremental grid costs, and consumer surplus.  If 
demand is perfectly inelastic (fixed), this objective is equivalent to mini-
mizing the sum of resource, storage, and transmission costs. 
• Short-run (spot) electricity markets, including energy, ancillary service, and 
capacity markets, are perfectly competitive.  All suppliers are price takers 
and profit maximizers. 
• Similarly, in the long run, generation expansion planners are siting opti-
mally and competitively to maximize their profits, given the cost of trans-
mission as reflected in locational marginal prices, which depend on the grid 
and all suppliers’ decisions. 
Of course, this basic proactive model simplifies reality but then do all models.  
These assumptions enable the bi-level game to be solved as a single optimization model 
since the TEP objective of maximizing market surplus is consistent with perfect competi-
tion on the lower level, which can be modeled by maximizing total market surplus as well.  
(See proof in Appendix A.)  Relaxing any of those three assumptions will generate a new 
type of “proactive” transmission planning model that in general, will have a difficult to 
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solve bi-level structure in which the leader and follower objectives are not aligned, as men-
tioned above.   
Besides relaxing the three assumptions, another way in which co-optimization 
models can be broadened is by including more types of market players, including consum-
ers (i.e., demand response) and storage.  As mentioned before, in Feb. 2018, the FERC 
issued Order No. 841 to urge the U.S. markets under its purview to modify their tariffs to 
make sure that electric storage can compete with the conventional generators in the energy, 
ancillary service, and capacity markets, so that energy storage can participate fully in spot 
markets and are able to set prices (FERC, 2018). 
With electricity storage coming into play, co-optimization models must now co-
optimize (or anticipate) the siting and operation of storage.  As a result, additional assump-
tions are needed, namely that storage owners are competitive.  They, therefore, choose the 
timing, type, size, and location of storage facilities to maximize their profit subject to lo-
cational commodity prices that they assume they cannot alter.  Reflecting the new FERC 
rules (FERC, 2018), practical co-optimization models usually assume that storage owners 
can either let the ISO dispatch their facilities optimally or, equivalently, they self-schedule 
with perfect foresight of the time-varying prices they will receive. 
4.3.3 Quantify the Economic Value of Considering Storage Expansion in Transmis-
sion Expansion Planning 
As battery costs continue to decline, batteries, flywheels, compressed air, and other 
storage devices will achieve more penetration in power markets and thereby interact with 
and change the value of transmission and generation.  Traditional vertically integrated util-




possible investments in storage might change optimal investments in other assets.  In re-
structured, vertically disintegrated markets, on the other hand, storage is another player, of 
whom the operating and investment decisions will need to be anticipated by transmission 
planners in the proactive paradigm.  If the effects of grid reinforcements on the siting, 
sizing, and timing of storage investment is disregarded in TEP, the result might be a dif-
ferent—and economically inferior—transmission plan.  I now address the question: how 
can we quantify the value of considering storage in a proactive TEP? I propose and demon-
strate a procedure for quantifying this value in the remainder of this chapter. The demon-
stration is for the western US and Canada system (WECC) for the year 2034.  
Previous work  (Liu et al., 2013a; Spyrou et al., 2017) has quantified the value of 
anticipating how grid reinforcements affect generation expansion in TEP (i.e., the “value 
of generation-proactive TEP”) for the eastern US and Canada system.  There, authors show 
that iterating between (1) solving a TEP subject to a fixed generation build-out and (2) 
solving a generation expansion problem (GEP) subject to a fixed network can realize only 
part of the value of generation-proactive TEP. 
In summary, the quantification of the value of considering storage in proactive TEP 
involves three steps:  
1) planning with co-optimization of storage, generation, and transmission;  
2) planning while disregarding the possibility of the storage installation and how it 
reacts to network expansions; and  
3) evaluation of the latter, potentially flawed plan by modeling the “actual” reaction 




This process is presented in a more formal, rigorous way later in this section.  The first step 
is the full co-optimization, where the transmission expansion planner makes an expansion 
plan anticipating the reactions of both generation and storage installations.  The results of 
this step are the optimal plan (a set of selected transmission projects) and a minimized 
system cost.  In the second step, a transmission expansion plan is obtained from a “flawed” 
planning model, where the transmission expansion planner ignores the possibility of stor-
age installation, and only generation is considered in such a “flawed” co-optimization 
framework.  Finally, I evaluate this “flawed” plan by plugging it into the co-optimization 
model (fixing the network decision variables at their flawed values) and getting a new 
minimized cost for the generation and storage followers, which may involve the installation 
of storage but at potentially different locations and in different amounts than the full co-
optimization.  The difference in the costs between steps 1 and 3 is the value of considering 
storage in transmission expansion planning.  Because step 3 is more constrained than step 
1, its cost will be no lower than the full co-optimized model and is potentially higher.  I 
call this increase in cost the “value of model enhancement for storage” (VoMES).17  I de-
fine another closely related term, “value of storage” (VoS), as the objective function im-
provement if storage is allowed to be expanded in the system, i.e., the differences in the 
objective function values resulting from step 1 and 2.  For example, the VoS under alter-
native incentive mechanisms for merchant transmission expansions is calculated for IEEE 
test-systems in Khastieva et al. (2019).  These results show that the VoS is relatively small 
compared to system cost ($2 million compared to $442 million) but can be more than three 
times higher than that amount if transmission expansion incentives are provided.  The 
 




conceptual differences and relationship between VoMES and VoS will be discussed in a 
more formal, mathematical way below. 
I now present the details of each step, including the TEP co-optimization models 
that we apply.   
Step 1. Planning with Co-optimization (Benchmarking): Imagine we have a 
TEP tool which can select the best set of new transmission lines (T) by anticipating the 
construction of new generation (G), the installation of new storage (S), and the system 
operation (P) to minimize annualized system cost C(T, G, S, P) (in $/yr) for some future 
scenario year.  (Existing facilities are implicitly in the model as well.) All the decision 
variables are subject to the feasible region (F) which is defined by the physical operating 
constraints for the network as well as individual resources (e.g., Kirchhoff’s laws, line and 
resource capacity limits, ramp limits, state-of-charge relationships etc.) and policy 
constraints such as renewable portfolio standards or emissions limits.  An abstract mathe-
matical programming problem (MP1) can be shown as follows, the formulation of which 
is shown in Chapter 2:  
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. 
If this is solved to optimality, it will return a solution of (T*, G*, S*, P*) and a system cost 
of C(T*, G*, S*, P*).  (Note that if demand is elastic, instead of minimizing cost, we would 
instead be maximizing net market surplus, recognizing the value of benefits associated with 
different levels of consumption as captured by the integrals of demand curves.) 
By definition, C(T*, G*, S*, P*) is the lowest cost that the model can achieve, and 




transmission plan other than T* will leads to a system cost no lower than C(T*, G*, S*, P*), 
and hence that network configuration and the associated cost can be used as a benchmark. 
Step 2. Planning without storage anticipation: Imagine the planner chooses to 
ignore the storage installation in the TEP.  Mathematically, it means forcing S = 0 in the 
formulation above (MP1).  Thus, we are solving the following problem (MP2) instead: 
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Let the solution of this TEP model be (T̂, Ĝ, 0, P̂) and the associated system cost be C(T̂, 
Ĝ, 0, P̂).  T̂, therefore, stands for the optimal transmission expansion plan that the planner 
can get if they ignore the possibility of installing storage. 
Step 3. Plan Evaluation: Imagine the transmission expansion plan from Step 2 is 
implemented.  Mathematically, it means forcing T = T̂ in MP1; equivalently, we are solving 
the following problem (MP3):  
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Let (T̂, G̅, S̅, P̅) be the solution of MP3 and C(T̂, G̅, S̅, P̅) be the associated objective func-
tion.  By definition, C(T̂, G̅, S̅, P̅) is no lower than C(T*, G*, S*, P*), since the former is the 
system cost resulted from choosing a transmission plan T̂ other than the optimal T*. One 
can thus naturally conclude that the cost of ignoring storage installation leads to a different 
plan and a cost no lower than the optimal.  And the difference between C(T̂, G̅, S̅, P̅) and 
C(T*, G*, S*, P*) is the “value of model enhancement to consider storage” (VoMES) in 
TEP: 




In a sense, this is the value of “smart” planning that proactively anticipates how storage 
will be installed and used, versus a naïve plan that overlooks storage.   
This value of smart planning is distinct from the overall “value of storage” VoS to 
the system, as in Khastieva et al. (2019), which is the cost improvement from a co-opti-
mized plan that only includes transmission and generation to a plan that co-optimized stor-
age as well; i.e., the reduction in cost from MP2 (no storage) to MP1 (all options):  
 VoS = C(T̂, Ĝ, 0, P̂) – C(T*, G*, S*, P*). 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Diagram of Value of Model Enhancement to consider Storage (VoMES) and 





Note that VoMES ≤ VoS in that the cost of MP3 will necessarily be no higher than 
MP2’s cost.  More specifically, this is because MP2 and MP3 have the same value of T, 
but MP3 is free to choose both G and S, while MP2 can only choose G as S is constrained 
to zero.  Their relationship is shown in Figure 4.1. One implication of this inequality is that 
the economic value that storage can potentially provide to the system can be offset by 
TEP’s naive disregarding storage expansion and its response to transmission expansion, in 
which case the net benefit will be the remainder of (VoS – VoMES).  Thus, the larger 
VoMES is (as a proportion of VoS), the greater the loss of storage benefits will be if naïve 
rather than proactive transmission planning is undertaken; in other words, the benefits of 
storage to the system is more dependent on transmission expansion planning. 
In this chapter, my focus is on the value of modeling to implement proactive TEP, 
and my major interest is, thus, in the calculation of VoMES to show what can be gained 
from proactive planning.  But the calculation of VoS is also useful as it illustrates one of 
the many types of insights that can be obtained from applying TEP models.  Readers should 
also bear in mind that the terms VoMES and VoS are not limited to the anticipated storage 
expansion, and they can easily extend such concepts to other aspects of the electricity sys-
tem.  The value of enhancing a model with generation-transmission co-optimization is cal-
culated by Spyrou et al. (2017); i.e., VoME of co-optimization, showing that co-optimiza-
tion can double the net cost savings from transmission expansion, comparing to purely 
reactive TEP; iterative planning (alternating between transmission and generation capacity 
expansion models) can partially but not fully realize these benefits.  For a review of en-
hancements that have been implemented in transmission expansion models, readers are 




4.3.4 Detailed Formulation Discussion  
The general formulation of MP1 is shown in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, and here, 
I provide some additional details specific to the model used in this Chapter.  Also, for a 
review of literature on co-optimization transmission and storage but omitting generation 
expansion, I refer the reader to works of Khastieva et al. (2019); Qiu et al. (2017). Some 
general assumptions include the following. 
In general, TEP models need to consider both short- and long-run uncertainties, 
since in Xu and Hobbs (2019) and Chapter 2 I have shown that considering a range of long-
run economic, regulatory, and technological scenarios in a two-stage stochastic program-
ming framework can make a significant and economically important difference in trans-
mission plans.  However, for the sake of simplicity in this chapter, the consideration of 
uncertainty will be limited to short-term variability, namely load, wind, solar, and hydro 
conditions.  For reviews of TEP models that consider long-term uncertainties, readers are 
referred to works of Ho et al. (2016); Munoz et al. (2014); Park et al. (2019); van der 
Weijde and Hobbs (2012).  
The operating constraints and costs of this model include the linearized unit com-
mitment formulation that was proposed in Kasina et al. (2013), in which start-up costs are 
included in the cost objective, while ramp rates, start-ups, and minimum output levels con-
strain generation levels. A more comprehensive version of this formulation with long-term 
planning and long-run uncertainties can be found in Chapter 2. Meanwhile, classic unit 
commitment formulations that use binary variables to represent generator commitment sta-
tus is given by Morales et al. (2013); Takriti et al. (1996); such variables are difficult to 




impractically large MILP models, and so transmission planning models tend to use simpler 
operating models. 
The network formulation is based upon a combination of a linearized DC load flow 
(DCOPF), which represents how Kirchhoff’s voltage law induces parallel flows in the net-
work (Glover et al., 2011), and disjunctive constraints that utilize the Big-M formulation 
(Winston et al., 2003).  Only high voltage facilities are represented.  For more advanced 
power flow modeling that  includes transmission losses and reactive power, readers are 
referred to Ozdemir et al. (2016); Zhang et al. (2013).  
Renewable portfolio standards by states are represented, including rules allowing 
one state to use renewable energy credits generated in other states to meet renewable obli-
gations as implemented in Ho et al. (2016) and Xu and Hobbs (2017).  Carbon policy is 
represented by a tax on carbon emissions. 
4.4 Numerical Example: Analysis of Value of Model Enhancement to 
Consider Storage 
4.4.1 Overview 
In this section, I present an example of co-optimization of transmission, generation, 
and storage is presented, which is based on a 54-node network aggregated from the system 
of Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) in the U.S. and the planning target 
year is 2034.  The network data are from the WECC 2026 Common Case (WECC, 2017), 
and I plan for the year 2034 based on the load, fuel cost, and policy data that are specified 
by WECC’s Long-Term Planning Tool (WECC, 2013a).  With this example, I will answer 




will decreasing costs of storage technology affect the transmission expansion planning? 
How much benefit can we get in transmission expansion planning by anticipating the 
storage expansion? From the point of view of potential storage investors: How will the 
transmission expansion planning affect the profitability of the storage technology? How 
much potential benefit is lost because the transmission planner naively ignores the 
possibility of storage expansion? After reviewing the test system in the next section, I will 
further decompose the questions in Section 4.4.3.   
4.4.2 Test Case Description: 54-node System for WECC 
In this subsection, I summarize the test system, a 54-node system for WECC.18  All 
54 nodes are further aggregated from the network that appeared in Xu and Hobbs (2018), 
which in turn, is a reduced network using the 2026 Common Case of WECC (WECC, 
2017).   
Each node of this 54-node system stands for one or part of a single Transmission 
Expansion Planning Policy Committee (TEPPC) subarea of WECC.  When one TEPPC 
subarea is totally within one state, one node will be designated; when one TEPPC area has 
assets spanning several states, e.g., the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
(LADWP), several nodes will be designated and one node will be defined for each state 
(see Figure 4.2, where LADWP has nodes in states of California, Nevada, and Utah).  All 
inter-area transmission lines are aggregated within each corridor by dropping the imped-
ances and summing the thermal limits; in other words, only thermal limits are preserved, 
which is shown on the arcs of Figure 4.2 (Next Page).   
 






































































There are 519 aggregated existing generators and 238 generator candidates in this 
network.  These generators span 25 technologies, including different types of Coal, Gas, 
Nuclear, Hydro, Wind, Solar, Geo, and Biomass generation. 
As for generation candidates, on each node, two types of generation can be invested 
without limit: Gas Combustion Turbine and Gas Combined Cycle.  On the other hand, the 
renewables, i.e., Wind, Solar, Bio, and Geothermal, can only be expanded at 53 candidate 
sites and will need new transmission lines to be interconnected with the existing grid.  The 
53 candidate sites (not the same as nodes) and their maximum installed capacity are iden-
tified in (Western Governors' Association and U.S. Dept. of Energy, 2009).  A system-
wide view of the building cost and the expandable capacity is shown in Table 4.1. 
 




















Biomass 120 4300 20 345.04 3272 - 
Combined 
Cycle 
10 1213 20 97.33 - - 
Combustion 
Turbine 
9 825 20 66.20 - - 
Geothermal 120 5000 25 354.76 4719 - 
Solar PV 20 1471 35 89.82 85144 26.0% 
Onshore 
Wind 
40 1355 20 108.72 95288 30.6% 
*: Assumes a 5% discount rate 
**: Summation over all candidate sites 
***: Weighted average over all candidate sites, weights are the potential capacity  
 
There are two types of transmission lines: backbone reinforcements and renewable 
connections.  Backbone reinforcement candidates, which are 39 in number, expand capac-




candidates corresponding to the 53 renewable candidate sites.  All of the transmission ca-
pacity expansion costs are calculated based on the length and the voltage level of the buses 
in the original network.  The average line cost is 640 Million $/line, with a lifetime of 60 
years.  Assuming a 5%/year discount rate, the average annualized cost of transmission lines 
is about 34 million$/line-year. 
The type of storage we consider is a battery electric-storage system (BESS), and 
the cost and operation data are based on WECC’s generation capital cost tool (WECC and 
Energy and Environmental Economics, 2017).  I assume that a BESS will have 4-hours of 
storage using Li-ion technology with a round-trip efficiency of 92%.  The build cost is 
assumed to be $440/kWh in the year 2034 (i.e., $1760/kW); with assumptions of 15-year 
lifetime and 5% discount rate, this corresponds to an annualized cost of $42.5/kWh-year.  
Storage can be sited (1) at any of the 54 existing nodes in the system or (2) co-sited with 
the renewables at the 53 candidate renewable sites.  Different siting locations will incur 
different fixed operation and maintenance costs (FOM cost), with the average being 
$30/kW-year.  More details on the cost assumptions can be found in WECC and Energy 
and Environmental Economics (2017), where shows a dramatic decreasing of the storage 
installation cost up to the year 2029 with a 38% decrease compared to the year 2016.19 
Storage is expandable up to a capacity of 1000 MW at each location. 
 
19 Also see Lazard (2018) for a projected decrease of 8%/year of Li-ion battery capital cost decrease, from 
2018 – 2022; see NREL (2019) for several projections of Li-ion battery capital cost decrease, e.g., mid-level 
decrease at a pace of 5.5%/year from 2018 – 2030, starting with $1484/kW.  Overall, existing researches 
agree upon the fact that capital cost of battery is plummeting but with great uncertainty.  This particularly 
motivates my approach here: instead of solving one scenario for one capital cost of battery, I solved ten of 




There are 4 representative days that are selected, and each day is composed of 24 
hours. Thus, 96 hours are simulated to represent the variability of load and renewable out-
put conditions. 
I assume that future policies in the WECC region will incentivize significant in-
creases in renewable generation.  There are two types of environmental policies that are 
assumed to affect the system in the year 2034: Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and 
Carbon Pricing.  The RPS data for the year 2034 are from the DSIRE (Database of State 
Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, (DSIRE, 2018)), and the demand data are from 
LTPT (WECC, 2013a) from WECC.  RPS policies are implemented on the State-level, and 
I consider the fact that some states have in-state requirements.  For example, in 2034, Cal-
ifornia requires 60% of its demand to be supplied by renewables and 90% of the renewables 
should come from within the State.  Overall, in 2034, the WECC system requires 38% of 
its demand (1091 TWh/year) to be supplied by renewables; and for the U.S. part of the 
WECC, this requirement is 34% of the total energy demand of 854 TWh/year. The non-
compliance penalty is assumed to be $100/MWh, which is imposed in the objective func-
tion if a given state’s RPS is not met. 
For carbon pricing policy, I assume a universal carbon tax will be implemented 
upon the WECC system (or equivalently, a carbon cap-and-trade system is implemented 
within WECC, and the carbon price reaches the assumed equilibrium level.)  The carbon 
tax varies among the different study cases I consider in this chapter.  For current carbon 
policy implementations in WECC, I refer readers to Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
In the application of this chapter, I omit the DC load flow’s voltage law constraint 




experiments indicate that this assumption results in a minor overstatement of the network’s 
transfer capability and results in only minor distortions in near-term transmission invest-
ments (Xu and Hobbs, 2019); for more details, I also refer readers to Chapter 3.  Thus, the 
power flow is a “pipe-and-bubbles” (transshipment) formulation.  Furthermore, binary var-
iables for both transmission and storage expansion are relaxed (i.e., are continuous in the 
range [0,1] rather than binary), again in the interest of faster computation times.  In its use 
of continuous variables, the model resembles classical generation expansion planning mod-
els, which are formulated as linear programs.  More realistic models can be used in actual 
planning, but this model suffices for the purpose of this chapter, which is to illustrate the 
use of co-optimization and the calculation of VoMES. 
4.4.3 Questions to be Answered and the Experimental Design 
With the numerical results from the application of the above model and data, I shall 
answer the following questions: 
1. Would the anticipation of the amount and siting of battery storage change the trans-
mission expansion decisions and how? Will the electric storage incentivize more or 
less capacity expansion of transmission?  Less transmission indicates that, overall, 
batteries and transmission are substitutes; more would indicate that they are com-
plements. 
2. What is the economic value of enhancing the TEP model to include storage (Vo-
MES)? And how will the VoMES change with the build cost of the storage?  Note 
that this is the not, per se, the benefit of storage itself, which is VoS, equal to the 
difference in cost between MP1 and the naïve model without any storage at all MP2.  




storage will be sited and adjusting transmission decisions to take advantage of that; 
as explained at the end of Section 2, this is the difference between MP1 and MP3’s 
objective function values. 
3. Will the stringency of carbon prices that impact electricity markets change VoMES? 
I.e., if the carbon price is applied to the system, will the anticipation of the siting of 
storage be more or less valuable to the TEP? 
4. What are the sources of cost savings from proactive TEP? In particular, when there 
is a positive VoMES, were the cost savings from investment in transmission or 
generation, or from reduced fuel or carbon costs?  Ignoring the storage in transmis-
sion expansion planning will change the transmission expansion plan, and may con-
sequently incentivize investors to make suboptimal siting and the operating deci-
sions—which of those will be distorted more?  It is also conceivable that transmis-
sion costs will also increase; perhaps disregarding the possibility of storage in 
model MP2 will result in overbuilding of transmission versus that optimal TEP 
from model MP1, which might find that transmission and storage substitutes.  That 
would indicate that, overall, transmission and storage are substitutes.  On the other 
hand, reduced investment in T in MP2 (no storage S) would indicate that T and S 
are instead complementary.  





Table 4.2. Experimental Design for Value of Storage in TEP: Sets of model runs 





10 levels of build cost of storage (from 100% of base-
level $42.5/kWh-year to 10% of base-level); 10 levels 
of WECC-wide carbon tax from $0/Metric ton to 




10 levels of WECC-wide carbon tax from $0/Metric 





Same as Set MP1, except that the transmission expan-
sion plan is fixed at the levels selected in MP2 with the 
same carbon tax. There are 10×10 =100 runs. 
 
4.4.4 The Impact of Storage on Transmission Expansion Plans 
In this section, I show how the storage expansion would affect the transmission 
expansion plan.  Below, I summarize some conclusions that I can draw from the detailed 
results presented later in this section: 
1) The anticipation of storage siting/sizing will change the transmission expansion 
plan. An example is given in Figure 4.3, where cheaper storage results in more line 
construction in some places (substitution relationship) and less in others (comple-
mentary relationship); that is, blue lines represent the expansion plan at a battery 
cost level of 100%, and solid red lines are additional lines included in the expansion 
plan when the battery cost level becomes 10%.  Note the additional lines expanded 
between Idaho and Oregon, Northern and Southern California, and within Southern 
New Mexico when the battery cost is decreased; meanwhile, one line between Ar-
izona and New Mexico is canceled (dashed line). 
2) The greater the level of the carbon tax that is applied to the system, the more the 




3) Storage expansion anticipation can both encourage and discourage transmission ex-
pansion, with complementary effects dominating under some assumptions and sub-
stitution effects in other; and finally, 
4) The way that the transmission expansion plan changes differs between types of 
transmission candidates, i.e., backbone reinforcement and renewable interconnect-
ors. While the interactions between the backbone reinforcement and storage expan-
sion are mixed, and location-dependent, the interaction between the renewable in-
terconnectors and the storage expansion is more clear and is larger in magnitude: 
(a) while carbon cost is low, storage substitutes for renewable interconnectors, 
while (b) when carbon cost is high, then as the BESS cost is decreased, storage first 
substitutes for renewable interconnectors and then complements them. 






Figure 4.3. Map of Backbone Reinforcement Expansion: Comparison between battery 
costs of 100% of the base case level ($42.5/kWh-year) and 10% of that level. Carbon Tax 






























































Figure 4.4. Transmission capacity expansion (backbone reinforcements only) by proac-
tive TEP models MP1 with different BESS costs compared to the result of the TEP model 
with “No BESS” MP2 (Energy Storage Cost at 100% = $42.5/kWh-year). 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the difference between MP1 and MP2’s investment in the back-
bone reinforcements (on inter-regional lines) in 33 (out of 110) study cases: carbon tax = 
$0, 60, 80/Metric ton CO2e, and battery cost ranging from $42.5/kWh-year to $4.25/kWh-
year.  The capacity of all new backbone lines, in MW, is added up to create this index.  The 
figure shows that in cases where carbon tax = $0/Metric ton, anticipating storage expansion 
does not change the total backbone reinforcements from the “No BESS” case.  The loca-
tions of additions do not change either.  On the other hand, the results show some impact 




price is set to $80/Metric ton CO2e, considering storage expansion can cause both the ad-
dition and the cancellation of lines, depending on the cost of batteries.  As a result, whether 
backbone lines and storage or complements depends on battery cost assumptions, and sur-
prisingly, this effect is nonmonotonic.  Under the highest carbon cost, the magnitude of the 
effect does not increase uniformly as battery cost falls, and the direction of the effect 
changes twice as that cost is adjusted. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Transmission capacity expansion of backbone reinforcements selected by 
models with carbon tax = $80/Metric Ton CO2e in the year 2034 
 
I now turn my attention to locational effects.  Figure 4.5 is a zoom-in for the case 




from 40% to 30% (corresponding to $16.98/kWh-year and $12.74/kWh-year, respectively), 
one line from Arizona to New Mexico is canceled; while the battery cost goes lower, sev-
eral line capacities are added to the system, encouraged by the storage expansion.  The 
locations of those additions are scattered throughout the west, some near load centers (Cal-
ifornia) and others closer to renewable solar resources (New Mexico).  This is essentially 
showing that the storage system can both substitute (in cases where lines are canceled be-
cause of lower storage cost) and complement (in cases where lines are built because of 
lower storage cost) the transmission expansion. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Transmission capacity expansion of renewable interconnectors by proactive 
TEP models MP1 with different BESS costs compared to the result of the TEP model with 





When I turn from backbone line expansion to renewable interconnections, the story 
goes in a similar direction but with a much larger magnitude.  A reminder: renewable in-
terconnectors are the lines necessary to deliver new renewable developments to the grid.  
The expanded capacity of those interconnectors is much higher than the backbones.  For 
instance, backbone reinforcements range from 3.7 to 11 GW, while for renewable inter-
connectors, the range of additions is 31 to 86 GW.  This much higher expansion of inter-
connectors reflects the impetus towards renewable development throughout the west re-
sulting from our assumed renewable and carbon policies as well as declining costs of re-
newables.  Figure 4.6 shows that anticipation of the storage expansion can both discourage 
or encourage interconnector expansion.  I highlight that in both cases with carbon tax = 
$60 and $80/Metric Ton CO2e, lower battery costs will first slightly complement the re-
newable interconnector expansion (expanded capacity is slightly higher when battery costs 
go lower) and then substitute for expansion (expanded capacity is lower with battery cost 
goes lower), and then reverses again, returning to a complementary effect.  
We can intuitively understand how the storage can substitute for interconnector ex-
pansion: you either transport the excessive energy out for consumption, i.e., transmission 
expansion, or save it for later; i.e., storage expansion and the model (and assumedly the 
market) will choose the most economical approach.  Meanwhile, in cases where the storage 
expansion encourages renewable interconnectors, the reason is basically that the cheaper 
storage makes some originally uneconomical intermittent power become economical and 
worthwhile to be connected.  An example is solar in New Mexico that is only available but 
very strong in the middle of the day; it is not developed at all in high battery cost cases, but 




where carbon price is at $80/Metric Ton CO2e, and battery cost is at 10% of the base level, 
a 1000 MW BESS is co-sited with a 1575 MW Solar PV facility at a renewable candidate 
site at Southwestern New Mexico and a transmission line with 850 MW capacity connects 
both of them to the main grid node at El Paso Electric (EPE) at New Mexico; however, 
none of these lines are invested in when battery cost is above 20% of the base level. 
Overall, I observe from the results that anticipation of storage expansion will 
change the transmission expansion plan from our TEP model, sometimes encouraging it, 
and at other times the opposite.  How much does this anticipation, with the resulted expan-
sion change, benefit us? Or equivalently, if we transmission planners ignore storage sit-
ing/sizing while making the plan, what is the cost we will bear? As was explained in 
Section 4.3.3, this benefit/cost is called VoMES, the value of TEP model enhancement to 
proactively anticipate storage and will be discussed next. 
4.4.5 Value of Considering Storage in Co-optimized Transmission Expansion Plan-
ning 
In this subsection, I calculate the value of storage in transmission expansion plan-
ning VoMES.  To restate the framework defined in Section 4.3.3 above, I first plan trans-
mission expansion T anticipating both generation G and storage S investments (MP1); sec-
ond, I naïvely plan the transmission expansion without considering storage (MP2, having 
only T and G as variables); finally I plug the resulting naïve plan from MP2 into a co-
optimization model that includes storage expansion to simulate the reaction from the mar-
ket to the naïve transmission plan (MP3, optimizing S and G, but freezing T at MP2’s 
levels).  The intent of VoMES is to simulate the efficiency loss resulting from the situation 




as well as the reaction of storage siting and operation to transmission reinforcements, but 
the storage investors still have the chance to react.  The difference between the objective 
function values of MP1 and MP3 is this index.  
The VoMES in TEP in all 100 test cases are shown in Figure 4.7, and the amount 
of investment for new lines is shown in Figure 4.8.  Two basic observations can be made 
concerning the trends in these figures.  
Initially, with the carbon tax fixed at a certain level, VoMES is monotonically in-
creasing as the battery cost goes lower.  In other words, the lower the battery cost is, the 
greater the value of storage expansion anticipation is the transmission planners.  The value 
is zero for the highest battery costs and lowest carbon costs because no storage is added by 
model MP1 in those cases, so the MP1 and MP3 solutions are identical.  Unsurprisingly, 
the highest values of VoMES are associated with solutions that install the most battery 
capacity.   
Second, the carbon tax is a factor in the value of anticipating storage, but the effect 
is not monotonic. In other words, a higher carbon tax does not necessarily make VoMES 
higher. For example, when the battery cost is half the base level (50% case), as the carbon 










Figure 4.8. Backbone and Renewable Interconnection Transmission Investment Cost in 









To help interpret the magnitude of VoMES, first, I compare it to the incremental 
transmission investments.  Their ratio gives an indication of the relative importance of in-
corporating the proactive/anticipative perspective in planning.  Figure 4.8 shows the trans-
mission expansion cost in all 100 MP1 test cases as well as the 10 MP2 cases that is without 
the storage siting.  In 68 out of 100 MP1 test cases, I see that lower transmission expansion 
investment costs result compared to the corresponding “No BESS” case, implying that an-
ticipating storage results in less transmission investment (substitution effect).  In the re-
maining 32 cases, proactive planning, including storage results in more transmission (com-
plementary effect).  The ratios of VoMES to the MP1 transmission investments are shown 
in Figure 4.9.  This shows that the value of proactive planning that recognizes storage is a 
significant fraction of total transmission investment under the higher carbon cost assump-
tions and lower battery costs, which are the runs that have the most battery investment. 
Although how carbon policy will affect the transmission is largely out of the scope 
of this chapter, Figure 4.8 also shows that carbon policy has more impact on the transmis-










The overall value of storage to the system (VoS) results are shown in Figure 4.10. 
As pointed out in Section 2, the larger VoMES is (as a proportion of VoS), the stronger the 
impact that naïve transmission expansion decisions (which disregard storage reactions) will 
have upon the final realization of the economic value of storage. Among all the test cases, 
VoMES is about 0-27% of the VoS, and the average is about 14%.  Thus, anticipating how 
storage siting and amounts will react to grid expansion can significantly enhance the value 
of storage. 
4.4.6 Sources of VoMES in Transmission Planning 
We have seen that anticipating the sizing/siting of the storage will change the trans-
mission expansion, and this change will provide an economic benefit (VoMES in TEP) to 
transmission expansion planners.  To understand why, it is important to examine the 
sources of the VoMES, in terms of whether it is reduced investment (and if so, of what 
type) or reduced operating costs.  Is VoMES positive because given the changed transmis-
sion plan, the market will react with different generation/storage expansion, or are those 
investments relatively unchanged and it is transmission investments that shift?  Is most of 
VoMES comprised of fuel and carbon cost savings, or do capital cost savings contribution 
a large portion? I will identify the primary sources of VoMES in the WECC case study as 
follows.   
Figure 4.11 to Figure 4.13 show the components of VoMES for 60 different test 
cases (one figure per carbon price = $0, 60, 80/Metric ton CO2e, and within each figure 
BESS costs from 100 % level to 10 %).  As a reminder, I calculate VoMES by taking the 
difference between two objective functions: (1) the objective of MP1, i.e., TEP with gen-




simulation with transmission expansion fixed from the “No BESS” case (MP2).  Here, I 
now consider the differences in individual sets of objective function terms, shown in Sec-
tion 2.4.1 of Chapter 2.  The five components I break out are the separate investments in 
transmission, generation, and storage; fuel and variable O&M costs of generation (exclud-
ing carbon costs); and environmental terms, namely the carbon tax and any penalties 
(“ACP”) associated with noncompliance with the state-level renewable portfolio standards. 
All three figures show the same pattern:  
1) The proactive transmission plan (MP1, which anticipates storage in TEP) is intro-
ducing more generation and storage expansion than the naïve plans (MP2, without 
storage anticipation), and thus the VoMES components associated with generation 
and storage investments are negative. Thus, by proactively planning, transmission 
planners also encourage investment in generation and storage.  
2) VoMES arises mostly from savings in operating costs and policy compliance: the 
additional G and S investment just discussed more than pays for itself in terms of 
lower fuel costs, variable operation & maintenance costs, start-up and shutdown 
costs, carbon taxes and the RPS alternative compliance penalty.  
3) Consistent with the changes in transmission expansion cost discussed in Section 
4.4.5, most scenarios have slightly more transmission investment, but about a third 
have less investment.  However, the changes in transmission investment itself is 




















Interestingly, these results imply that although the total amount of transmission in-
vestment doesn’t change greatly, there is a magnification effect in which the changes that 
do occur in amount and location induce much larger changes in generation and storage 
investment.   
Please see an example of this impact in Figure 4.14.  There, the generation expan-
sion and storage expansion gave different transmission plans. (Only Wind and Solar are 
shown in the figure because other generation expansions are minor.) Model MP1 is show-
ing the optimal expansions, and while MP3 is the reaction of the market if instead the naïve 
transmission plan is implemented. The results first show that in both MP1 and MP3, solar 
is more impacted than wind by battery installations spurred by low battery prices.  Second, 
they show that the effect of naïve TEP is correspondingly greater on solar investments than 
wind investments.  Proactive TEP that anticipates storage will facilitate a roughly doubling 
of the amount of storage installation under low battery prices, and up to a 30% increase in 
solar installations.  There are much smaller increases in wind capacity.  The reason is that 
solar is only available during the day, and the storage is potentially more valuable to it than 
the wind resource, which is distributed more evenly over all 24 hours.  Thus, ignoring 
storage expansion in TEP will undervalue the combination of solar and storage, resulting 
in less transmission being built for solar and, ultimately, less solar development since the 






Figure 4.14. Solar, Wind, and Storage Expansion, given transmission plans from differ-
ent TEPs, Carbon Price = $80/Metric Ton CO2e, Battery cost at 100% level = 
$42.45/kWh-year 
 
4.5 Conclusions and Limitation 
With renewable penetration increasing in many power systems, the need for the 
transmission grid to bring remote renewables to market is growing, as is the need for stor-
age.  Because of the 10 year or longer lead times for grid reinforcements, this transmission 
should be planned in a proactive manner, anticipating how generation and storage siting, 
amounts, types, and timing will be affected (Krishnan et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2013b; Sauma 
and Oren, 2006; Spyrou et al., 2017).  Will the best plans for integrating renewables include 




seen.  Whatever the answer is, a transmission expansion planning tool with generation and 
storage co-optimization will decrease the cost of renewable integration relative to naïve 
planning that does not anticipate how supply and storage investors will react to changes in 
the grid.  
This chapter presents and applies a proactive transmission expansion planning 
model with generation-storage co-optimization, building on our previous work on trans-
mission-generation co-optimization (Ho et al., 2016).  After applying this model to the test 
case, I show examples to calculate the economic value of model enhancements to consider 
storage expansion (VoMES) in TEP proactively.   
The results show that considering storage expansion in TEP will change the trans-
mission plan by helping to identify and correct: (1) overbuilt line capacities that can be 
avoided by building storage, primarily near renewable energy generation locations and (2) 
underbuilt line capacities that convey renewable resources that turn out to be economical 
only when accompanied by storage. In other words, the results show that the storage can 
both complement and substitute for transmission expansion.  
The VoMES in my example is primarily the net of two cost changes: the incremen-
tal investment for larger amounts of generation and storage expansion in a fully proactive 
TEP model, and the savings that the increased investment makes possible in operating costs, 
such as fuel and carbon costs.  Both occur because of improved transmission planning 
resulting from co-optimization with storage.  On the other hand, a naïve transmission plan, 
which is the result of a planning process that disregards potential storage expansion, can 




As shown in the example application to the western U.S. and Canada, as storage 
costs are reduced in the year 2034, the VoMES in TEP increases.  This highlights the need 
for a transmission planner to consider storage expansion in the planning process.  However, 
this VoMES is sensitive to the policies that are affecting the power system: in our case, the 
carbon price will affect the VoMES in TEP significantly. 
To conclude, improved TEP models have value if they result in system plans with 
lower costs.  This chapter has shown how this value can be quantified for one particular 
improvement, the incorporation of storage.  Elsewhere, my colleagues have quantified the 
value of enhancing transmission models to include just generation co-optimization (Spyrou 
et al., 2017) and I have calculated the value of recognizing long-run uncertainties in regu-
latory, economic, and technological conditions in Chapter 3 (also in Xu and Hobbs (2019)).  
In several cases these values are comparable in magnitude to the size of the transmission 




Chapter 5 A Model-Based Assessment of Border Carbon 
Adjustments in the Western North American 
Electricity Sector, Part I: Background, Model, 
and Theoretical Results 
5.1 Chapter Summary 
This is the first of two chapters in which I provide a multi-objective impact com-
parison of two groups of potential border carbon adjustment (BCA) schemes that can be 
applied to the California AB32 carbon cap-and-trade system, in particular, the electricity 
sector.  The California carbon pricing policy is a unilateral system embedded in an inter-
connected power system for western North America: the Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council (WECC).  Chapter 5 (this chapter) focuses on the introduction, model formulation, 
and theoretical results, while Chapter 6 presents the numerical results and resulting con-
clusions about the policy as well as the needed model improvements. 
In this chapter, following the general introduction (Sections 5.2 and 5.3), I modify 
JHSMINE to facilitate the modeling of BCA by introducing new variables and constraints 
(Section 5.4).  More specifically, I enhance JHSMINE to incorporate bilateral trading of 
energy credits between generators and state-level Load-Serving Entities (LSEs), such mod-
eling of bilateral energy credit trading is a generalization of renewable credit trading and 
keeps track of the imports/exports of power flowing between the states, which are the sub-
jects of BCA.   
After presenting the model formulation, I provide some model properties and the-
oretical results in Sections 5.5 and 5.6.  My results show that if the Californian emission 
regulator charges imports based on a uniform technology-neutral rate that is applied to all 




towards the internal generators of California, given an assumed carbon price.  If, on the 
other hand, the Californian emission regulator charges imports in a way that discriminates 
based on the source technology, my results confirm what is well known from previous 
analyses: that such a policy will create incentives to “contract shuffle” in order to make 
energy credits flowing into California look cleaner than energy contracts flowing between 
states in the rest of WECC (Bushnell et al., 2014).  Furthermore, if the California emission 
regulator (California Air Resources Board, CARB) also chooses to rebate emission charges 
for exports,20 such a policy will push energy credits contracts from California emitting 
generators to the rest of WECC, creating an extra incentive to import clean energy from 
the rest of WECC.  The contribution of this work is that: to the best of my knowledge, it is 
the first time that the BCA mechanism is incorporated within a power system planning 
model. 
5.2 Introduction 
All carbon pricing policies are limited in geographical and/or sector coverage 
(World Bank, 2017).  Further, limited coverage will introduce so-called carbon leakage: 
increased emissions in non-regulated jurisdictions or sectors because of higher costs in the 
regulated jurisdictions/sectors due to carbon pricing (IPCC, 2014).  This fact has spawned 
proposals for “border carbon adjustments” (BCA) in which imports and exports of com-
modities between regulated and external jurisdictions are regulated, subsidized, and/or 
taxed (or border tax adjustment, BTA) (Fischer and Fox, 2012; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007).  
Intuitively, the regulations/subsidies/taxes can be imposed upon the most elemental form 
 
20 Rebate exports here means to exempt the Californian emitting generators from the allowance surrendering 




of interactions: inter-state transactions.  A BCA on import transactions typically requires 
the buyer or the seller to pay a carbon tax or surrender carbon emission allowances at an 
assumed emission rate for the commodity, perhaps differentiated by source or other attrib-
utes.  BCA regulation can also specify whether to rebate export carbon taxes paid on trans-
actions or otherwise exempt them from paying for emissions (Fischer and Fox, 2012).  
However, because of the homogeneity of electricity (i.e., electricity end-users can-
not easily distinguish where or how their electricity is produced in interconnected power 
systems), two problematic but highly related facts emerge.  First, estimates of the emission 
rate of cross-border power flow can be inconsistent and even misleading (Jiusto, 2006).  
Consider a simple example (see Figure 5.1) in which node A consumes 50 MW as does 
node B, and they are connected by a 50 MW transmission line.  At node B, there are two 
plants: a gas plant generating 50 MW and a hydro facility generating 50 MW of electricity, 
and there are no plants at node A.  As a result, there is 50 MW of power flow flowing from 
node B to node A.  From the perspective of A, how much emission should be associated 
with this inbound power flow? Should we accept an assumption made by the regulator, 





Figure 5.1. A two-node diagram: How much emission should be associated with the 50 
MW power flow? Orange arrows: the assumed sources of transactions before carbon tax; 
Blue arrows: after carbon tax. 
 
An intuitive answer is to look at the contract signed for this 50 MW power flow 
and set the emission rate as the emission rate of the supply-side of the transaction; however, 
this leads to the second problematic result of the homogenous electricity commodity: con-
tract shuffling (or secondary dispatch).  If the original contract (designated as orange ar-
rows in Figure 5.1) is signed between consumers at node A and the gas plant at node B, 
and the emission regulator at node A chooses to put a carbon tax on this contract, the gas 
plant can instead sign a contract with consumers at node B and let the hydro facility serve 
the demand at node A (blue arrows in Figure 5.1); as a result, the imported power seems 
emission-free, and the generators avoid carbon taxes that A might charge imports without 
changing their physical dispatch at all.  Such an effect has been widely recognized by aca-
demia; for example, Bushnell et al. (2014); Chen et al. (2011); Ismer and Neuhoff (2007); 
and policymakers, for example, CAISO (2018).   
Efforts have been made to solve this dilemma of deemed emission rates for cross-
border transactions.  To policymakers in the regulated jurisdiction, a “solution” would be 
a set of deemed rates that would reduce the leakage without distorting market efficiency.  
There are several alternative approaches to calculate a deemed rate that would need to be 
assessed against these policy objectives.  For instance, the California Independent System 
Operator (CAISO) had proposed the so-called two-stage framework, which tried to calcu-
late the real-time composition of the California net imports (CAISO, 2017); although this 
proposal was not finally chosen, it highlights the possibility of using the real-time infor-




regime and then setting the deemed rate accordingly.  On the other hand, the “marginal 
emission” for the regulated market can also be a candidate proposal.  This can be argued 
based on a set of analyses of the price pass-through of carbon cost, such as in Kim et al. 
(2010), Sijm et al. (2012). Since electricity prices will be raised because of the imposed 
carbon cost (passing-through), the effective carbon tax can be set at the bid price of the 
marginal unit in the regulated market.  Using marginal pricing principles, the system oper-
ator can calculate the rise in price because of carbon pricing and, based on such a rise in 
price, artificially lower the price faced by external generators.  Such an approach has been 
proposed in the carbon pricing plan of the New York Independent System Operator 
(NYISO) (NYISO, 2018).  Specifically, the marginal emission factor has been estimated 
for the United Kingdom (UK) in Hawkes (2010), and for Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Mary-
land (PJM) interconnection in (PJM, 2019).   
The elements of BCA policy include not only the deemed emission rate for the 
cross-border transaction (how much to charge), and whether to discriminate among sources 
or over time (e.g., day vs night, summer vs winter), but also the direction of BCA (whom 
to charge/rebate): whether to charge imports or to rebate exports or both (Fischer and Fox, 
2012).  Thus, in this chapter and the next, I focus on providing a comprehensive impact 
assessment of different BCA schemes on the power system.  
More specifically, I ask the following two questions: (1) for a unilateral carbon 
pricing jurisdiction in an interconnected electricity market, how will BCA schemes affect 
the local emission reduction, emission leakage, regional electricity production, transmis-
sion expansion, and consumer payments? And (2) given the current California cap-and-




economic efficiency (i.e., lower overall emissions and higher societal welfare), do such 
schemes potentially exist and how large are their benefits?  
5.3 Background 
5.3.1 Emission Control by Emission Pricing 
In 1970, the U.S. Congress passed the profoundly influential 1970 Clean Air Act; 
this act aimed to protect the public health from air pollution no matter the cost, as it forbade 
benefit-cost analysis for air quality standard quantification (Oates, 1994).  Standards were 
to be set on the basis of a single objective: to protect public health.  At about the same time, 
people started to recognize the potential for the use of economic instruments for emission, 
as argued in seminal papers by Baumol and Oates (1971) and Baumol (1972). There ensued 
a fierce debate on whether to use economic instruments or continue with command-and-
control stands (Weitzman (1974), Montgomery (1972), and Baumol (1972)), but academia 
and governments gradually accepted the idea of internalizing the environmental externali-
ties by charging at a fixed price (tax), or, more commonly, establishing an emission allow-
ance market by setting the standards first and creating tonnage-based rights that could be 
traded among companies in order to motivate cost-efficient control.  As a result, in Title 
IV of the 1990 Amendments to the 1970 Clean Air Act, the U.S. Congress directed the 
Environmental Protection Agency to establish a nationwide emission permits trading sys-
tem for SO2, a big step toward acceptance of emission pricing (EPA, 2019b). 
The rest of the world then followed this precedent, broadening such market-based 




I use greenhouse gas and carbon emission interchangeably.21)  The European Union Emis-
sion Trading System (EU ETS) started to function in 2005. It was the first international 
emission trading system to cover the greenhouse gasses of CO2, N2O, and PFCs, and it 
aimed to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 to 57% of the 2005 level (European 
Commission, 2019b).  The Canadian government created its own carbon pricing policy in 
2018, requiring all local governments to establish a carbon pricing mechanism with a price 
floor (Morneau, 2018).  The British Columbia system, established in 2008, was seen as a 
model for the rest of the country.  In summary, governments all over the globe, including 
China, the most emitting country in the world, have started to recognize that emission pric-
ing is an important policy tool to encourage carbon emissions reductions (World Bank, 
2017), although some governments have grown skeptical of carbon trading as a stand-alone 
mechanism and have adopted other policies either to stabilize the carbon price and/or sub-
sidize green technology development and adoption, e.g., the carbon price floor proposed 
by U.K. (Hirst, 2018).  
The original pioneer of emission trading, the United States, has, however, fallen 
behind in the trend towards carbon pricing.  Currently, there are only two sub-national 
carbon cap-and-trade systems in the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) (RGGI, 2018), and the California cap-and-trade system (CARB, 2014; Pavley, 
2016).  Many other carbon pricing attempts are dead, including the national Waxman-
Markey bill that came close to adoption in 2009 (Waxman and Markey, 2009), and the 
Clean Power Plan proposed by the Obama Administration in its closing days (EPA, 2019a), 
 
21 Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are not limited to carbon emissions as they also include, for instance, Methane 
(CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), and Perfluorocarbons (PFC).  However, when people quantify the level of ef-
fluent, all these GHGs are represented in the unit of [mass]/CO2e, which is short for Carbon Dioxide Equiv-




the carbon tax bill in Washington state (Washington Secretary of State, 2018), and the cap-
and-trade bill in Oregon (Joint Committee on Carbon Reduction, 2019).  At the time of 
writing this thesis, the only new attempt to implement carbon pricing in the U.S. is led by 
the New York power system operator, which is trying to incorporate the social cost of 
carbon emission into the electricity markets (NYISO, 2018).  
5.3.2 Local Carbon Pricing and Carbon Leakage Mitigation 
Although more and more governments have joined the effort of cutting carbon 
emission by means of carbon pricing, the coverage of such policies is far from global.  For 
the United States, only 10 of the 50 states are covered by California and RGGI.  Therefore, 
this limited coverage leads to concerns about emission leakage in forms of a shift of pro-
duction activity from regulated regions to unregulated regions who then export to the for-
mer (IPCC, 2014).  In terms of the major objectives of carbon policy outlined above (cost 
and global emissions reduction), the inconsistent carbon policies that lead to leakage may 
be inefficient in that costs are increased to the economy because of shifts in production 
patterns while net emissions reductions are less than desired, resulting in high costs per 
unit of actual emissions reduction. 
With the recognition of this potential source of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, 
current carbon pricing regimes usually attempt to mitigate carbon leakage in some manner.  
For instance, EU ETS allocates some emission permits at no cost to sectors facing the 
carbon-pricing-introduced risk (European Commission, 2019a). This policy can lower 




markets as well as internal markets subject to import competition.22  By protecting vulner-
able sectors through this subsidy, the emission regulator attempts to keep production ac-
tivities inside the carbon pricing regimes.  As a result, emissions will tend to stay within 
the regulated region.  However, depending on the extent of competitiveness of outside sup-
ply, such measures, by lowering prices and increasing local demand, may also make local 
carbon goals more difficult and expensive to achieve (Zhao et al., 2010).   
Another choice is the aforementioned BCA, which directly deals with cross-border 
transactions.  For instance, the two subnational carbon pricing regimes of the U.S., RGGI 
and California Cap-and-Trade, adopt distinctly different BCA schemes for the electricity 
system in which they are nested.  On the one hand, RGGI is neither charging importing 
power for embodied carbon nor rebating allowances to exported power (RGGI, 2018).  
Meanwhile, on the other hand, the California cap-and-trade system charges imports, re-
quiring electricity importers to specify the source of electricity contracts and to surrender 
allowances based on the emissions rate of supply (CARB, 2014).  If no particular source is 
specified, a generic allowance surrender rate at 0.428ton/MWh is imposed.  California also 
does not rebate allowances for California plants that export power to other jurisdictions.  
Other States in the U.S. have also actively considered adopting carbon pricing.  For in-
stance, the electricity system operator of New York state, NYISO, proposed adopting a 
carbon cost roughly at $50/ton for generation sold in its market. Note that New York State 
is a member of RGGI, and the proposed carbon price is much higher than the current RGGI 
allowance price, which is around $5/ton up to the time of writing this thesis (RGGI, 2018).  
 
22 Per the rules of the EU ETS, a sector is facing such a risk if the carbon pricing introduces a direct or indirect 
cost of more than 5%, and if this sector’s trade intensity with non-EU countries is above 10%.  Trade intensity 
for each sector is calculated as the ratio between (Imports + Exports) and (Total Revenue + Imports) 




Such a unilateral action thus necessitates the adoption of a BCA scheme, and NYISO pro-
poses to lower the ex-post price faced by importers by the amount of CO2 premium caused 
by the new carbon pricing.23 
5.3.3 Review of Previous Analyses of BCA in Electricity and Other Sectors 
Since the seminal work of Markusen (1975), which pointed out that border taxes 
can be designed to internalize international externalities, there has been a great deal of 
literature on the impact of unilateral carbon pricing and border carbon adjustments.  Most 
have focused on competition among regulated and unregulated economic sectors within an 
economy and/or international trade (Antimiani et al., 2013; Burniaux et al., 2013; Eichner 
and Pethig, 2015; Elliott and Fullerton, 2014; Fouré et al., 2016; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; 
Lanz and Rausch, 2011).  The policies analyzed include unilateral taxation of imports, the 
forgiveness of carbon prices for exports, bilateral trade agreements, etc.  For example, 
Antimiani et al. (2013) argue that BCA can be ineffective for limiting carbon leakage and 
call for a cooperative solution between other economies without emission regulation.  Ad-
ditionally, Eichner and Pethig (2015) and Elliott and Fullerton (2014) gave examples of 
unilateral carbon pricing that can introduce negative carbon leakage to the rest of the sys-
tem, i.e., the carbon pricing implementation lowers emissions outside of the jurisdiction as 
well as inside.  Several works on BCA focus on the electricity sector, including Bushnell 
et al. (2014); Chen et al. (2011); Levin et al. (2019).  For example, Chen et al. (2011) and 
 
23 For example, suppose one importer imports 1 MW into NYISO region and the LMP at the boundary bus 
is $60/MWh, which is obtained from the ex post process after the real-time operation.  Then NYISO examine 
the market result and identified that this marginal price is set by a gas power plant inside NYISO with a 0.5 
ton/MWh emission rate.  NYISO then concludes that $40/ton x 0.5ton/MWh = $20/MWh out of $60MWh is 
raised by the carbon price.  Instead of paying the importer at $60/MWh, NYISO will pay $60/MWh - 




Bushnell et al. (2014) revealed that the high volume of contract shuffling in the electricity 
sector could accompany high carbon leakage in the California cap-and-trade system.   
As for the methodologies used by this literature, many papers have adopted general 
equilibrium models, such as Antimiani et al. (2013); Burniaux et al. (2013); Elliott and 
Fullerton (2014); Ismer and Neuhoff (2007); Lanz and Rausch (2011).  Others use engi-
neering-economic models of individual economic sectors that allow a richly detailed rep-
resentation of technological details and the impacts of policy on individual market partici-
pants. In this work, I choose a bottom-up approach in order to capture the diversity of 
generation technology, transmission limitations, and geographical distribution of fuels and 
demands that are critical to determining the impact of carbon regulation on trade patterns, 
costs, and prices within the power sector. I model the expansion decision of power gener-
ation, the hourly operation decision of generation and transmission, and the bilateral trad-
ing of the energy credit in a single optimization, which in turn is equivalent to a partial 
equilibrium that involves each relevant participant of the electricity sector. Similar model-
ing approaches can be seen in Bushnell et al. (2014); Lanz and Rausch (2011); Levin et al. 
(2019); Palmer et al. (2017). Other electricity analyses have been more aggregate, consid-
ering only supply curves in different markets (Chen, Liu, Hobbs), or just short-run opera-
tional (dispatch) effects ((Hytowitz, 2018)).  Lanz and Rausch (2011) provided a compar-
ison between the results from the top-down modeling approach and the bottom-up one, 
modeling a national carbon pricing policy in the United States; Levin et al. (2019), with a 
power system expansion planning model, showed that the adoption of carbon tax in Texas 





For analyses that model the electricity sector as complementarity problem repre-
sentation of a partial equilibrium, I refer readers to references such as Chen et al. (2011); 
Zhao et al. (2010).  My work here is different from the existing works in the following two 
respects: 
1) I provide detailed engineering-economic modeling of generation and transmission 
expansion in response to carbon pricing policies, whereas most previous works do 
not consider transmission investment. 
2) I provide detailed modeling of energy credit trading for renewable portfolio stand-
ards and its interaction with trade, leakage, contract shuffling, and BCA issues, and 
how they jointly affect investment.  In contrast, previous works either focus on 
carbon pricing, e.g., Chen et al. (2011) or disregards interstate/inter-jurisdictional 
interactions, e.g., Levin et al. (2019). 
5.4 Model Formulation  
5.4.1 General overview  
The general approach I take is to first formulate a partial equilibrium problem for a 
competitive multi-jurisdictional electricity market with transmission constraints and dif-
ferent carbon and RPS rules in each jurisdiction or subset of jurisdictions.  Then I show 
that there exists a single optimization model whose solution satisfies those equilibrium 
conditions.  If the solution is unique, then the optimization model can be used to simulate 
the market and show the impact of alternative formulations of carbon border tax rules.  This 
general approach is widely used in energy market modeling (Gabriel et al., 2013), and in 





Figure 5.2 summarizes the market structure in my model using a two-node example 
(please imagine the two nodes as two states), omitting the commodities of operating re-
serves, RPS credits, and carbon credits for the moment. The electricity market is in the 
middle, connected by solid arrows.  Electricity is a differentiated commodity by location 
and time, so the location and timing of consumption and production must be accounted for, 
resulting in differentiated prices.  In this chapter, I treat the electricity market as a central 
pool-based market.24 Generation companies generate electricity and sell it to an Independ-
ent System Operator (ISO) at the nodal locational marginal price (LMP), and the ISO trans-
mits the electricity to the load-serving entities (LSEs), charging LSEs at location marginal 
price.  Dashed arrows connect the relevant participants in the energy credit market, in 
which the generators perform bilateral trading of energy credits with the LSEs, and the 
latter buys the energy credits.  
 
 
24 As seen later in the experimental design (Chapter 6), the WECC power system is comprised of not only 
central pool-based markets like those of California, but also bilateral-contract-based electricity markets, e.g., 
Northwest Power Pool, in which vertically integrated utilities trade physical power transactions among them-
selves.  However, the central-pool modeling approach will not distort the result here. This is because under 
the assumption of the absence of market power, the equivalence among the (1) central pool-based market, (2) 
vertical integrated utility and, (3) bilateral market between generation companies and load-serving entities 
has been proved by Boucher and Smeers (2000).  Metzler et al. (2003) find an analogous equivalence in the 
case of a Cournot market among oligopolistic generators who are price taking with respect to the cost of 





Figure 5.2. A two-node diagram of the Electricity and Energy Credit Bilateral Trading 
 
Why do I model energy credits as separate commodities from electricity?  The short 
answer is that I use the credits and the associated market to separate other attributes of 
electricity from the power attribute.  When electricity is generated from a power plant, it 
is, in fact, tagged with different attributes, including the power, the associated emissions, 
the type of generation technology (especially the type of renewable energy), the point of 
origin or sink (if a bilateral contract is signed), and the timing of the generation.  In addition 
to the power, a demand/supply for another attribute is created when the regulator estab-
lishes a market-based policy instrument to encourage or limit that attribute.  For instance, 
demand for renewable credits by LSEs is created when an RPS law is passed by the regu-
lator; each LSE must provide a certain fraction or more of its sales from qualifying renew-
able sources.  In the case of carbon, it is essential to account for the point of sink, for 
example, if a carbon-priced generator claims part of its electricity production is exported 
to a region outside of the carbon pricing regime.  Meanwhile, the point of origin must be 




pricing: the electricity generated inside the carbon pricing regime will be charged the car-
bon price if it emits carbon dioxide.  The timing of the production can possibly be relevant, 
for example, in cases where the deliverability of the renewable credit is required to be 
accounted for at the hourly level.  In a proposed (but not implemented) carbon accounting 
scheme for the CAISO, hourly accounting would have been required (CAISO, 2017), 
which would have been burdensome and of questionable effectiveness (Hogan, 2017).  In-
deed, a regulator might be suspicious if a factory only working at night claims that it is 
emission-free because it buys all its solar credits from a solar farm; there are press reports 
of facilities claiming solar credits for solar generation at night (Watts, 2014).   
As these other attributes are simultaneously generated while the electricity is gen-
erated, I can, in fact, use a single energy credit variable to generalize all of them: this var-
iable will be indexed with the generator k (for the point or state of origin, the generation 
technology, and the emission), the node or state w (for the point where the power sinks), 
and hour h (for the time of generation). In the following model, I call this variable cpfw,h,k, 
which stands for the “contract power flow.” In different constraints, this variable plays 
different roles.  For example, in the LSE cost minimization, cpfw,h,k can be used to account 
both for imported emission (if multiplied by the deemed rate) while the generator k is lo-
cated outside the carbon-pricing state w, while also accounting for imported renewable 
credits (if the generator k is identified as a renewable resource by the state government; in 
other words, REw,k = 1).  Although rare, a generator can be both renewable and emitting 
carbon, e.g., a biomass steam turbine, and so have nonzero amounts of both types of attrib-




I organize the rest of the section in the following manner. Initially, I introduce new 
notation (variables, constraints, and coefficients) to JHSMINE (see Chapter 2) so that JHS-
MINE includes variable cpfw,h,k in a way that models regulation of power attributes. Then 
I list the optimization problems of different market players, and finally, at the end of this 
section, I show that the modified JHSMINE is equivalent to the union of these individual 
problems, by showing that JHSMINE’s KKT conditions are the same as the concatenation 
of the individual player problems’ KKTs plus market clearing for each commodity.  Please 
bear in mind that in this Chapter, JHSMINE is used in a setting of deterministic and static 
(single year) planning.  Consequently. the indices of (s,y) are dropped, and transmission 
and generation expansion costs are annualized so that I calculate the annualized total cost 
and profits for each player.  This assumes that multiyear dynamics in policy and technology 
are not a great influence on the outcome of the market; this may not be the case, but veri-
fying that is left to future research. 
5.4.2 Special Notation for Accounting for Power Generation Attributes 
ik Index: Bus i where the generator k is located. 
wk Index: State  w that financially owns the generator k; also called the home 
state of the generator k in this Chapter. 
cpfw,h,k Variable: Energy credit contract from the generator k to state-level LSE w 
at the hour h, unit: MW. 
cpfbw,h,k Variable: Energy credit contract purchased by the state-level LSE w from 
the generator k at the hour h, unit: MW. 
cpfsw,h,k Variable: Energy credit contract sold by the generator k to the state-level 




λ Dual variables: shadow prices of the constraints; the meaning and the unit 
depend on the super/subscript. 
AERh Parameter: Average emission rate at hour h, additional super/subscript will 
apply depending on the context, unit: ton/MWh. 
DRw,h,k Parameter: Deemed emission rate assumed for the energy credit contract 
between the state-level LSE w and the generator k at the hour h, unit: 
ton/MWh. 
GCOMIk Parameter: Initial generator availability of the generator k, unitless, zero to 
one.  For a full definition, check Chapter 2. 
GEXCAk Parameter: Annualized generation expansion cost, unit: $/year. 
GVCh,k Parameter: Variable cost of generator k, which is composed of fuel cost and 
variable O&M cost, unit: $/MWh. 
LCOMIl Parameter: Initial transmission availability of the transmission line l, unit-
less, binary. For a full definition, check Chapter 2. 
LEXCAl Parameter: Annualized transmission expansion cost for transmission line l, 
unit: $/year. 
MERh Parameter: Marginal emission rate at hour h, additional super/subscript will 
apply depending on the context, unit: ton/MWh. 
5.4.3 ISO problem 
The ISO’s objective is (1) to maximize its annualized profit from arbitraging across 




annualized capital cost of the transmission line.25, 26 The objective is to maximize equation 
(5.1), where the variable 𝜆ℎ,𝑖
𝐿𝑀𝑃 is the locational marginal price; the meanings of other var-
iables/parameters are given in Chapter 2.   
, , ,Maximize Congestion Rent
Transmission Construction Cost
LMP













  (5.1)   
Constraints (5.2) and (5.3), below, are the upper and lower limits of the power flow 
imposed by transmission line thermal limits.27 Constraint (5.4) keeps track of the line avail-
ability, and constraint 5.5 below is the upper limit of the line availability and the expansion 
decision. 
 
, ,0 ( ) ,h l l l h lpf LTM lstat h l−     (5.2) 
 , ,0 ( ) ,h l l l l hpf LTM lstat h l− −     (5.3) 
 ( ) 0 ( )Tel l l llstat LCOMI lincexp l− + =   (5.4) 
 ( ), 1 0 ( , )Ts Txl l l llstat lincexp l −     (5.5) 
The optimality conditions, i.e., the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions, of the ISO 
problem can be derived as in (5.6) to (5.7).28  Note that I scaled up the hourly constraint 
by the number of hours HWh while deriving the optimality conditions in the remainder of 
 
25 Although the ISO is not maximizing the congestion rent in the real word, it is a good approximation since 
it is equivalent to maximizing the surplus from supply and demand bids. See Hobbs et al. (2000). 
26 Given the discount rate (i) and the lifetime (N), the annualized capital cost (A) is calculated by multiplying 
the overnight capital cost (P) by the capital recovery factor (CRF), where the latter is defined as CRF = 
i(1+i)N/((1+i)N-1). The annualized capital cost represents a cash flow stream occurring at the end of each 
operating year before the end of the lifetime, and such a cash flow stream is equivalent to the overnight cost 
in the present value. 
27 Readers should notice that this is a pipes and bubbles representation, but a linearized DC load flow is 
possible. 
28 For linear programming, KKT conditions serve as both necessary and sufficient optimality conditions. See 




this section.  Also note that if the thermal limit is limiting the power flow, i.e., (5.9) or 
(5.10) is binding, a price difference between the two ends of the line will emerge because 
of (5.6).   
 ( ), , , , ,, 0 ,
LMP
h l h l h l i l h i
i
pf free LBI h l  − −  =    (5.6) 
 ( ), ,0 0Te Tsl h l h j h l l l
h
lstat HW LTM l    ⊥ −   + − +     (5.7) 
 0 0
Tx Te
l l l llincexp LEXCA l  ⊥ + +    (5.8) 
 
, ,0 0 ,h l h l l lpf LTM lstat h l ⊥ − +     (5.9) 
 , ,0 0 ,h l h l l lpf LTM lstat h l ⊥ +    (5.10) 
 ( ), 0Tel l l lfree lstat LCOMI lincexp l − + =    (5.11) 
 ( )0 , , 1 0Ts Txl l l llstat lincexp l  ⊥ − +    (5.12) 
5.4.4 Generation Companies 
Each generation company (GenCO) k attempts to maximize its annualized profit 
from the energy market, and thus, the objective is to maximize (5.13) subject to the Con-
straints (5.14) to (5.17); please notice that inasmuch as I formulate this as a GenCO specific 
problem, I omit “for all k” from the constraint domain.  Furthermore, I omitted nonnegative 
constraints for simplicity.  I omit requirements for operating reserves, but these can be 
readily included as discussed in Chapter 4, and as shown there, they do not make a signif-
icant difference in the market outcomes for the WECC market; this is also true for the 
linearized unit commitment shown in Chapter 4. 
The objective function of each GenCo (5.13) is the annual net profit, which equals 
the revenues from both the electricity market and the energy credits market minus the var-
iable cost, carbon allowance cost, and the fixed operation and maintenance cost.  If profit-




expansion cost; if it is not economical to keep the plant running, the generation capacity 
will be retired.  It is noteworthy that, for a generator inside a carbon pricing regime, if the 
export contract is subject to the rebate, extra revenue will be generated for every contract 
leaving the state.   
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The constraint (5.14) is the capacity limit of the generation output for each hour 
accounting for both forced outage rates and (in the case of renewables) wind or solar avail-
ability, and Constraint (5.15) requires the generator k to sell all the energy credits generated.  
The constraint (5.16) keeps track of the plant status, i.e., how much of the maximum ca-
pacity is available in a given hour.  The constraint (5.17) is the upper limit of the generator 
availability, expansion decision, and retirement decision.  See Chapter 2 for more explana-





, , ,0 ( )
cap
h k k h k k h kgopt GNPL GHAV gstat h−      (5.14) 
 ( ), , , ,0 Credith k w h k h k
w
gopt cpfs h− =   (5.15) 
 ( ) 0 ( )Gek k k k kgstat GCOMI gincexp gincret − + − =  (5.16) 
 ( ), , 1 0 ( , , )Gs Gx Grk k k k k kgstat gincexp gincret   −   (5.17) 
I can derive the optimality conditions of the generation profit maximization as (5.18) 
to (5.19).  The optimality conditions illustrate how power plants will be operated.  For 
instance, Condition (5.18) states that if the generator is operated below its capacity limit, 
the marginal benefit from selling electricity and energy credit must be equal to the marginal 
cost, which is composed of the carbon allowance payment and the variable cost.  Please 
pay attention to the condition (5.19), where the boxed term only appears for the case in 
which state wk is rebating the energy credit for any contracts involving exports from the at 
state. 
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Ge Gx
k k k k kgincexp GEXCA GNPL   ⊥  + +   (5.21) 
 0 0
Ge Gr
k k kgincret   ⊥ − +   (5.22) 
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h k h k k h k kgopt GNPL GHAV gstat h ⊥ − +      (5.23) 
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free gopt cpfs h − =   (5.24) 
 ( ), 0Gek k k k kfree gstat GCOMI gincexp gincret − + − =  (5.25) 




5.4.5 Load-Serving Entities 
I assume the LSE demand is purely inelastic (i.e., a fixed load), and thus the LSE 
is to minimize the cost of serving the load while meeting the RPS obligation.29 I also as-
sume LSEs are the so-called “first importers” of electricity, which is a term used in the 
California system to assign the obligation of paying for carbon emission. In other words, 
an LSE is assumed to be the owner of the electricity at the first point of delivery in Cali-
fornia and would be the point of regulation (CARB, 2014).  As a result, they are the subject 
of BCA (boxed term in the objective function 5.27). The deemed emissions rate applied 
can vary based on the policy assumptions for the particular run. The objective function of 
an LSE is to minimize (5.27) subject to constraints (5.28) to (5.32).  Please notice that 
insomuch as I formulated this as a state-level LSE-specific problem, I omitted “for all w” 
from the constraint domain.  Furthermore, I omitted nonnegative constraints for simplicity. 
 
29 This can be readily generalized to the cases where the demand is elastic, as shown in Chen et al. (2011).  
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  (5.27) 
Constraints (5.28) and (5.29) are, respectively, the general RPS requirement and 
the instate RPS requirement.  Note that energy credits brought from other states are not 
eligible for meeting the instate RPS requirement in this formulation.  Constraints (5.30) 
and (5.31) are the upper limit of the alternative compliance credits that LSE can buy from 
the government and the upper limit of load shedding.  The constraint (5.32) is a requirement 
to LSEs that the served load must be equal to the sum of bought energy credits, which will 
specify the composition of the generation that meets the supported load at an hourly reso-
lution.   
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We can derive the optimality conditions of the LSE problem as in (5.33) to (5.40). 
Again, the boxed item in the condition (5.35) only appears if the LSE is under the unilateral 
carbon pricing jurisdiction, and the latter chooses to implement a BCA that charges the 
importing transaction. 
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5.4.6 Market Clearing Conditions 
As aforementioned, there are two markets in this equilibrium:  the electricity market 
with its market-clearing condition (5.41) and the energy credit market with its market-
clearing condition (5.42).   
 ( ), , , , , ,, 0 ,
i
LMP Load
i h h k i l h l h i h i
k K l
free gopt LBI pf LOAD n h i
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w h k w h k w h k w h kfree cpfs cpfb cpf w h k = =   (5.42) 
5.4.7 An Equivalent Single Optimization 
There is a single optimization that is equivalent to the equilibrium comprising the 
problems of GenCos, LSEs, and the ISO in the above subsections.  The objective function 
of such a single optimization is to minimize (5.43), which is the sum of all individual ob-
jectives.  Note that the boxed term only appears when the carbon pricing regime charges 
the import at the assumed carbon tax/price and/or rebates carbon charges to exports.   
The first boxed term “LSE Border Carbon Charge” is the total payment from the 
LSEs to the emission regulator (who is not a market party within the model) due to the 
imported energy credit contracts; the domain of the summation, i.e., (w, k ∉ Kw) indicates 
that the BCA only applies to imported energy credit contracts.  The second boxed term 
“Generation Border Carbon Rebate” is the total revenue of GenCOs from the rebating ac-
tion from emission regulators; the domain of the summation, i.e., w ≠ wk indicates that 
GenCOs are gaining rebate revenue from all contract leaving its home state wk.  Readers 
are welcome to confirm that (5.43) is the same as the objective function listed in Chapter 
2 except the boxed terms, which are the modifications that this Chapter makes to the basic 




objective, this model simulates the actions of market parties in response to an emissions 
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  (5.43) 
The constraints (i.e., from (5.44) to (5.57)) are the union of all individual operation 
and construction constraints appearing in the above subsection. 
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It can be shown that there are one-to-one correspondences between all optimality 
conditions of the single optimization and the union of the optimality conditions of the in-
dividual problems and market clearing constraints shown above. See a proof in Appendix 
A. This implies the following fact: if there exists a solution of the equilibrium problem, i.e., 
the union of market party KKT conditions and market clearing conditions in Sections 5.4.3 
to 5.4.6, it will also be an optimal solution from the single optimization constituted by 




implies that I can obtain an equilibrium solution for the market by solving the single opti-
mization problem.  In summary, in the remainder of the analysis, I will solve a single op-
timization, which is equivalent to the market equilibrium problem. 
5.5 Properties of the Model & Market Structure 
In this subsection, I discuss some important properties and essential instruments 
that I will frequently refer to or use while explaining numerical results in Chapter 6.  First, 
I will discuss the deliverability constraint, which never appears in the previous works be-
fore; and subsequently, I will discuss some properties of two important dual variables, 𝜆𝑤,ℎ
𝐷𝑒𝑣 
and 𝜆𝑤
𝑅𝑃𝑆 that can be derived from the KKT conditions.  These discussions will lay the 
groundwork for further consideration of theoretical results in Section 5.6.  
5.5.1 Deliverability of the Energy Credits 
If I define that “energy credits are delivered” as “the net of the inbound/outbound 
of energy credit transactions equals the sum of cross-border power flows,” I can prove the 
deliverability of energy credits in the model.  Consequently, all renewable energy credits 
traded in the model will satisfy the deliverability requirement specified in the RPS of some 
states; e.g., Arizona RPS requirement, which requires the renewable credits sold to Arizona 
LSE must be available to Arizona consumers (DSIRE, 2018).  The proof goes as follows. 
By summing up (5.56) (node-level energy balance) to the state-level and comparing 
the result with (5.55), I can reach (5.58), which shows that all credits bought by a state 
must satisfy the state-level energy balance. 
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Then, by summing (5.45) over all generators in one state (the result is Eq.  (5.59)) 
and comparing the result with (5.58), I obtain the equality of (5.60) which states that all 
the energy credit contracts inbound/outbound from the state must, jointly, be equal to the 
sum of tie-line power flow minus the pseudo-tie power flows.  The tie-lines are the lines 
connecting two states, and the pseudo-tie power flows occur whenever a pseudo-tie plant 
is operating.  Pseudo-tie plants are defined here as the plants with financial ownership in-
side one state while the plant itself is physically in another state, i.e., (k ∈ Kw, ik ∉ Iw).30 
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  (5.60) 
In summary, the model formulation guarantees that every bilateral cross-border en-
ergy credit transaction can be delivered by the cross-border power flows between the origin 
and destination states.  It is not possible for more energy credits to be delivered into a state 
or other jurisdiction (or less, for that matter) than the amount of net power flows.  
It should be noted that the deliverability defined here is only one of many deliver-
ability requirements; to wit, the deliverability shown here is in the hourly resolution and at 
the state level and might be either overly restrictive or loose. It can be overly restrictive 
either because (1) the regulator might not require deliverability at all, for example, allowing 
 
30 There are other definitions of pseudo tie plant.  A pseudo tie plant might not be “owned” but instead oper-
ated as if it is within the other state.  A NV renewable plant might allow itself to be controlled by a California 
entity (e.g., imbalance power is provided within California) in order to qualify being Californian renewable.  




the usage of the so-called unbundled renewable energy credit to fulfill the RPS requirement, 
or because (2) the regulator might require deliverability in a coarse time-resolution, for 
example, a yearly balance.  These situations are readily accommodated in this modeling 
framework, as shown in Chapter 2.  On the other hand, the deliverability requirement here, 
however, can also be overly loose as it only requires the state-level tie-power flow feasi-
bility, while, in reality, the deliverability requirement of the energy credit contract might 
be in the form of specifying not only the points of origin and sink but also the path defined 
by the balancing areas through which a power transaction is deemed to flow.  In bilateral 
power transactions in the west, paths must be defined for day-ahead energy transactions, 
and transmission capability “acquired” (even though the true physical flows may be much 
different), such as required by the Electronic Tag maintained by the North American En-
ergy Standards Board (NAESB, 2016).  These, too, can be modeled in a linear program-
ming framework (Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004).  Given that the current hourly, state-level de-
liverability requirement has a middle-level stringency, I conclude that it is a good approx-
imation for the policies currently in place in the western US; in other words, my model 
requires that LSEs meet the RPS requirement at annual level, but also need to buy and 
account for the energy credits at the hourly level as part of the annual accounting. 
5.5.2 The Dual Variable of the Energy Credit Deliverability Constraint 
As a preparation of the forthcoming discussion in Section 5.5.3, here, I show that 
dual variables of the energy credit deliverability constraint (5.55), 𝜆𝑤,ℎ
𝐷𝑒𝑣, will converge to a 
single value among the states without a BCA.  In my case study, this means that this price 
of energy contracts is the same among all non-California states, but can differ from the 




any state without a BCA, the demand is supported by at least one non-renewable energy 
credit contracts.  Mathematically, I state this assumption as follows: (in the absence of this 
assumption, the shadow prices can diverge) 
 , , , , , , , , ,for all , :{ 0, : 0, 0}w h k w k w h k w h k w h kh w DR k RE cpfb cpfs cpf=  = = =  . 
To prove this, initially, I perform variable substitution on the following comple-
mentary constraints (excerpted below from Section 5.4, from each individual player prob-
lem; in particular, I excerpted the conditions from states without BCA and the conditions 
from non-renewable generators):  
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By variable substitution, I reach the following result: 
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Because a portion of the above condition will appear again several times later in 
this chapter, I use a shortcut to represent that part; to wit, I use Rh,k to represent the net of 
the electricity price minus the sum of the carbon allowance payment (if any), the variable 
cost, and the economic rent from the capacity constraint.  The right side of the condition 
says that this margin from the electricity market (including a deduction for the capacity 




Put differently, the energy and contract revenues on the margin equal the variable and car-
bon costs plus the capacity economic rent. 
Returning to the subject of the convergence of 𝜆𝑤,ℎ
𝐷𝑒𝑣 among the states without BCA, 
readers should quickly notice that as the model maintains the energy balance at the node-
level as well as the state-level, one deliverability constraint is redundant; i.e., I can drop 
the deliverability constraint for one state without affecting the solution, which I call the 
reference state (w*.)  If the reference state is a state without BCA; i.e., if DRw*,h,k = 0, I will 













This generator, however, can sell its credit to other states without BCA, so it must satisfy 




h k w hR −  . 
Combining these two intermediate results, I conclude: for other states without BCA, 
𝜆𝑤,ℎ
𝐷𝑒𝑣 must satisfy the following: 
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Similarly, for the same reason, a generator that supports any state without BCA 
other than w* must satisfy the following condition: 
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Combining the results of Condition (5.62) and Condition (5.63), I can conclude this 
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5.5.3 The Dual Variable of the Renewable Portfolio Standard Constraint 
In this subsection, I will show that the dual variable of the renewable portfolio 
standard constraint, also known as the renewable energy credit (REC) price, will converge 
to a single value among the states with neither BCA nor in-state RPS.  I assume that REC 
credits generated in one state can be used in any other state in the west.  In the more general 
case where only subsets of states can trade RECs with each other, this result will not apply 
(e.g., Perez et al. (2016)) 
Similarly to result (5.61), for renewable generators, if they are able to sell the en-
ergy credit to a state with neither BCA nor in-state RPS, the energy contract must satisfy 
the following condition: 
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Suppose one state that has neither a BCA nor an in-state RPS ( no Constraint (5.52)) 
(call it A) has a REC price of 𝜆𝐴
𝑅𝑃𝑆 and there is another state also with neither BCA nor in-
state RPS (call it B) with a different REC price 𝜆𝐵
𝑅𝑃𝑆.  Inasmuch as there must exist a gen-
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By taking the difference between these two conditions, I have: 
 .
RPS RPS




Since the notation of A and B are exchangeable, I conclude that all REC prices converge 
to a single value among all states that are with neither BCA nor in-state RPS. 
5.6 Theoretical Results 
In this section, I provide theoretical results that readily follow from the properties 
established in Section 5.5, plus some data assumptions.  Theoretical results shown here 
will explain most of the numerical results will appear later in Chapter 6.  
5.6.1 A-B-C-D-L Relation 
In this section, I introduce an essential instrument to which I will frequently refer 
in the following discussion: the A-B-C-D-L relation.  Before delving into the mathematical 
formulation, here are some special simplifications I make for the purposes of this section: 
as all the following formulas are respected in each hour, the index of hour can thus be 
omitted.  Besides, for any generator k, if its home state wk is without an RPS, it is considered 
as a non-renewable generator by any other state.  To put these assumptions in mathematical 













Furthermore, as all states but California in my WECC test system are without both 
a BCA and an in-state RPS requirement31 (DSIRE, 2018), results derived from the Section 
5.5 apply; that is, their REC prices 𝜆𝑤
𝑅𝑃𝑆 converge to a single value and the dual variables 
 
31 Please notice that, there are at least two types of restrictions of energy credit trading, which are conceptu-
ally related. One is identified as in Perez et al. (2016), specifying the origin of the the energy credit; the other, 
is to require the deliverability to the consumer, as I am using here.  These two are related in the way that the 




of the energy credit deliverability constraint 𝜆𝑤,ℎ
𝐷𝑒𝑣 converge to zero (0).  I can thus call the 
union of all WECC states but California as “the Rest of WECC”, or “ROW” for short. 
As a result, for the purposes of analyzing REC and energy credit prices, I can simply 
represent the WECC system using two areas, California and the Rest of WECC (ROW).  
Furthermore, at each hour, I can group all generators in WECC into eight (8 = 23) groups 
(see Table 5.1), depending on (a) whether or not a generator is renewable, (b) whether or 
not the ownership of this generator is in California, and (c) whether the generator is selling 
its energy credit to California or the ROW.  A generator group can be empty, and they are 
not mutually exclusive; the groups can also differ by each hour. 
Table 5.1. Eight Groups of Generators 
Group Home Renewable Sell Energy Credits to 
K1 California Yes California 
K2 California Yes ROW 
K3 California No California 
K4 California No ROW 
K5 ROW Yes California 
K6 ROW Yes ROW 
K7 ROW No California 
K8 ROW No ROW 
 
Due to the impact of California’s BCA, the energy credit contract flowing into Cal-
ifornia or out of California will have an impact on the KKT conditions of each individual 
player; for example, for a generator belonging to K1 (i.e., renewable generators that belong 
to California and sell energy credits to the California LSE), the energy credit contract var-






, , , ,
1








CA h k h k CA CA CA h
RPS
ROW h k h k CA h k ROW
RPS IRPS Dev RPS





cpf R CTAX DR
CTAX DR
A B CLD
L C A B D k K
  

   
  ⊥ − − − =
  
 ⊥ − − 
→ + − + 
→  − − + 
 
The maximum condition in the last inequality arises because this condition applies to all k, 
but the CTAXCA DRh,k term is the only one that is specific to a given k.   
In words, the extra payment to deliver energy contracts in California (Lh) is at least 
equal to (1) the difference between California’s RPS price (from the general RPS constraint, 
A, and the in-state RPS constraint, B) and the ROW RPS price (C), plus (2) the maximum 
carbon cost per MWh among all renewable generators in California (Dh,k).  I call such a 
condition the “A-B-C-D-L” relation.  Note that for generators in group K1-K4, Dh,k only 
appears if the California emission regulator chooses to rebate emissions costs associated 
with exports from California.  Similarly, I can derive the A-B-C-D-L relation for each group 
from K1 to K4: 
 ( )1 , 1: max | ,h h kK L C A B D k K − − +   
 ( )2 , 2: min | ,h h kK L C A B D k K − − +   
 ( )3 , 3: max | ,h h kK L D k K   
 ( )4 , 4: min | .h h kK L D k K   
For generators in group K5-K8, I can have a similar derivation.  For example, for 
generators in K5 (renewable generators that belong to ROW but sells its energy credits to 
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As a result, for generators in group K5-K8, I summarize the results as follows: 
 ( )5 , 5: max | ,h h kK L C A D k K − +   
 ( )6 , 6: min | ,h h kK L C A D k K − +   
 ( )7 , 7: max | ,h h kK L D k K   
 ( )8 , 8: min | .h h kK L D k K   
To conclude this section, I summarize the A-B-C-D-L relation for all eight groups 
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  (5.67). 
5.6.2 Scope Limit  
While providing theoretical results, I limit my scope to commonly appeared cases 
that satisfy the conditions listed below; in other words, although there exist 28 = 256 situ-
ations depending on which of the eight categories of generators are empty, I limited my 
scope to a subset of 15 situations.   
1) The portion of the REC price of California that corresponds to the non-instate price 




2) The REC price of California in-state RPS is nonzero; that is (B > 0).   
3) At least one Californian renewable generator sells its generated energy credit lo-
cally; that is, K1 ≠ Ø, 
4) No California renewable generator sells its generated energy credit to ROW; that is 
K2 = Ø, and 
5) At least one ROW conventional generator sells its generated energy credit to any 
state of ROW; that is K8 ≠ Ø, 
6) At least one Californian conventional generator is generating electricity; that is K3 
∪ K4 ≠ Ø,  
7) At least one ROW renewable generator is generating electricity; that is K5 ∪ K6 ≠ 
Ø, and 
8) At least one ROW generator is selling its energy credit to California; that is K5 ∪ 
K7 ≠ Ø. 
5.6.3 Technology-Neutral Deemed Rate 
In this section, I show that if the emission regulator implements the technology-
neutral deemed emission rate for power imports to California, including both the time-
varying and static deemed rates cases, such an implementation will function as a technol-
ogy-neutral subsidy to all Californian generators. To wit, while Dh,k is the same for all 
generators in K5-K8, Lh will rise with higher Dh.  This will increase the profitability of 
generation in California and, therefore, in many cases, the amount of such generation that 
is built and operated.  The argument goes as follows. 
Initially, under the technology-neutral deemed rate, the A-B-C-D-L relations of all 
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. 
This is derived as follows.  When A = C, the conditions involving K5 and K7 are the same, 
and consequently, Lh = Dh due to K8 ≠ Ø, furthermore, K4 = Ø and K3 ≠ Ø, implying a 
situation that California is a pure importer of energy credits and all Californian non-renew-
able energy credits stay local.  
Overall, within the limited scope specified in Section 5.6.2, I can conclude that if 
the REC price of California and that for the ROW coincide, I will have Lh = Dh, and Cali-
fornia is a pure importer of energy credits; consequently, a higher deemed rate will intro-
duce higher revenue to the local generators in a technology-neutral way.  Furthermore, 
imported contracts will not receive any extra revenue for their contracts: Lh and Dh will 
cancel each other.  In other words, for conventional generators in the ROW, the price at 
which they trade their energy credits with Californian LSEs is zero, and they only receive 
the energy price; for ROW renewable generators trading with Californian LSEs, the energy 
credit trading price is just the REC price.   
More interestingly, given the deemed emission rate, as a higher carbon price will 
introduce a higher Dh, it will also act as a higher subsidy to local generators. This will result 
in both more local (gas-based) generation in California, as well as higher profits for that 
generation sector.  Consequently, if the regulator sets a high value for the technology-neu-
tral deemed emission rate, the carbon price itself will behave as a subsidy to the emitting 




5.6.4 Technology-Based Deemed Rate 
Under the same assumptions mentioned at the beginning of Section 5.6.2, I show 
below the theoretical result while the Californian emission regulator chooses to base the 
deemed emission rate on the generation technology associated with each energy credit con-
tract; that is, DRh,k = GERk. Such a policy will cause low emission energy credits from 
ROW to be imported to California as much as possible: all imported energy credits will 
appear to be emitting less than any energy credit flowing among the states of ROW.  
Initially, under the technology-based deemed rate, A-B-C-D-L relations of all eight 
generator groups (given A = C) are as follows:  
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Assuming that A = C, consider the following situations: (a) if K4 ≠ Ø, then K5 or  
K7 must be emission-free, and Lh = 0, implying that if California is importing any energy 
credit while exporting simultaneously, imports must look emission-free.  Now consider (b) 
if K4 = Ø; i.e., California is purely importing credits, inasmuch as K5 ∪ K7 ≠ Ø and K6 ∪ 
K8 ≠ Ø, I can further conclude that any energy credit contract transaction inbound to Cali-
fornia (i.e., K5 or K7 or both) must emit no more than the energy credit contract transaction 
flowing among ROW states (i.e., K6 or K8 or both). In other words, if a ROW-ROW con-
tract is emission-free (in the eyes of the Californian emission regulator), all imports will be 
emission-free. 
In conclusion, if the Californian regulator implements a BCA with technology-




California is exporting any credits) or as clean or cleaner than the energy credits flowing 
between ROW states (if California is not exporting any credits).  
5.6.5 Rebating Exports with Technology-Based Deemed Rate 
In this section, I will show that: while the Californian emission regulator chooses 
to rebate exports in addition to charging imports, such a policy results in export to the ROW 
of emitting energy credits generated inside California; this contrasts with what I might call 
the “vacuum” effect (drawing in zero-emission credits from the ROW) caused by charging 
imports.  By looking at the A-B-C-D-L relationships, which I reproduce below given A = 
C, I can conclude that energy credits flowing from California to ROW (K4) or among ROW 
states (K6 or K8) must emit more than what flows to California. 
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The California emission regulator’s policy of rebating carbon costs associated with 
exports will encourage the emitting energy credits to be exported (generators in K4 need to 
be the heavily emitting ones to satisfy the conditions above).  However, the LSEs still have 
to acquire energy credits to match the demand they serve; because of the charges on imports, 
the only choice left for Californian LSE is to buy clean energy credit from the ROW.  As 
a result, just like the fact that charging imports creates an incentive to importing low-emit-
ting energy credits, rebating exports creates an extra economic incentive to generate emis-
sion-free energy credits inside California or ROW.   
In summary, this section has shown the following results, several of which are 




1) A technology-neutral deemed emission rate will work as a technology-neutral 
subsidy towards Californian generators; in particular, given a deemed rate, this 
subsidy is higher when the carbon price is higher. 
2) Charging imports based on emission rates of the source-side of the ROW-to-
CA power contract will create an incentive to import emission-free power con-
tracts as much as possible up to the point that the most emitting ROW-to-CA 
power contract looks as clean as or cleaner than any ROW-to-ROW power con-
tract. 
3) Rebating exports based on emission rates of the source-side of CA-ROW will 
create incentives for emitting generators in California to export their power con-
tract; as a consequence, a California LSE is left with a stronger incentive to buy 
emission-free power as much as possible, from both the ROW and California.  
5.7 Conclusions and Limitations 
In this chapter, I provide the model structure and some theoretical results for anal-
yses of BCA policies power markets subject to local carbon regulation in some jurisdic-
tions as well as RPS policies.  The model structure presented here showed necessary is a 
modification to the basic JHSMINE formulation of Chapter 2, which paves the way for the 
numerical results of the next chapter.  It is, however, noteworthy that this enhanced JHS-
MINE can perform more analyses other than just the single state (California) carbon pric-
ing that readers will see in the next chapter; for example, multi-state carbon pricing can be 
easily modeled by changing some parameters.  On the other hand, limiting the scope can 




numerical observation, e.g., why rebating the carbon costs of California exports can en-
courage the system to build more clean energy in the ROW.   
However, as noted above, all of the theoretical results that I derived are subject to 
strong assumptions, e.g., free-trading of renewable energy credits throughout the WECC 
except California, the in-state renewable policy of California is always binding with posi-
tive shadow prices, etc.  Such complication arises from the fact that I use a single variable 
to represent both the interstate power contract (used to account for carbon emissions) and 
renewable credit trading; in other words, carbon emission accounting and renewable credit 
accounting are bundled.  The theoretical results would be much more generalizable if these 





Chapter 6 A Model-Based Assessment of Border Carbon 
Adjustments in the Western North American 
Electricity Sector, Part II: Experimental 
Design and Case Study 
6.1 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I demonstrate the experimental design and the results for the re-
search questions raised at the end of Section 5.2.  To reiterate, the questions I address are 
as follows: 
1) For a unilateral carbon pricing jurisdiction in an interconnected electricity market, 
how will BCA schemes affect local emissions reduction, emissions leakage, re-
gional electricity production, transmission expansion, and consumer payments?  
2) Given the current California carbon pricing scheme, if I define a “better” border-
cost adjustment scheme as one achieving more system-wide economic efficiency 
(i.e., lower overall emissions and higher societal welfare for the WECC as total), 
would such as scheme require changing the definition of which emissions are sub-
ject to BCA (to charge power imports or to rebate power exports)? Or would it 
require a change in the deemed emissions rate (how much to charge)? 
To address these questions, I consider several possible modifications of the current 
implementation of AB32 in California (CARB, 2014) and separate the alternative schemes 
under investigation into two groups. Group One represents alternative approaches for cal-
culating the deemed emission rate set for energy credit contracts that Californian LSEs 
import. Group Two is composed of four alternatives in which the emission regulator allows 
either none, either, or both charging of emissions associated with imports and rebating of 




technology-based deemed rate scheme.  These alternatives are summarized in Table 6.1.  
Comparisons of these alternatives allow me to address the above research questions.  








Deemed Rate Scheme 






1 Yes No Technology-based 
2 Yes No Constant* 
3 Yes No Time-varying Marginal-Internal 
4 Yes No Time-varying Marginal-External 
5 Yes No Time-varying Average-Internal 





7 No No N.A. 
8 (Same as 1) Yes No Technology-based 
9 No Yes Technology-based 
10 Yes Yes Technology-based 
*A range of levels of the constant deemed rate are evaluated 
 
The impact metrics include overall regional (WECC) carbon emissions, indicators 
of emissions leakage based on distributions of carbon emissions between California and 
the ROW, distribution of electricity production among states and generation types, total 
market (social) costs, and California consumer payments.  Although my emphasis is on 
overall efficiency (the minimum social cost of achieving alternative targets for emissions 
reduction), the other metrics will shed light on the trade-offs between the local and regional 
objectives, and help California policymakers to infer the effectiveness of the policy on 
improving local welfare.  
As for total carbon emissions and local emissions distributions, my results lead to 
several policy-relevant conclusions.  (1) The current practice of charging California im-
ports based on emission rate of the source facility of the energy contract can lead to large 




California generators can lead to the highest reduction in carbon leakage but with an in-
crease of California consumer payments.  (2) Refining the deemed emission rate to vary 
by time of day or season of the year only leads to shifting of emission from generators 
external to the carbon pricing regime to internal generators (reducing carbon leakage), 
while the total emissions only decrease by a limited amount.  (3) Among all the assessed 
BCA schemes, a scheme that bases the deemed rate on the marginal external emission rate 
leads to the best overall economic efficiency, in terms of being on the efficient frontier of 
west-wide emissions versus total social cost.  I note that these conclusions may be system-
specific and may not apply in general to all local carbon regulation schemes that are con-
sidering BCA schemes. 
With regard to the relationship between carbon emissions and California consumer 
payments, my results show the following. (1) A higher constant deemed rate will raise 
California consumer costs, but that they are at least in part offset by increases in California 
government revenues from carbon permits.  (2) Among the time-varying schemes in Group 
One, the cheapest cost to California consumers can be achieved by basing the deemed rate 
on the average emissions caused by internal generators, followed by marginal emissions 
caused by internal generators.  (3) Among the schemes in Group Two, when rebating ex-
ports and charging imports are happening simultaneously, the system can achieve the west-
wide carbon emission reduction with a slight increase in consumer cost.  
In the following sections, I start by defining alternative deemed emission rates in 
Group One and alternative BCA structures in Group Two (Section 6.2).  To calculate some 
of those equilibria, an iterative Gauss-Seidel approach is required to find marginal or av-




Section 6.3.  I then move on to explain the data I use in this set of analyses (Section 6.4).  
Finally, after showing and discussing the results of the comparisons (Section 6.5), , I pre-
sent a set of concluding remarks and a summary of key results (Section 6.6). 
6.2 Deemed Rate Schemes 
As mentioned in the previous section, I investigate two groups of BCA schemes. In 
this section, I provide a roadmap of how I model different deemed rate schemes (Group 
One), while Group Two’s schemes are self-explanatory.  Group One is composed of six 
alternative deemed emission rate schemes (Cases 1-6, Table 6.1), i.e., cases that differ in 
how the parameter sets DRw,h,k is calculated.  The deemed emission rate (hereafter, deemed 
rate) is defined as how much CO2e emissions the regulator assigns to each energy credit 
transaction.  For simplicity, the dimension of CO2e (metric tons) is hereafter is referred to 
as tons. 
The first deemed rate setting (Case 1, Table 6.1) is based on the supply-side of a 
contract as currently implemented in the California carbon pricing system, where the first 
deliverer (importer) must specify the source of emission associated with the contract and 
surrender the associated emission allowances in proportion to the source’s emissions.  If 
the first deliverer can (or chooses) not to specify the source, an “unspecified-source” emis-
sion will apply at 0.428 ton/MWh (Bushnell et al., 2014; Pavley, 2016).32  Intuitively, this 
provides an approach for coal plants to mask their emissions by not reporting the source, 
but it may also be viewed as penalizing renewable sources whose emissions are less than 
that rate.  However, in this analysis, the “unspecified-source” is not modeled for the 
 
32 For example, in 2017, among all imported electricity (around 94 TWh), 20% of imports are unspecified. 
For comparison, around 21 TWh is specified coal and gas while 51 TWh is non-emitting resources. See the 




following two reasons: (1) all interstate contracts are tagged with a source-generator, so 
the emissions are already source-specified (see the previous chapter), and (2) as we see in 
the results, the contract shuffling volume is so large that even though imported generation 
is assumed to be required to be source-specified, shuffling conceals the true source.  As a 
result, imports can appear almost emission-free, at least from the point of view of the BCA. 
This obviates the need to model the masking of imported emissions using “unspecified-
source.” 33 
The second deemed rate setting (Case 2, Table 6.1) is to apply a uniform deem rate 
for all contracts at all times, i.e., a constant, non-dynamic technology-neutral deemed rate. 
I test a range of deemed rates from zero (0) to 0.45 ton/MMBTU, the latter corresponding 
to the emission rate of a typical natural gas combustion turbine.  At one extreme, a zero 
deemed rate is the same as the pure supply-side/source-based carbon pricing case in which 
only California sources are regulated (Chen et al., 2011), because LSEs have no responsi-
bility to report the imported emission and surrender the associated allowances.  Under any 
of the uniform deemed rates tested, there will be no incentive to shuffle contracts. 
The third and fourth types of deemed rate settings apply a time-varying deemed 
rate, and they are respectively based on the marginal emissions internal or external to the 
carbon pricing jurisdiction (Cases 3 and 4, Table 6.1); in other words, the deemed rate of 
each hour is defined as how much emissions changes internally (or externally) to the car-
bon pricing jurisdiction if the state-level load served by internal (external) sources varies 
by 1 unit.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, setting the deemed rate based on marginal 
 
33 This analysis, the cost of efforts to identify a source of import is assumed to be negligible; however, the 
model can be extended to include difficulty of source-specification using an assumed transaction cost; and 




emissions of internal generators follows the logic of “the carbon pricing policy rais(ing) 
the cost of marginal units which in turn set the electricity prices” (NYISO, 2018). It is then 
argued that by basing the deemed rate on internal marginal emissions, the regulator can roll 
back the extra payment to the outside generators caused by internal carbon pricing (ibid.).  
In this sense, the alternative (Case 3) I test here is closest to the NYISO proposal (ibid.).   
The fifth and sixth types of deemed rate settings also apply time-varying deemed 
rates, but they are respectively based on the average, rather than marginal, emissions inter-
nal or external to the carbon pricing jurisdiction (Case 5 and 6, Table 6.1).   
To calculate marginal emissions in Cases 3 and 4, I raise the load of the carbon 
pricing jurisdiction (in this case, California) by a small incremental amount in each hour.  
I do this by moving up the energy demand on every bus inside the state in proportion to the 
original demand (Eq. 6.1 below uses California as an example).  And then, I re-dispatch 
the entire multistate system; the incremental system-wide emissions are the marginal emis-
sions respect to the demand increase.  This total is then apportioned to internal and external 
emissions rates as follows.  External marginal emissions are calculated by dividing incre-
mental external emissions by incremental external generation.  Internal marginal emissions 
are instead obtained by dividing incremental internal emissions by incremental internal 
generation.  
To take California as an example: the external marginal emissions are the sum of 
incremental emissions from the generators located in the rest of WECC. The marginal in-
ternal (external) emission rate, however, is the incremental emissions inside (outside) the 
carbon regime divided by the incremental generation inside (outside) of the jurisdiction 




external marginal emission rate, it is possible that the all the incremental generation of 
interest is from inside the state, making the denominator equal to zero (or vice versa); in 
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Meanwhile, the average emission rate calculation does not involve re-dispatch and is cal-














































In summary, I shall test all six alternative deemed rates systems in Group One, 
defined above, some of which may involve extra calculation.  In the next section, I will 
demonstrate the Gauss-Seidel iteration approach I use to calculate time-varying deemed 
rates.   
 




6.3 Find Time-Varying Deemed Emission Rates – a Fixed Point 
Problem 
Finding the time-varying deemed rates in Cases 3-6 is essentially finding the solu-
tion to a fixed-point problem.  To wit, let the procedure of calculating the marginal/average 
emission rate (i.e., Equations 6.1 to 6.3) be represented as a fixed point problem in which 
we are attempting to find the solutions x*, y*, DR to the following vector-valued function 
 ( )* *|ERf=DR x ,y DR , 
where (x*, y*) represents the vector comprising the optimal solution of the investment 
decision x and the operation simulation y minimizing the societal cost, given a vector of 








x ,y x,y DR  
where F stands for the feasible region, and SC() is the societal cost defined in the previous 
chapter.  Thus, finding a deemed rate equal to the marginal/average emission rate is basi-
cally calculating the following fixed-point problem: 




DR x ,y x y DR  
Such a fixed-point problem corresponds to a cat-and-mouse game formed by the 
regulator and the power sector participants.  Initially, suppose the regulator sets the deemed 
rate at some nominal marginal (or average) emission rate DRo (which might be estimated 
from previous periods, for instance), and gives another chance to the system to re-dispatch.  
As a result, the new marginal generators (and emissions DR1) might differ from those in 
the previous periods, or total emissions may change (Figure 6.1, inner feedback loop).  




marginal/average emissions, and deemed rates; the dispatch resulting in each hour will, in 
turn, change the value of generation and transmission addition and affect the expansion 
decision (Figure 6.1, outer feedback loop). 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Deemed rate (if set based on marginal emission rate) will influence the mar-
ginal generator and vice versa 
 
In this analysis, I use a double-loop fixed-point iteration algorithm in Figure 6.2 to 
attempt to find the solution to such a fixed-point problem.  Note that a fixed point may not 
exist, or if it does exist, the algorithm may be unsuccessful in finding it.  Outer Loop A 
(Yellow box, Figure 6.2) explicitly models the interaction between the investment x and 
the market operation and deemed rate setting (y, DR).  I define the convergence of Loop 
A as being achieved when the change in the objective function value (SC, societal cost, see 
Chapter 5) between Loop A iterations is small enough (i.e., < ε
A 
).   
The inner Loop B (Grey box, Figure 6.2), on the other hand, is a fixed point iteration 
to find the deemed rate with a fixed generation and transmission expansion plan; in other 
words, modeling the interaction between the market operation y and deemed rate setting 
(DR).  I define the convergence of Loop B as a small enough mean deviation of deemed 
rates between Loop B iterations (i.e., < ε
B




the iteration limit (here, 20), then I take the average values from the last 10 iterations.  Note 
that within the Loop B, the investment decisions are treated as fixed numbers.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Diagram of the algorithm of modeling time-varying deemed rate based on 
marginal and average emission rate 
 
It is easy to observe that Loop B is one fixed-point iteration. Loop B iterates be-
tween the market operation y and deemed rate setting (DR) given the generation fleet and 
the transmission topology until the convergence criterium εB is achieved or the literation 
limit B is exceeded.  Notably, this is a Gauss-Seidel iteration that iterates between the fol-
lowing two steps: 




y x x y DR , 
( ),AERfDR x y , 
where xA is the fixed expansion plan from outer Loop A.  I do not attempt to prove either 
the existence or the convergence of such Gauss-Seidel iteration in this thesis.  However, 




of its convergence properties is given in the context of other applications (Greenberg and 
Murphy, 1985).   
6.4 Experimental Setting 
To define a baseline, I run a model without the Californian carbon price as the first 
step. Then I test each BCA scheme, i.e., both Groups One and Two, with two assumed 
Californian carbon price realizations ($20/ton and $40/ton.)35 
In this set of analyses, I run the modified JHSMINE model (Section 5.4) for the 
WECC in the year 2034. The system is a reduced network based on the 2026 Common 
Case of the WECC (WECC, 2017) with 361 buses and 712 transmission lines using the 
network reduction method developed in Zhu and Tylavsky (2018).  Readers can find more 
details of the network reduction procedure in Appendix B. A map of the network is shown 
in Figure 6.3. 
 
35 Up to the time of writing this thesis, the most recent  five rounds of the California-Quebec joint auction of 
carbon allowance yielded allowance prices in a range $15.05/ton – $17.16/ton, following an increasing trend 
over time (CARB, 2019c). $20/ton here is selected as a reasonable price close to price levels today, while 
$40/ton is selected as a high carbon price case.  This $40/ton is roughly the same as the current carbon tax in 





Figure 6.3. Map of the test system. Red dots are buses, and green triangles are renewable 
generation candidates. Red lines are existing AC lines, and orange lines are existing 
High-voltage DC lines. Blue lines are the equivalent lines resulting from network reduc-
tion. 
 
For generators, there are 1504 aggregated existing ones and 810 candidates, span-
ning 32 technologies, including Coal, Gas (Combined Cycle and Combustion Turbine), 
Nuclear, Wind, Solar, Geothermal, and Biofuel.  Only gas generation can be built as con-
ventional thermal generators with a 5-GW limit on each bus, while renewables, i.e., Wind, 
Solar, Biofuel, and Geothermal, can only be expanded at 53 candidate sites and will need 




existing 361 buses) and their maximum installed capacity are identified in Western 
Governors' Association and U.S. Dept. of Energy (2009).  Specifically, I double the renew-
able potentials of California, 5 out of 53 sites (compared to Chapters 3 and 4), to avoid 
situations where California could possibly deplete its renewable potential.  All the assumed 
capital costs of generation expansion are based on WECC and Energy and Environmental 
Economics (2017) and are differentiated by location. 
Transmission lines candidates are categorized into two types: backbone reinforce-
ments and renewable connections. There are 54 reinforcement candidates for the backbone 
network arcs in Figure 6.3. In addition, there are 104 renewable connection candidates that 
can be developed to connect the 53 candidate sites.  Transmission expansion candidate 
costs are calculated based on the length of the transmission line, the width, and the type of 
land-use, and the voltage level, using the base cost of the conductors and substations as 
found at WECC (2014c).  There are four (4) days (96 hours) simulated to represent the year 
2034, based on the method shown in Appendix D of this thesis. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) data for the year 2034 are from DSIRE 
(DSIRE, 2018), and demand data are from WECC-LTPT (WECC, 2016b).  Because state-
level RPS policies do not cover every type of utility in the state, I adjust the requirement 
according to the share of the total electricity sales that is covered by RPS.  For example, 
although Washington State requires that 15% of the electricity demand be met by renewa-
bles in 2030, that requirement only covers utilities that serve more than 25,000 customers. 
As these utilities were serving 87.1% of the total load of Washington in 2017, , the effective 
RPS of Washington requirement is therefore about 13.1% of total Washington demand.  In 




the same as the latest specified number.  For example, in 2030, California requires 60% of 
its demand to be supplied by renewables, and 75% of the requirement should be met by 
generation directly connected to California or delivered without substituting electricity 
from another source; I assume this number will not change in 2034.  The alternative com-
pliance penalty is $100/MWh for all states with RPS, i.e., in case there is a renewable 
energy capacity shortage, the LSE needs to pay such a penalty (or buy renewable credits 
from the state government) to fulfill the RPS requirement.  The RPS requirement used in 
this Chapter is shown in Table 6.2.  For British Columbia, there is a $40/ton Carbon Tax, 
but no BCA is implemented. 
 
Table 6.2. Assumed RPS Requirements in 2034 
State RPS State RPS 
Alberta 30.0% Mexico 0.0% 
Arizona 14.6% New Mexico 16.1% 
British Columbia** 93.0% Nevada 22.8% 
California* 59.3% Oregon 35.2% 
Colorado 21.0% Utah 0.0% 
Idaho 0.0% Washington 13.1% 
Montana 13.4% Wyoming 0.0% 
* CA also requires 75% of the RPS requirement to be met by in-state renewable generation 
** All WECC regions, except British Columbia, are assumed to account generation from large 
(>20MW) hydroelectric facilities as non-renewable  
 
I put some restrictions on interstate energy credit trading.36  First, in the case of 
existing generating units, only those with a nameplate capacity higher than 200 MW can 
 
36 As mentioned in Chapter 5, in my experimental setting, the electricity and energy credit are bundled. (I.e., 
energy credit contracts are specified by source-sink at an hourly level, and these contracts are supported by 
interstate powerflows.) Furthermore, the definition of energy credit setting is not limited to renewable re-
sources.  For instance, if 60% of California electricity demand is supported by contracts from renewable 
resources, the remaining 40% must be from non-renewable ones, and, consequently, California LSEs have 
to buy non-renewable credits to support such a composition (possibly at zero price).  As another example, if 
a generator is deemed unable to sell its credits to California, it is effectively unable to sign a bilateral elec-




sell energy credits out of the state.  Consequently, it can be assumed that the difficulty is 
great for selling power to a state other than the home state.  Second, for any plant, energy 
credits can only be sold to the home state, the neighboring state, or the state adjacent to its 
neighboring state.  For example, a plant located in Arizona can sell its credit to anywhere 
in the WECC except Alberta, British Columbia, Washington, and Montana.   
I also made several simplifications of the model setup to speed up the solution pro-
cess.  For example, power flow is modeled as a transshipment power flow model (as shown 
in Section 5.4), not as a DC load flow, and generating unit commitment is not included as 
well as storage expansion and investment.  At the expense of larger models and slower 
computation times, these complications could be included. 
6.5 Numerical Results 
In this results section, I first look at the time-varying property of marginal/average 
emission rates resulting from the calculation of the deemed rates (Section 6.5.1).  Then I 
examine to look at the impacts of adopting different BCA schemes within Groups One and 
Two; the impact metrics include (a) WECC, California, and ROW emissions (Section 
6.5.2), (b) California and ROW electricity production (Section 6.5.3), (c) transmission ex-
pansion in WECC (Section 0), and (d) Cost to California Consumers (Section 6.5.5.). And 
finally, I identify the carbon border tax schemes that achieve the best overall economic 
efficiency (Section 6.5.6.)  
6.5.1 Time-Varying Property of Marginal/Average Emission Rate 
Does the Gauss-Seidel approach proposed in Section 6.3 succeed in finding time-
varying deemed rates?  The answer is a qualified yes.  Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the state-




of the four days as an example (Sept 30th, 2034), calculated in the inner loops of the algo-
rithm (Figure 6.2, Grey box) and the expected (average over the final iterations) value used 
in the final expansion model.  I make three remarks here.  First, short-run marginal emis-
sion rates indeed vary in different hours, ranging from zero to around 0.7 ton/MWh.  Sec-
ond, the internal and external marginal emission rates are significantly different in several 
hours.  Finally, the cat-and-mouse game happens in which the iterative process does not 
converge and instead alternates between two or more values.  As a result, the expected 
value has to be taken over several iterations; this would be an implementation issue in real 
life.   
 
Figure 6.4. Marginal emission rate (internal California) over the last 10 iterations (dot-
ted lines) and their average (red line with cross marks) (Carbon Price = $40/Ton, Sept 





Figure 6.5. Marginal emission rate (external to California) of the last 10 iterations (dot-
ted lines) and their average (red line with cross marks) (Carbon Price = $40/Ton, Sept 
30th, the year 2034) 
 
The average emission rates (Equation 6.3) for one day are shown in Figure 6.6.  
Similar results are observed for the other three days simulated in 2034. Overall, the average 
emission rates show more stability than the marginal emission rates.  The average emission 
rates of external generators are universally higher than their internal counterparts and are 
less variable in that California is a relatively cleaner state with almost no coal capacity 
(except the must-run combined heat and power plants) and more renewables, including 
solar, wind, and geothermal capacity.  Internal average emission rates are relatively higher 
in the late afternoon because of the lack of clean-energy during those intervals, while they 
are close to zero during the late night as most internal generators that are operating are 
emission-free during that time (e.g., from Bio, Geothermal, Hydro, and Wind). For the 
average emission rate calculation, the expected value from multiple iterations is not neces-





Figure 6.6. Average emission rate (internal and external to California, Carbon Price = 
$40/Ton, Sept 30th, the year 2034) 
 
6.5.2 BCA Impact on California, ROW, and Total Carbon Emissions 
How will each BCA scheme impact carbon emissions and leakage? In this section, 
I will answer this question by showing how different BCA schemes will affect the emis-
sions of California, the ROW, and both together (all WECC) as a system under the base 
case assumptions of Section 6.4.   
The primary emission leakage metric I select in this Chapter is the WECC-wide, 
ROW, and California mass differences, which are calculated by “Emissions in Mton/year 
under a Case (from Table 6.1)” minus “Emissions in Mton/year without California Carbon 
Price”.  If such a number is positive, then emissions increase because of a policy imple-
mentation specified by a case in Table 6.1; if furthermore this increase is in the ROW, then 
there is emissions leakage.  For example, without California carbon price (i.e., Case 0 in 
Table 6.1), the ROW emissions are at 251.18 Mtons/year; however, ROW emissions in-
crease to 270.12 Mtons/year when carbon price = $40/ton and California adopts the tech-




ROW is (270.12 – 251.18 =) 18.94 Mtons/year.  A special case can thus arise: if such a 
number is negative in ROW, then this is a negative leakage.  For example, as shown later, 
if when the carbon price is at $40/ton and California adopts a constant deemed rate at 0.41 
ton/MWh, the ROW emissions fall to 245.18 Mtons/year; the leakage is (245.17 – 251.18 
=) -6.01 Mtons/year.    
6.5.2.1 Local Carbon Price Can Increase System Emissions 
Before delving into the comparison of BCAs, I make the following related obser-
vation concerning the numbers I show later in this section.  It is a seemingly counterintui-
tive result that carbon pricing within California can increase WECC-wide emissions, 
showing a significant amount of carbon leakage.  Further, this effect is worse when carbon 
prices are higher.  In particular, among all investigated deemed rate schemes (in fact, in 
both Group One & Two), the highest WECC-wide emission increase results from no BCA 
case (or constant deemed rate = 0 ton/MWh) while the carbon price is $40/ton; in that case, 
California emissions are reduced by 17.88 Mtons/year, but ROW emissions are increased 
by 19.26 Mtons/year, resulting in a system-wide emission increase of 1.37 Mtons/year.  The 
second worst case is the result of the technology-based deemed rate scheme, the current 
implementation.  For example, when the carbon price is at $40/ton, California emissions 
decrease by 17.67 Mtons/year, but ROW emissions increase by 18.94 Mtons/year, resulting 
in a 1.26 Mtons/year overall increase.   
In fact, a simple example can explain such a result: suppose there are two gas gen-
erators that consume the same natural gas source at $5/MMBTU with an emission factor 
at 0.06 ton/MMBTU.  Assume further that one is in California and has a marginal cost at 




non-fuel variable O&M cost is zero in both generators and their per MMBTU fuel cost is 
the same, the ROW gas generator must be emitting more as its heat rate is higher (8 
MMBTU/MWh > 7 MMBTU/MWh).  Intuitively, without a carbon price, the system will 
first dispatch the cleaner unit, as it uses less fuel.  Further assume that California imposes 
a carbon price of $20/ton, and then the clean generator has an effective marginal cost of:  
$20/ton × 0.06 ton/MMBTU × 7 MMBTU/MWh + $35/MWh =  $43.4/MWh, 
which is higher than the dirtier generator in ROW.  As a result, California’s carbon price 
only makes the cleaner generator more expensive to dispatch, and consequently WECC-
wide emissions will increase when generation is shifted to the out-of-state source.  BCA 
with technology-based deemed rates cannot eliminate such an effect due to the contract 
shuffling issue discussed in Chapter 5.  With this being discussed, the comparisons between 
BCAs are shown as follows.  
6.5.2.2 Group One: Different Deemed Rate Schemes 
Alternative Constant Annual Rates.  Figures 6.7 to 6.9 show emissions from Cal-
ifornia, ROW, and WECC as a total, respectively, as a function of different uniform 
deemed rates (Case 2).  As a reference, without California's carbon price, JHSMINE gen-
erates a result showing that California emits 30.09 Mtons/year, while ROW emits 251.18 
Mtons/year (shown as the horizontal lines in Figures 6.7 and 6.8, respectively).  As a com-
parison, in 2017, California actually reported a carbon emission of 38.58 Mtons from in-






Figure 6.7. California carbon emissions with different constant deemed rates, Case 2 
 






Figure 6.9. WECC total carbon emissions with different constant deemed rates (Case 2) 
 
The second observation is that the higher the constant deemed rate is, the more the 
carbon emissions California generators emit, and the fewer carbon emissions are from the 
ROW.  The reason is that the higher deemed rate makes import more expensive, and con-
sequently, California will choose to rely on more gas power from inside.  Meanwhile, 
WECC total emissions are very stable over that range (e.g.., ranging from 280.47 to 281.87 
Mtons/year with different constant deemed rates while carbon price = $20/ton).  In other 
words, a higher constant emission rate will bring the emissions back to California (raising 
emissions from about 16.71 Mtons/year to 36.29 Mtons/year under a $20/ton carbon price, 
and 12.21 Mtons/year to 38.79 Mtons/year under a $40/ton carbon price, , Figure 6.7), 
while reducing carbon leakage (lowering ROW emission from about 264.90 Mtons/year to 
244.18 Mtons/year, under a $20/ton carbon price, and 270.44 Mtons/year to 240.92 
Mtons/year under a $40/ton carbon price, Figure 6.8) while making the total system cleaner, 




of magnitude lower than the shift in emissions between California and ROW as the deemed 
rate changes.  The largest difference between WECC-wide emissions is about 1% of the 
total.  These differences are roughly doubled when California’s carbon price is doubled.  
Intriguingly, the local emission trends from all three carbon price scenarios ($0, 
$20, and $40) cross each other while the constant deemed rate is about 0.36-0.37 ton/MWh: 
beyond this point, the higher the carbon price is, the more CO2e California generators will 
emit relative to the $0 price case. This is because an increase of carbon price within Cali-
fornia, an importer in the electricity system, under a fixed deemed emission rate will simply 
increase the cost of importing; thus, California will rely more on its own generation fleet 
to support the load, and thus more emissions happen inside California.  
This phenomenon is consistent with the theoretical results of Section 5.6, in which 
I showed technology-neutral deemed rates would function as a subsidy to all Californian 
generators, which increases California generation profits and production as the deemed rate 
increases.    
Time-Varying versus Constant Deemed Rates.  I now turn my attention towards to 
the time-varying deemed rates and ask: Can a time-varying deemed rate do a better job of 
cutting emissions?  In this section, I provide comparisons in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, which 
show the emissions if the deemed rate scheme for power imports to California is set at (1) 
technology-based deemed rates, (2) time-varying deemed rates of all four combinations of 
average versus marginal rates and internal versus external sources, or (3) a constant deemed 
rate equal to the corresponding yearly average.  The yearly average is calculated using Eq. 
(6.4)  For example, in the scenario where the Californian carbon price is $40/MWh, if the 




the yearly average of such time-varying rates is 0.26 ton/MWh.  A comparison between (2) 




DR HW DR=   (6.4) 
 
Table 6.3. Comparison of Emissions of BCA with Different Deemed Rate Schemes Ap-
plied to Only California Imports (Carbon price = $20/ton), Group1, Cases 1-6 
Case  
California Carbon Price 
= $20/ton 
Change in Emissions (Mton/year) 





































0.30 -4.85 -5.49 4.73 5.39 -0.12 -0.09 
1 Technology-based -13.34 13.64 0.31 
Base 
Case 
Emission with no Car-
bon price (Mton/year) 





Table 6.4. Comparison of BCA with Different Deemed Rate Schemes (Carbon price = 
$40/ton), Group1, Cases 1-6 
Case  
California Carbon Price = 
$40/ton 
Change of Emission (Mton/year) 






































0.30 -7.99 -8.70 7.55 8.32 -0.44 -0.38 
1 Technology-based -17.67 18.94 1.26 
Base 
Case 
Emission with no Carbon 
price (Mton/year) 
30.09 251.18 281.27 
 
By comparing the columns of “time-varying” and “constant” in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, 
I can conclude that introducing time-variation with the internal marginal emission rate can 
introduce more emissions inside California and correspondingly reduce emissions in the 
ROW; in other words, such time-variation lowers the carbon leakage by sacrificing the 
local emission reductions.  For instance, when the carbon price is $20/ton, imposing time-
varying ratesbased on the internal marginal emission rate lowers the emission reduction (or 
equivalently, increase the emissions) in California by (6.62 – 4.18 =) 2.44 Mtons/year.  In 
the same example, ROW emissions are reduced by (6.61 – 3.92 =) 2.69 Mtons/year.  The 
higher the carbon price is, the more such impact I observe.  For instance, the pair of num-





On the other hand, time-variation based on the external marginal emission rate can 
behave in the reverse direction from using the internal rates: it reduces California emissions 
and increases the rest of WECC values.  The net effect, however, is an overall decrease of 
WECC-wide emissions, and such an emission reduction is the largest among different 
deemed rate alternatives within each carbon price scenario. Overall, the largest WECC-
wide decreases shown in the two tables result from using time-varying rates are seen in the 
marginal-external case; there is no obvious intuition for why time variation would result in 
less leakage in that situation.   
In contrast, time-varying deemed rate schemes based on average emission rates 
show almost no difference compared to their yearly-stationary counterparts.  This is at least 
in part because the average emission rate has much less time-variability or is very low 
compared to the marginal emission rate and thus is more similar to the constant deemed 
rate (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). 
Overall, different schemes based on imposing deemed rates on imports to Califor-
nia have varying impacts on the local emission and carbon leakage (on the order of 0-20 
Mton/yr), and can lower system-level emissions by 0-2.64 Mton/yr.   
6.5.2.3 Group Two: Charge Imports and Rebate Exports 
The previous subsection considered only policies that penalize power imports to 
California, without rebating emission expenses for California Exports.  Tables 6.5 and 6.6 
show the changes in emissions if I allow power exports to receive emission cost rebates in 
JHSMINE.  In all shown cases, the selected deemed rate scheme is the technology-based 
deemed rate, where energy credits flowing across the California border pay according to 




to source emissions (in the case of rebating exports).  Simultaneously charging imports and 
rebating exports (Case 10) will decrease local emissions, with an overall decrease in 
WECC-wide emissions. This holds for both carbon price scenarios, but the amount of 
WECC-wide reduction is small (0.11MT for Case 10 in Table 6.5, and 0.34 MT in Table 
6.6).   
 
Table 6.5. Emission Comparisons of Different BCA with/without Charging Imports and 
Rebating Exports (Carbon Price = $20/ton), Cases 7-10 (Technology-based deemed rate) 
Case (Table 6.1) 
Californian Carbon 
Price = $20/ton 
Change in Emissions (million ton/year) relative to 





California Rest of WECC WECC Total 
7 No No -13.38 13.69 0.31 
8 (same as 1) Yes No -13.34 13.64 0.31 
9 No Yes -2.57 2.43 -0.14 
10 Yes Yes -2.15 2.04 -0.11 
Base Case 
Total emissions with 
no Carbon price 
(Mton/year) 
30.09 251.18 281.27 
 
Table 6.6. Emission Comparisons of Different BCA with/without Charging Imports and 




Price = $40/ton 
Change in Emissions (million ton/year) relative to 





California Rest of WECC WECC Total 
7 No No -17.88 19.26 1.37 
8 (same as 1) Yes No -17.67 18.94 1.26 
9 No Yes -3.36 3.54 0.18 
10 Yes Yes -2.95 2.61 -0.34 
Base Case 
Total emissions with 
no Carbon price 
(Mton/year) 





These comparisons indicate that, instead of only charging imports which increase 
the WECC-wide emissions, rebating exports at the same time can be a pathway to lowering 
carbon leakage and overall system-wide emissions.  These results are consistent with the 
theoretical results that I provided in Section 5.6.5: the action of rebating exports creates an 
extra incentive for ROW or California to dispatch low-emitting generation to support the 
demand in California. , ,  
6.5.3 BCA Impact on Electricity Production Type and Location 
The previous sections’ emission results show that technology-neutral deemed rate 
schemes (i.e., constant or time-varying deemed rates) when applied to imports alone can 
indeed mitigate carbon leakage more effectively than a technology-based scheme, and bas-
ing deemed rates on marginal external emission information can reduce system-wide emis-
sions.  Further, rebating exports in addition to charging imports using a technology-based 
scheme can lead to both a leakage reduction and a limited amount of system-wide emission 
reduction.  A question thus arises: what are the reasons for the observed incremental car-
bon leakage mitigation and the observed incremental system-wide emission reduction?  
My results in this section show that:  
1) Different deemed rates schemes mitigate the leakage by shifting gas generation 
back to California (resulting in spatial distributions closer to the base case, Case 0, 
with carbon price = $0/ton) while barely changing the overall generation mix,  
2) Rebating exports in addition to charging imports can indeed encourage emission-
free generation built out in ROW; however, this effect is limited to the states from 
which California can directly buy power.  Most of this “promised” emission cut is, 




emission cuts I show in Section 6.5.2 are due to the replacement of coal-fired power 
in ROW. 
All figures in this subsection show the net energy generation changes in comparison to 
Case 0 where California carbon price = $0/ton.  To begin with, the generation mixes of 
California and ROW of Case 0 are shown in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7. Generation Mixes of California and the Rest of the WECC under Case 0; i.e., 




ROW states where California 
can directly trade power* 
ROW states where California 
cannot directly trade power** 
Bio 11.61 5.09 8.08 
Coal 1.17 113.96 60.14 
Geo 23.58 13.07 0.00 
Hydro 25.84 124.09 81.73 
NatGas 75.48 117.65 57.25 
Nuclear 0.00 44.75 0.00 
Solar 13.65 9.07 0.00 
Wind 23.69 38.93 14.03 
New-Bio 1.76 0.00 0.00 
New-Geo 23.81 20.59 0.53 
New-NatGas 3.86 2.70 50.49 
New-Solar 41.13 10.70 0.00 
New-Wind 11.13 34.53 27.89 
Total 256.71 535.14 300.15 
* Including states of Washington, Oregon, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Utah, Colorado, New Mex-
ico, and Baja California of Mexico. 
** Including states of Montana, Wyoming, Texas, and Canadian provinces of British Columbia, 
and Alberta. 
 
6.5.3.1 Group One: Comparison of Different Deemed Rate Schemes 
Alternative Constant Annual Rates.  Figures 6.10 to 6.12, respectively, show the 




emission rate scheme where the California carbon price = $40/ton.37 All plots show the 
annual energy changes compared to the Base Case where California carbon price = $0/ton.  
(Changes under the carbon price of $20/ton are less dramatic and are mentioned briefly 
below.)  Higher deemed rates barely affect any generation type except for gas-fired power.  
For instance, the scale of Figures 6.10 and 6.11 is much larger than Figure 6.12.  With a 
higher deemed rate for California power imports, the system dispatches California gas-
fired power plants more heavily, which substitutes for gas-fired power generation in ROW.  
This is consistent with the theoretical result developed in the previous Chapter: a constant 
deemed rate acts as a subsidy for California generators.  This implies that changes in 
WECC-wide emissions are mainly due to small differences in gas generator efficiencies 
between California and the ROW. 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Change of Generation mix of California, under constant deemed rate 
Scheme (0 – 0.45 ton/MWh), Carbon Price = $40/ton; i.e., Case 2 minus Case 0 
 
37 In Figure 6.12, for sake of simplicity, I combine changes from all renewable generations together.  As seen 





Figure 6.11. Change of Generation mix of the Rest of WECC, under constant deemed 
rate scheme (0 – 0.45 ton/MWh), Carbon Price = $40/ton; i.e., Case 2 minus Case 0 
 
Figure 6.12. Change of Generation mix of the WECC as total, under constant deemed 
rate scheme (0 – 0.45 ton/MWh), Carbon Price = $40/ton; i.e., Case 2 minus Case 0 
 
It is noteworthy that renewable generation is higher than Case 0 when the constant 
deemed rate is less than 0.2 ton/MWh (Figure 6.12); however, for those same deemed rates, 




the increased gas-power in ROW is in fact dirtier than the decreased gas-power in Califor-
nia. 
 Figures 6.13 to 6.15, respectively, show the generation mixes of California, ROW, 
and WECC system under other deemed rate scheme alternatives with carbon price = 
$40/ton.  All plots show the changes upon the no California carbon price case.  Like the 
observations above under the constant deemed rate scheme, the only significant effect of 
other alternatives is on gas-fired power.  One exception is the deemed rate based on mar-
ginal external emissions: under this scheme, besides the gas-fired power, ROW builds 
slightly more solar energy (at 1.65 TWh), cuts some wind energy (-1.66 TWh), and most 
importantly, cut coal-fired power production (-2.86 TWh), and consequently provides 
some emission reduction (as seen in Section 6.5.2.2).  As shown in Figure 6.15, at the 
system-level, the emission reduction is achieved by substituting ROW coal power with 
California gas power.  When carbon price equals $20/ton, the “homecoming gas-fired 
power” basically follows the same pattern shown in Figures 6.13 to 6.15, although the 






Figure 6.13. Comparison of the change of generation mixes within California under dif-
ferent deemed rate schemes, Carbon Price = $40/ton; i.e., Cases 1-6 minus Case 0 
 
 
Figure 6.14. Comparison of the change of generation mixes of the Rest of WECC under 






Figure 6.15. Comparison of the change of WECC-wide generation mixes under different 
deemed rate schemes, Carbon Price = $40/ton; i.e., Cases 1-6 minus Case 0 
 
6.5.3.2 Group Two: Charge Imports and Rebate Exports 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 compare generation mixes within just California with different 
BCA schemes with and without rebating of emission costs of exports under scenarios of 
Carbon price = $40/ton.  When carbon price equals $20/ton, the changes basically follow 
the same pattern, although the effects are somewhat smaller in magnitude.   
Like the observations in the previous section, these alternatives strongly affect gas 
production from existing gas-fired plants in California.  Interestingly, in all cases, the in-
cremental effect of adding a charge to imports (i.e., from the second column to the third in 
the table, or from the fourth to the fifth) introduces almost no changes to generation mixes.  
This is due to the significant amount of contract shuffling.  As a reminder, the total 
California energy demand in this chapter is 343.70 TWh/year.  When the carbon price is 
$40/ton and the BCA is absent, the total amount of California generation is 209.17 




the BCA is implemented with a technology-based deemed rate, total California generation 
rises slightly to 209.80 TWh/year.  Both imply roughly 134 TWh/year net energy imports.  
In the case of no BCA, these 134 TWh/year net energy imports are the net of 32.37 
TWh/year “California to ROW” exports and 166.90 TWh/year gross imports from ROW, 
of which 93.75 TWh/year is emission-free.  However, with the technology-based deemed 
rate implemented, the 134 TWh/year net imports are, instead, composed of  8.26 TWh/year 
“California to ROW” exports and 142.16 TWh/year gross imports from ROW, which is 
100% emission-free.  In short, due to the technology-based deemed rate, all imports be-
come emission-free without significantly changing the net imports.    
Meanwhile, adding a policy of rebating exports has an impact: by comparing the 
second column to the fourth, or the third to the fifth, I conclude that rebating exports will 
encourage more gas-fired power production inside California.  For instance, when the car-
bon price is $40/ton, the gas-fired power generation more than doubles from the first to the 
third column (75.48 (Base) – 46.87 = 28.61 TWh to 75.48 (Base) – 8.44 = 67.04 TWh) and 




38 For perspective, this can be compared to actual historical generation; in 2017, Californian natural gas power 





Table 6.8. Change of California Generation Mix (TWh) compared to the Base Case, Car-
bon Price = $40/ton, the year 2034, Cases 7-10 minus Case 0 
Change of Produc-
tion (TWh) 








& Rebate Export 
(Case 10) 
Geo -0.16 0.04 -0.17 0.00 
New-Solar 0.15 -0.05 0.17 -0.01 
New-Wind 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Coal -1.10 -1.10 -1.13 -1.08 
NatGas -46.87 -46.25 -8.44 -7.15 
New-NatGas 0.44 0.44 0.70 0.51 
Total -47.54 -46.91 -8.87 -7.71 
 
ROW generation mixes under carbon price = $40/ton (Table 6.9) reveals the other 
side of the story: rebating exports in addition to charging imports can encourage some more 
emission-free generation in some part of ROW (in states where California LSE can trade 
energy credits), but can also discourage emission-free generation in other places.  More 
importantly, simultaneously rebating exports and charging imports can cut emissions in its 
neighboring states by replacing coal-fired power.  For instance, when the carbon price is at 
$40/ton, compared to Case 7 that only charges imports, emission-free electricity increases 
by 3.42 TWh in the ROW states where California LSE can buy power (see the upper part 
of Table 6.9).  In the same comparison, however, emission-free electricity decreases by 
3.79 TWh in the ROW states where California cannot directly buy power.  The WECC-
wide emission reduction shown in Section 6.5.2 is achieved by cutting coal power produc-
tion in California’s neighbor states.  These results are explainable by one of the conclusions 
from Section 5.6.5: rebating exports can provide additional encouragement (on top of 
charging imports) towards the generation of ROW emission-free energy.  By the results of 
this section, we can further see that this conclusion only applies to ROW states from which 





Table 6.9. Change of ROW Generation Mix (TWh) compared to the Base Case, Carbon 
Price = $40/ton, the year 2034, Cases 7-10 minus Case 0 









Only (Case 9) 
Charge Import 
& Rebate Ex-
port (Case 10) 
ROW (Califor-
nia’s Neighbor 
State or its 
Neighbor's 
Neighbor)* 
New-Solar 0.79 0.78 0.00 0.76 
New-Wind -4.44 -4.35 -3.58 0.26 
New-Geo 1.06 1.06 0.00 0.00 
Bio 0.15 0.14 0.03 -0.03 
Coal 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.20 
NatGas 43.54 42.93 7.98 6.68 
New-NatGas 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22 
Subtotal 41.42 40.86 4.71 7.70 
ROW – Other** 
Wind 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
New-Wind 3.59 3.58 3.57 -0.20 
NatGas 2.50 2.43 0.58 0.20 
New-NatGas 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Subtotal 6.12 6.06 4.16 0.01 
Total 47.54 46.91 8.87 7.71 
* Including states of Washington, Oregon, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Utah, Colorado, New Mex-
ico, and Baja California of Mexico. 
** Including states of Montana, Wyoming, Texas, and Canadian provinces of British Columbia, 
and Alberta. 
 
Table 6.10 shows the WECC-wide generation mixes under a carbon price of 
$40/ton.  As explained in Section 6.5.2.1, even with more emission-free generation (Table 
6.10, Case 7 vs. Case 0), emissions of WECC can still be higher because (relatively) clean 
California gas-fired power is replaced by dirtier/less-efficient gas-fired power in ROW.  
Following the same vein, but in the opposite direction, emissions can be cut even with less 
emission-free generation.  For instance, in Table 6.10, if CARB charges imports and re-
bates exports simultaneously, renewable generation decreases compared to the no BCA 
case (Case 7), however, the system-wide emissions are still lower (see Section 6.5.2.3).  As 




Table 6.10. Change of WECC Generation Mix (TWh) compared to the Base Case, Car-
bon Price = $40/ton, the year 2034, Cases 7-10 minus Case 





Only (Case 8) 
Export Rebate 
Only (Case 9) 
Charge Both Import 
& Rebate Export 
(Case 10) 
Wind 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Geo -0.16 0.04 -0.17 0.00 
New-Solar 0.94 0.74 0.17 0.75 
New-Wind -0.84 -0.76 -0.01 0.07 
New-Geo 1.06 1.06 0.00 0.00 
Bio 0.15 0.14 0.03 -0.03 
Emission-Free Subtotal 1.16 1.22 0.02 0.80 
Coal -1.03 -1.04 -1.06 -1.27 
NatGas -0.84 -0.88 0.12 -0.26 
New-NatGas 0.70 0.70 0.92 0.74 
 
 
6.5.4 BCA Impact on Transmission Expansion 
How would different BCA schemes affect transmission expansion?  Since the eco-
nomic value of transmission between California and the ROW is largely derived from de-
livering power into California, more California local production due to whatever reason 
will likely lead to less transmission built-out between California and the ROW. 
Before providing quantitative answers, another reminder to the readers is that, as 
mentioned in Section 6.4, two different sets of transmission expansion candidates are avail-
able: (1) renewable interconnectors that connect renewable generation expansions to the 
grid and (2) backbone reinforcements that reinforce the backbone transmission lines.  Each 
can be expanded in continuous amounts (zero up to the upper bound), which, as Chapter 2 
explains, is assumed in order to improve execution times.  Since all renewable generation 




schemes on renewable interconnectors has been implicitly discussed in the previous section: 
BCA schemes that penalize imports only with different deemed rates have negligible im-
pact on the expansion of renewable interconnectors since there is little impact on renewable 
capacity itself.  In contrast, rebating California exports can incentivize more renewable 
interconnector expansions to wind resources in states where California LSE can buy power 
directly.   
Consequently, in this section, I focus on the impact of BCA on backbone transmis-
sion expansions.  Among all the cases being studied (i.e., Cases 0-10 in Table 6.1), new 
backbone reinforcements only appeared in six interstate corridors (see Figure 6.16): (1) the 
border between California, U.S. and Baja California, Mexico, (2) the corridor between the 
Intermountain station (Utah) to Mona station (Utah), (3) the border between British Co-
lumbia, Canada and Washington, U.S., (4) the border between California and Oregon, (5) 
the border between Arizona and New Mexico, and (6) the border between Idaho and Ne-
vada.  I consider (2) to be equivalent to a California to Utah interstate transmission line, as 
the Intermountain Power Project station in Utah is at the endpoint of a high-voltage DC 
line between California and Utah (see Figure 6.3, the orange line between Utah and Cali-
fornia).  Thus, corridors (1), (2), and (4) are essentially California border crossings that are 
likely to be affected by changes in net imports to California, while (3) allows more flow 
between Canada and the US in the Pacific Northwest.  Specifically, although within-state 
reinforcement candidates exist in the test system, none are selected.  In the following sub-
sections, I will describe how BCA impacts these interstate transmission expansions in the 




   
Figure 6.16. Four corridors with expanded reinforcement candidates in the test cases 
 
6.5.4.1 Group One: Comparison of Different Deemed Rate Schemes for Import-Only Pol-
icies 
Figure 6.17 shows the interstate transmission expansions when the emission regu-
lator implements different levels of constant deemed emission rate for charging imports 




left in Figure 6.17), the other five transmission expansions decrease as the (constant) 
deemed rate is increased.  For instance, the expanded capacity between California and Utah 
starts at 750 MW while the deemed rate is zero and drops to 0 MW while the deemed rate 
as high as 0.45 ton/MWh.  The reason is that higher deemed rates decrease the amount and 
value of power imports to California. 
 
Figure 6.17. Expansions of Interstate Transmission Capacity (MW) under constant 





Although only the imports flowing to California are subject to BCA, BCA’s dis-
couragement of transmission expansion can also happen at non-California boundaries.  For 
example, as shown in the middle left and bottom of Figure 6.17, the transmission expansion 
between British Columbia and Washington drops from around 350 MW to 100 MW.  Ex-
amination of the flows indicates that this is because the economic value of Canadian ex-
ports is decreasing as the deemed rate increases.  Figure 6.17 also shows that given the 
constant deemed rate, the high carbon price will generally encourage more transmission 
expansions in these corridors, especially at the California-Oregon border.  This is again 
because of the increase in California imports spurred by the increased cost of California 
power production from carbon regulation. 
Figure 6.18 compares interstate transmission expansions under other deemed rate 
schemes (i.e., Cases 0-6 in Table 6.1).  I note here that (1) these deemed rate schemes do 
not affect the transmission expansion between the U.S.-Mexico boundary (held at 1000 
MW, the maximum expandable amount), and (2) the interstate transmission line between 
Idaho and Nevada is only expanded by an insignificant amount.  Thus, the results of these 
two lines are not shown.  Like the results of the constant deemed rate cases, other four 
interstate transmission expansions are discouraged by high deemed rates (Figure 6.18), e.g., 
transmission expansions under internal marginal emission rate (with annual average = 0.26 
ton/MWh) are greater than the expansions under external marginal emission rate (with an-
nual average = 0.41 ton/MWh).  Furthermore, a technology-based deemed rate results in 
higher transmission expansions compared to other deemed rate schemes; e.g., the expanded 
capacity between California and Oregon is 771.41 MW when the technology-based 





Figure 6.18. Expansions of Interstate Transmission Capacity (MW) under different 




6.5.4.2 Group Two: Charge Imports and Rebate Exports 
Figure 6.19 shows the interstate transmission expansions if the emission regulator 
chooses to rebate emissions expenditures by exports on top of the import charges.  Similar 
to the previous section, the results of the California-Mexico transmission line and the 
Idaho-Nevada line are not shown here.  The policy choice of rebating exports tends to lower 
transmission expansions in the four corridors (in Figure 6.19, compare the 1st pair of col-
umns vs. the 3rd pair, and the 2nd pair vs. 4th pair).  For instance, the expansion between the 
California-Oregon border is greatly suppressed because of the export rebate; in contrast, 
the expansion is about 749.49 MW (when California carbon price = $20/ton, and is 771.41 
MW when carbon price = $40/ton) if no BCA is implemented or the technology-based 
deemed rate is used for charging imports.  On the other hand, the action of charging imports 
(with a technology-based deemed rate) has almost no impact on transmission expansion 
(the 1st pair of columns vs. the 2nd pair, and the 3rd pair vs. the 4th pair).  The exception is 
the transmission expansion between New Mexico and Arizona, which increases from 0 to 





Figure 6.19. Expansions of Interstate Transmission Capacity (MW) with BCA with/with-




The negligible impact on transmission investment from the technology-based im-
port charge is consistent with the generation results in Section 6.5.3: only insubstantial 
changes occur in California/ROW generation mixes because of the actions of a technology-
based import charge.  In this case, the importer-exporter balance between California and 
ROW does not shift much because of import-only BCA. Thus, the value of transmission, 
and therefore its expansion does not change.  On the other hand, implementing a policy of 
rebating exports lowers the cost of (gas-fired) power exports from California, incentivizing 
more California gas exports and less power flows towards California. Thus, less transmis-
sion expansion is justified.39    
 
6.5.5 BCA Impact on Costs to California Consumers 
In this section, I will examine how different BCA alternatives affect the costs to 
California consumers.  In this section, the cost to California consumers is quantified in two 
ways.  One is by the wholesale energy price, which is calculated by dividing the total an-
nual LSE payment (in $) by the total energy load (in MWh), i.e., Eq. 6.5.  (See the definition 
of CCw in Section 5.4.5 of Chapter 5.
40)   
 ( ), ,Wholesale Price /
w
Load
w w h h i h i
h i I





   (6.5) 
The second way is to net out from those consumer power payments two quantities received 
by the California government or California ISO on behalf of consumers: economic rents 
due to carbon payments (to the California Air Resources Board) and congestion rents on 
 
39 As explained in Chapter 5, net interstate power flow equals the net of import and export contracts.  Thus, 
more export contracts can introduce a lower power flow, and less transmission build-out.  
40 To put it in words, CCw (or the calculated wholesale price) is composed of electric energy expenditures, 
cost of lost load (if any), RPS non-compliance penalty (if any), energy credit payment through bilateral trad-




the California grid (equal to within-California transmission congestion payments plus one-
half of transmission congestion payments for interties between California and its neigh-
bors).  This second approach assumes that these rents are ultimately returned to California 
consumers, either through lower taxes or greater government expenditures on programs 
benefiting California consumers (in the case of carbon payments) or lower payments to the 
CAISO for operating the California grid.  Presently, CARB devotes its carbon pricing rev-
enue for a downstream program called “California Climate Investments.” This program is 
intended to combat GHG emissions, improving public welfare and the environment 
through investing the cap-and-trade revenue in promoting clean transportation and other 
types of projects (CARB, 2019a). In the RGGI system, by comparison, payments for car-
bon are primarily devoted to energy conservation programs that are intended to benefit 
consumers ((RGGI, 2018)).  Also, the CAISO’s benefit-cost analyses of transmission ex-
plicitly assume that electric costs to California ratepayers are reduced if transmission con-
gestion (the difference between consumer payments for bulk power and generation reve-
nues) increases (Awad et al., 2010). 
Figure 6.20 shows California wholesale prices under the constant deemed rate 
scheme (Case 2).  As expected, the introduction of carbon pricing in California will raise 
the wholesale price; when the constant deemed rate is higher, the wholesale price will be 
higher.  The prices with the reimbursement from the ISO and the state government vary by 
a much smaller amount (within $1/MWh).  This highlights that the increase of the prices 
without reimbursement is major driven by the extra BCA payments to the government, and 






Figure 6.20. Average California wholesale prices under the constant deemed rate scheme 
(Case 2) 
 
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 summarize the wholesale prices for all other BCA schemes 
without and with reimbursement from ISO and government within Groups One and Two.  
Intuitively, the introduction of carbon pricing will raise the wholesale prices paid by con-




rises from $80.64/MWh (Case 0) to $83.05/MWh (Case 7, the price from no BCA case 
without reimbursement).  It is not surprising to see that nearly all BCA schemes raise the 
wholesale price, as Californian consumers need to pay more to import power from the 
ROW.  But introducing time-variations in the deemed rate, however, does not induce a 
significant rise in electricity price compared to its yearly-average constant counterpart; in 
fact, the wholesale prices are sometimes lower because of the time-variation (e.g., in case 
of BCA based on marginal internal emission when the carbon price = $40/ton, wholesale 
prices decreases from $88.14/MWh to $87.89/MWh).  This is a promising result if the 
emission regulator is trying to mitigate carbon leakage.   
Nevertheless, California consumers have to pay for carbon leakage mitigation.  
First, without transferring state carbon permit revenues and ISO congestion revenues to 
consumers, when the California regulator adopts time-varying deemed rate schemes, which 
are most effective at mitigating leakage, the wholesale prices are universally higher than 
the current practice in California, , which charges imports at the technology-based deemed 
rate.  Second, with such rent transfers to consumers, allowing deemed rates to vary over 
time according to hour-by-hour marginal external emissions can raise the costs to Califor-





Table 6.11. Comparison of California Wholesale Prices under Different BCA Schemes 
(Cases 0 -10), without reimbursement of carbon and transmission rents from the ISO and 



































0.30/0.30 84.66 84.62 88.62 88.54 
2 
7 No BCA 83.05 85.56 
1/8 




9 Rebate Exports 83.68 86.49 
10 










Table 6.12. Comparison of California Wholesale Prices under Different BCA Schemes 



































0.30/0.30 74.75 74.75 75.53 75.54 
2 
7 No BCA 75.04 76.46 
1/8 
Charge Imports (at Tech-
nology-based deemed rate) 
75.07 76.59 
9 Rebate Exports 74.23 74.35 
10 





0 Carbon Price = $0/ton 74.05 
 
6.5.6 Societal Welfare (Market Efficiency) and Total Carbon Emissions 
This last set of results addresses the Pareto efficiency of alternative policies in terms 
of overall economic costs to the West versus total West emissions.  Figure 6.21 shows the 
trade-off between the WECC-wide resource cost (i.e., the sum of generation, transmission 
expansion cost and operation cost, deducing RPS penalties41 as well as carbon payments, 
which are transfer payments) and carbon emissions.  The Pareto frontier (red dashed line) 
among alternative California-only policies is largely defined by three solutions:42 the no 
 
41 In fact, RPS penalties never happen in due to the experimental design of this Chapter, see Section 6.4.  The 
California renewable potentials are doubled from Chapters 3 and 4.   
42 Some constant deemed rate schemes also lie on the frontiers: constant deemed rate ≥ 0.38 ton/MWh when 




carbon price case (Case 0, 281.27 Mton CO2e versus 32.94 Billion US$/year), and the two 
cases where the emission regulator of California bases import deemed rates on marginal 
external emissions (280.18 Mton CO2e versus 32.96 Billion US$/year when carbon price 
= $20/ton; and 278.64 Mton/yr versus 33.01 Billion US$/yr).  In other words, deemed rates 
based on external marginal emissions can achieve better economic efficiency than other 






Figure 6.21. Trade-offs between WECC resource costs and emissions (different colors 
stand for different BCA schemes; triangles stand for cases with carbon price = $20/ton 
under various deemed rates; circles stand for cases with carbon price = $40/ton under 
various deemed rates; red dashed line shows efficiency frontier (from Cases 0-10); green 
dashed line and diamonds show the efficiency frontier formed by assuming carbon prices 





Turning to a comparison of particular deemed rate policies within Group One (im-
port charges only), although the deemed rate schemes based on marginal external emissions 
lie on the frontier, none of the time-varying deemed rates clearly dominates the deemed 
emission rate without time-variation.  Meanwhile, with only several exceptions, higher 
deemed rates generally lead to higher economic efficiency by simultaneously lowering 
system cost and emissions (i.e., moving in the southwest direction in Figure 6.21); but the 
amount of emissions improvement is, however, almost negligible.   
For perspective, I also provide three additional points in Figure 6.21, which repre-
sent efficient benchmark policies for the entire WECC region.  These are a WECC-wide 
carbon price/tax applied at (1) $0/ton (for British Columbia, this WECC-wide carbon price 
is on top of its existing carbon tax), (2) $5/ton, and (3) $10/ton.  It is noteworthy that the 
first case is the same as Case 0.  In the case of $5/ton, overall emissions are 280.17 
Mtons/year, and the WECC-wide resource cost is 32.94 billion US$/year; for the case of 
$10/ton, the numbers are 278.45 Mtons/year and 32.94 Billion US$/year.  The correspond-
ing incremental carbon emission abatement costs for cases (2) and (3), as compared to (1), 
are $3.20/ton of emission reduction and $5.44/ton of emission reduction, respectively.  
These rates are, as would be expected, roughly halfway between $0 and the tax.  
Note that the frontier formed by cases with WECC-wide carbon price (green dotted 
line in Figure 6.21) clearly dominates the frontier formed by the study cases 0-10 (red 
dotted line), highlighting the efficiency loss from the sub-regional emission regulation, as 
opposed to an efficient region-wide policy.  The results show that California can unilater-
ally motivate changes in west-wide emissions, as the red frontier shows; however, the cost 




wide policy.  To illustrate this, note that the slopes from the x mark to either point of the 
red frontier (dark blue triangles) are, respectively, $19.95/ton of reduction and $27.70/ton.  
These costs are approximately five times as high as the incremental costs of $3.20/ton and 
$5.54/ton found for the cases of WECC-wide carbon price.  
6.6 Conclusions and Limitations   
This chapter explores the potential cost and emissions impacts of different border-
cost adjustment schemes that could possibly be implemented in the California AB32 car-
bon pricing system.  The major conclusions are summarized in Tables 6.13 and 6.14, and 




Table 6.13. Major conclusions of Chapter 6 (Part 1) 






(Case 0 vs. 
Case 7) 
Due to the imposed California carbon price: 
a. California emissions decrease, but WECC-wide 
emissions increase. The emission leakage is majorly 
due to the shift of gas-fired power from existing gas 
power plants of California to the ones in the Rest of 
WECC. 
b. More transmission expansion happens as carbon 
pricing without BCA essentially promotes more im-
ports. 
c. Costs to consumers increase, no matter whether the 
CAISO or the state government transfer carbon and 
congestion rents to consumers. 
d. WECC suffers economic efficiency losses as both 
WECC-wide emissions and WECC-wide resource 
cost increase, and therefore Case 7 does not lie on 
the efficiency frontier for California policy cases. 
Carbon Price = $40/ton, Case 
7 has 0.22 Billion US$/year  
higher WECC cost, 
$4.92/MWh higher California 
wholesale price ($2.41/MWh 
if with reimbursement), 1.26 
Mtons/year higher WECC-
wide emissions, 972 MW 
more backbone transmission 
construction.   
Case 7: 
Leakage (increases in Rest-of-
WECC emissions) is 19.26 
Mtons/year and larger than the 
within California emission re-
duction 17.88 Mtons/year.  









(Case 2 vs. 
Case 7) 
Compared to carbon pricing without BCA, the BCA 
that adopts a constant deemed rate will: 
a. Mitigate carbon leakage by bringing gas-fired 
power production from ROW back to California. 
b. Discourage transmission expansion.  And the higher 
the deemed rate is, the fewer transmission expan-
sions are. 
c. Without reimbursement from CAISO or the state 
government, the costs to consumers increase with a 
higher constant deemed rate.  With reimbursement, 
however, the cost to consumers is nearly constant 
and can be lower than the no BCA case.  
d. With only several exceptions, a higher deemed rate 
leads to system economic efficiency gain, i.e., lower 
WECC-wide emission and lower WECC-wide re-
source cost.  Some policies are on the economic ef-
ficiency frontier of California policy cases. 
Carbon Price = $40/ton, and a 
deemed rate of 0.41 T/MWh, 
Compared to Case 7, Case 2 
has 0.19 Billion US$/year 
lower WECC cost, 
$4.15/MWh higher California 
wholesale price ($0.75/MWh 
lower if with reimbursement), 
2.78 Mtons/year less emis-
sions, 1042 MW less backbone 
transmission construction.  
In Case 2: 
Leakage is negative at -6.01 
Mtons/year, California emis-














(Case 3-6 vs. 
Case 2) 
Allowing deemed rates to vary over the year generally: 
a. Leads to more emission leakage mitigation, but the sys-
tem-wide emissions barely change, with one exception: 
b. Time-variation based on external marginal emission 
rates can relatively increase emission leakage but can 
also lead to emission cut by demoting coal-fired power 
in ROW. 
c. Introduces a small increase in cost to consumers if the 
ISO or the state government provides reimbursement. 
d. Time-varying deemed rates do not dominate its constant 
counterpart in terms of system cost and emissions, ex-
cept cases based on the external marginal emission rate.  
Such a BCA scheme also lies on the economic efficiency 
frontier among all the California policy cases. 
Carbon Price = $40/ton, 
and using non-California 
marginal emission rates, 
Compared to Case2, Case 
4 has 0.04 Billion $/year 
higher WECC cost, 
$0.11/MWh lower Cali-
fornia cost ($0.33/MWh 
higher with reimburse-
ment), 1.24 Mtons/year 
lower WECC-wide emis-
sions. 
In Case 4: 
Leakage in that case is 
negative at -3.10 
Mtons/year, California 





(Case 10 vs. 
Case 1 or 8)  
Rebating exports in addition to charging imports can 
a. Mitigate carbon leakage by incentivizing gas power ex-
ports.  It promotes emission-free generation expansion in 
ROW states from which California LSEs are permitted 
to directly buy renewable power; however, most of this 
“promised” emission cut is offset by the decrease of re-
newable energy production in other ROW states. 
b. Discourage transmission expansion as less imports are 
needed. 
c. Reduce costs to consumers without reimbursement; in 
case reimbursement exists, costs to consumers can in-
crease. 
d. Provide economic efficiency gain, i.e., lower WECC-
wide emission and lower WECC-wide resource cost, 
thereby lying on the efficiency frontier of California pol-
icy cases... 
Carbon Price = $40/ton, 
and using technology-
specific emission rates, 
Compared to Case 1 or 8, 
Case 10 has 0.14 Billion 
$/year lower WECC cost, 
$2.13/MWh lower Cali-
fornia cost ($0.23/MWh 
lower with reimburse-
ment), 1.61 Mtons/year 
lower WECC-wide emis-
sions, 719 MW less back-
bone transmission con-
struction.  
In Case 10: 
Leakage in that case is 
2.61 Mtons/year; Califor-
nia emission reduction is 
2.95 Mtons/year.  Leak-
age percentage is 88.5%. 
 
 I have compared two broad groups of BCA alternatives.  Group One focuses on 
the deemed rate schemes assumed for power imports to California, while Group Two fo-
cuses on exploring the potential benefit of different combinations of export rebates and 
import charges.  For the emission regulator of Californian, which would aim to cut overall 




rise of the consumer payments, adopting a deemed rate scheme that is based on external 
marginal emissions or rebating exports in addition to charging imports can be promising 
alternatives.   
To justify this recommendation, I first consider the impacts within California, 
which is the subject of the first question asked at the beginning of this chapter: For a uni-
lateral carbon pricing jurisdiction in an interconnected electricity market, how will BCA 
schemes affect emission reductions, emission leakage, regional electricity production, 
transmission expansion, and consumer payments?   It turns out that changing from a tech-
nology-based deemed emission rate (the present policy of the California Air Resources 
Board under AB32) to technology-independent deemed rates for imports indeed mitigates 
carbon leakage.  For instance, comparing Case 1 (Technology-based) and Case 3 (time-
varying internal marginal emission rate), the leakage is reduced from 13.64 Mtons/year to 
3.92 Mtons/year when carbon price = $20/ton. (For the $40/ton scenario, this reduction is 
from 18.94 Mtons/year to 6.19 Mtons/year.)  Also, that change in policy would result in 
emissions reductions WECC-wide rather than the emission increases that occur in Case 1.  
Furthermore, among the investigated time-varying deemed rates, the one based on 
external marginal emissions delivers the most leakage mitigation.  In the same case, 
WECC-wide emission reduction also occurs due to incremental solar capacity expansion 
and decreased coal power production.  However, in all other cases, system-wide emissions 
barely decrease (and can increase, at least in several considered cases) if only imports are 
charged.  This highlights that reducing leakage by assigning a technology-independent 
deemed rate to imports simply shifts gas-fired generation from outside California to within 




interstate transmission expansions, especially ones connecting California to the Rest of the 
WECC: the higher the deemed rate (in case of time-varying deemed rate, the annual aver-
age), the less interstate transmission lines will likely be built.  
On the other hand, rebating emission expenses for California generation that is ex-
ported can partially mitigate leakage and reduce WECC-wide emissions relative to import-
only BCA, but only to a very limited extent.  The results also show that the action of charg-
ing imports with technology-based deemed rates barely affects transmission expansion rel-
ative to no BCA, while on the other hand, the action of rebating exports lowers the value 
of incremental transmission addition, and hence, less transmission capacity is expanded.  
The above discussion also answers the second question: Among all California-only 
policies, which BCA provides the most system-wide economic efficiency improvement?  As 
shown in Figure 6.21, it is the BCA scheme that bases the deemed rate on the marginal 
external emissions.  Some solutions with higher fixed deemed rates also are cost-effective 
compared to other California-only policies, but do not provide as many emissions reduc-
tions.  However, the incremental cost of all of these policies is about five times as high per 
ton of carbon removed as a WECC-wide carbon price policy that applies to all the region’s 
emissions.  Thus, the cost of the limited emissions reductions from even a large state going 
it alone is very high compared to coordinated regional or national policies.  A single state 
policy would have to be justified by a lack of regional or federal alternatives, or by a desire 
to exercise leadership by showing the political and technical feasibility of reductions, 




However, my conclusions here are limited by, and likely sensitive to, the assump-
tions I made and the data I used.  I highlight two limitations that should be addressed in 
future work:  
1) In order to make the Gauss-Seidel iterative procedure for calculating marginal 
emissions practical, I dropped some constraints that were included in the JHSMINE 
versions in Chapters 3, such as DC load flow (rather than the pipes-and-bubbles 
considered here), convexified unit commitment (rather than merit-order commit-
ment without intertemporal constraints), binary limitation of transmission expan-
sion (rather than continuous expansion), and storage operations and investment, 
which will surely affect the results.   
2) My BCA alternative list is not exhaustive: one can easily imagine that the emission 
regulator could choose to charge imports by, for example, discriminating between 
renewable generation and existing generation, or new versus existing generation 
investments.  This would potentially provide incentives for the ROW to install more 






Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Research 
In this chapter, I will first review the conclusions that I have drawn in the main text, 
as well as some limitations to those conclusions (Section 7.1).  These limitations also indi-
cate potential avenues for future research, as discussed in Section 7.2.   
7.1 Research Conclusions 
Researchers and practitioners have both contributed to expanding the capability of 
power system planning models.  Many ideas have been proposed for elaborating the models 
to improve their fidelity or enable those models to address new questions. However, due 
to limited computational capabilities, we cannot implement them all. We need to make a 
choice. 
This situation motivates Chapter 3, the first part of this work, which is about eval-
uating the choices.  More specifically, I addressed the following questions: What, precisely, 
is a “better” planning model? How can we value, in economic terms, the extent to which 
one planning model performs better than another? In Chapter 3, I proposed a systematic 
framework to quantify the economic benefits brought by possible enhancements to trans-
mission expansion planning (TEP) models.  I call the estimated benefits the value of model 
enhancement, VOME.  It is closely related to the decision analysis concept of the value of 
information, and to my knowledge, is new to the literature. 
To show the practicality of this framework, I tested it by evaluating four optional 
enhancements to transmission planning models: the consideration of long-run uncertainties 
by stochastic programming, the refinement of short-run temporal resolution by adding 
more load slices, the refinement of power flow representation by adding DC OPF, and the 




of a TEP for the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), and concluded that 
the most beneficial choice is the consideration of long-term uncertainty; the VOMEs of the 
other choices are much less.  It can be concluded, , therefore, that  (1) it is beneficial to 
devote more effort and to allocate more resources to carefully identify relevant long-run 
uncertainties; and (2) a simple stochastic programming model with a small set of hours and 
a pipes-and-bubbles power flow simulation, which solves much faster than the most so-
phisticated model, can potentially yield a plan that achieves most of the potential economic 
benefits. 
As mentioned above, power systems are continually changing, and one of the many 
examples is the emergence of affordable battery energy storage.  Are transmission and 
storage complements or substitutes?  Both transmission and storage promise to lower the 
cost of accommodating the increasing amount of variable renewable energy, and for that 
reason they appear to substitute for each other.  Put simply, we either save the excess en-
ergy for later when it is needed or transmit it to another location where it is needed.  How-
ever, as identified in the literature, e.g., Neetzow et al. (2018), under some circumstances 
transmission and storage can instead be complementary. Thus, an unambiguous answer to 
the complement or substitute question is thus not available.   
Motivated by this, in Chapter 4, I asked and answered a set of different questions 
that have not appeared in the literature before: How much benefit can we get in transmission 
expansion planning by anticipating storage expansion, accounting for both potential 
substitution and complementary relationships?  How much potential benefit is lost because 




With the help of the VOME framework, in Chapter 4, I answered these questions 
using the WECC test case.  The results reveal that: (1) the economic value brought by 
anticipating storage installation in TEP, which I called Value of Model Enhancement to 
consider Storage (VoMES), increases when the cost of storage decreases, implying a higher 
impact of storage installation upon the transmission expansion; (2) this VoMES is a net 
result of two factors: capital cost increase introduced by more renewable energy and 
storage installation  and the consequent operation costs saving; (3) the naïve plan obtained 
by TEP without storage installation anticipation will cause a loss of potential net benefit 
(with an average loss of 14%) of storage investment; and (4) this VoMES of TEP can be 
sensitive to the carbon pricing policy.  These results are, of course, limited to my test 
system.  
In Chapters 5 and 6, I used the TEP model as a policy impact assessment tool and 
answered the following questions: Can a state regulator significantly affect system 
emissions, costs, and emissions leakage by taxing or otherwise pricing of the carbon 
flowing into the state?   
To answer these questions, I modified my TEP model in Chapter 5, and in Chapter 
6, I tested my model in the WECC system, where California, a unilateral carbon pricing 
jurisdiction, is located.  I looked at different border carbon adjustment (BCA) alternatives 
and examined their impact on emission and leakage, power system investment and dispatch, 
transmission expansion, consumer costs, and WECC-wide economic efficiency.   
The results of Chapter 6 showed that the current Californian border carbon 
adjustment (BCA), which charges imported power based on the emission rate of the 




For instance, when California's carbon price is at $40/ton, compared to the no carbon price 
scenario, the rest of WECC emissions increase by 18.94 Mtons/year while California’s 
emissions only decrease by 17.67 Mtons/year.  In this case, the leakage percentage is 107% 
(= 100% × 18.94 ÷ 17.67), and carbon pricing in California increases the net WECC-wide 
emissions in the power sector.  On the other hand, BCA alternatives that charge imports at 
technology-neutral deemed rates, including the BCA schemes that base deemed rates on 
marginal or average emission rates, indeed help to mitigate emission leakage.  For example, 
when the California carbon price is at $40/ton, and the California emission regulator 
charges imports at the external marginal emission rates, the emission leaked to the ROW 
is only -3.10 Mtons/year (in fact, this is a negative leakage).  Nevertheless, this leakage 
mitigation is accompanied by an increase in California emissions of 0.46 Mtons/year.  
Charing imports with at the external marginal emission rates bring the most system-wide 
emission reduction (3.10 – 0.46 = 2.64 Mtons/year when carbon price = $40/ton, 1.10 
Mtons/year when carbon price = $20/ton), but reduction amount is <1% compared to the 
emission level without a carbon price.  Rebating emissions costs associated with California 
exports in addition to charging imports can also increase WECC-wide emission reductions, 
but only to a limited extent. 
However, all cases that I investigated are significantly more expensive than an 
efficient west-wide carbon tax.  As shown in the results of Chapter 6, comparing to the 
WECC-wide carbon tax, the resource cost increase per emission reduction (or abatement 
cost in short) resulting from the most efficient California BCA is about five times as 




7.2 Future Research 
As I have previously discussed, the results and conclusions of Chapters 3 and 4 
concerning the value of improved transmission models are, of course, limited to the test 
system and data I considered.  Testing the same four modeling choices in Chapter 3 or the 
proactive consideration of storage modeled in Chapter 4 for another test system may give 
appreciably different answers as to which model improvements matter most for planning.  
As an example, planning for a power system with a large coal/nuclear fleet will clearly 
benefit from unit commitment modeling, and so even though that improvement didn’t mat-
ter much in the gas- and renewable-dominated WECC system we assumed for 2034, it 
might be important for other situations.  On the other hand, as technology and policy con-
tinually evolve, so will power systems.  Ten years from now, the answers I get for the 
WECC system may also be dramatically different from what I obtained in this thesis. 
Future research that could improve and build upon Chapter 3 includes (1) expand-
ing the scope of the evaluation, and (2) using the obtained information to develop a possible 
new planning paradigm.  The first point is obvious: I only test four out of eight general 
categories of possible enhancements identified in Table 3.1 of Chapter 3; in fact, Chapter 
4 represents one of these other extensions.  The second area for future work is also attrac-
tive: one of the results in Chapter 3 implies that a simple model (a stochastic program that 
has multiple long-run scenarios but includes only a pipes-and-bubbles power flow and a 
small set of hours) can capture most benefits of transmission expansion planning.  This 
result implies that we can possibly use a simple but easy to solve model as a filter to pre-
select transmission candidates for more detailed analysis, such as possible transmission 




can be executed, especially if transmission expansion is modeled by binary variables, and 
possibly provide a much more beneficial plan.  For instance, with fewer corridors, more 
high voltage lines, and other line configuration alternatives for those corridors can be mod-
eled, together with more sophisticated load flow methods. 
Desirable future research related to Chapter 4 includes the introduction of two 
missing elements to the analysis to provide a fairer comparison between transmission and 
storage.  These are (1) the lifetime loss of storage capability due to deep cycling, and (2) 
transmission losses.  In the results shown in Chapter 4, the assumed lifetime of battery 
storage is already much shorter than for transmission lines, and this fact is reflected in the 
calculation of annualized capital cost.  However, as pointed out by the literature, e.g., Xu 
et al. (2018a), the lifetime of the battery can be much shorter if it is operated in a deep 
cycling mode; as a result, the current JHSMINE formulation which disregards this cost of 
deep cycling may, therefore, introduce bias.  Similarly, disregarding transmission losses in 
Chapter 4 may give too much advantage to transmission candidates.  Both storage and 
transmission involve losses in reality: to save electricity for later with storage, we must 
suffer an efficiency loss;43 in the same vein, transmitting power far away results in I2R 
resistance losses.  Thus, proper transmission loss modeling may provide a more balanced 
comparison.  Adding transmission loss in the TEP model has been explored in literature, 
for example, by Ozdemir et al. (2016).  
For Chapters 5 and 6, the limitations of this analysis of BCA present opportunities 
for future work to investigate the interaction between carbon and renewable policies.  In 
my current implementation, the ineffectiveness of technology-neutral deemed rates is 
 




partially due to the fact of high prices for in-state renewable energy credits in California.  
As a result, the economic incentives provided by technology-neutral deemed rates can only 
boost Californian gas-powered generation and consequently increase California emissions.  
Questions that remained unanswered include: How would the carbon policy and renewable 
policy interact under alternative assumptions concerning the amount of California 
resources, or the existence and stringency of renewable policies in the West?  What if other 
states, such as Oregon and Washington, implement carbon pricing? Beside, in order to 
make the Gauss-Seidel iterative procedure for calculating marginal emissions practical, I 
dropped some constraints that were included in the JHSMINE versions in Chapters 3, such 
as DC load flow (rather than the pipes-and-bubbles considered here) and convexified unit 
commitment (rather than merit-order commitment without intertemporal constraints).  In-
vestigating how these simplifications affected my result would be also an interesting ex-
tension of this research. 
To conclude, coming up with new model formulations and capabilities is usually 
assumed to improve planning, but this is not necessarily the case.  Indeed, it is well 
recognized in other fields, such as ecology, that more complex models are not necessarily 
better in prediction system outcomes (Radosavljevic et al., 2014).  The benefits of planning 
enhancements should be assessed, and compared to their costs.  These benefits include not 
only potentially more economic grid expansion plans, but also better policy designs; the 
value of improved models for better policy decision making has not been systematically 




Appendix A – Central Planning and Perfect Competition 
In this appendix, I provide abstract proofs for two key arguments that I asserted to 
be true in the main text of this thesis: 
1) If solved to optimal, the linearized transmission-generation-storage expansion plan-
ning (L-TGSEP in short) is equivalent to the equilibria formed by the perfect com-
petition among transmission, generation, and storage with the capability of expan-
sion of each; in short, central planning and perfect competition (Samuelson, 1952).   
2) The transmission-generation-storage expansion planning with binary transmission 
expansion (B-TGSEP in short) is equivalent to a situation where transmission ex-
pansion planner is a societal-welfare maximizing leader, and all players react per-
fectly competitively to the transmission expansion decisions and the short-run lo-
cational marginal prices.  See Spyrou (2019) for related proof.  
Before delving into the proofs, here is some notation that only applies in this appendix.   
I Players, i = 1 … n; where the player 1 is reserved for transmission planner. 
J Markets, j = 1 … m; note that the market here can be any market, e.g., elec-
tricity markets, energy credit markets, ancillary service markets, or capacity 
markets; more specifically, these markets can differ within themselves by 




𝑜 Matrices associated with constraints of the player i and its “buy/sell/other” 
decision variables. 




𝑜 Vectors of coefficients in objective functions; the length of the first two 




𝑝 Vector of the market-clearing prices; the length of this vector is m in that 
there exist m markets. 
𝑅 Vector of the right-hand sides of the market-clearing conditions; the length 
of this vector is m in that there exist m markets. 
𝑥𝑖
𝑏 Vectors of “buy” decision variables of the player i; as there are m markets, 
the length of this vector is m. 
𝑥𝑖
𝑠 Vectors of “sell” decision variables of the player i; as there are m markets, 
the length of this vector is m. 
𝑥𝑖
𝑜 Vectors of all “other” decision variables of the player i; a decision variable 
is an “other” decision variable if it does not participate in any market activ-
ity.  The length of this vector varies by players.  Examples are capacity var-
iables if there exists no capacity market, or slack/surplus/artificial variables 
to be added for the Standard from of Simplex. 
𝛽𝑖 Vectors of the shadow prices of the constraints of the players i in the central 
planning.   
𝛾 Vector of the shadow prices of the market constraints in the central optimi-
zation. 
𝜆𝑖 Vectors of the shadow prices of the constraints of the player i; 
I prove the first result by showing the one-to-one correspondence between the union 
of the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (KKTs) of individual planers & market-clearing 
conditions and the KKTs of the central planning.  To start, let us see, for each individual 
player i, its optimization is as following (notice that the equal sign “=”, the less or equal 
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Please note that the notation of this problem is the standard form of the linear programming 
(Nocedal and Wright, 2006) and is general enough to represent any player that participates 
in markets so long as his optimization is linear; this includes generation expansion with 
relaxed unit commitment, storage expansion, transmission expansion with relaxed expan-
sion decision, etc.  Specifically, the last term of the objective function is the revenue or 
payment generated in all markets.  The corresponding KKTs are as follows (here I call 
these conditions Oi): 
 
0 ( ) 0
0 ( ) 0
0 ( ) 0
 free, 
b b b T
i i i i
s s s T
i i i i
io o o T
i i i i
b b s s o o
i i i i i i i i
x c p A
x c p A
O i
x c A





 ⊥ − + − 

 ⊥ − −  

 ⊥ −  
+ + = 
 
Then, I cast the market clearing conditions as follows (here I call it M): 
 ( )s bi i
i
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On the other hand, I cast the central planning problem; i.e., a societal welfare max-
imization, as follows (please note that I cast it in a minimization form):  
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I give the KKT conditions associated with the central planning as follows, (here I 
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It thus readily follows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the “CP” and the 
union of “Oi for all i” and “M”.  Specifically, there is a correspondence between shadow 
prices: βi ↔ λi and γ ↔ p.  Since the central planning model is a linear program, its KKT 
conditions sufficiently and necessarily define its optimal solution; on the other hand, as its 
KKTs are the same as the union of individual KKTs of each player and market clearing 
constraints, the optimal solution of central planning supports the equilibria formed by each 
player.   
The proof from the other direction follows the same logic: if a solution (x, λ, p) 
supports equilibria; i.e., it satisfies all individual KKTs and market clearing conditions, it 
must be an optimal solution of the central planning model.  This completes the proof of the 
equivalence between the central planning and the perfect competition, the famous Samu-
elson Principle mentioned in Samuelson (1952). 
The second result awaiting proof is as follows: the TGSEP with binary transmission 
expansion decision variables; i.e., B-TGSEP is equivalent to a situation where transmission 
expansion planner is maximizing societal welfare while anticipating everyone will react in 
perfect competition to the transmission expansion decision.  To prove this result, initially, 
I recast the central planning model with one modification; that is, I restrict the “other” 
variable of the transmission expansion planner, 𝑥1
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As a result, this B-TGSEP is a mixed-integer program (MIP), which is lacking KKT-based 
optimality conditions; therefore, an equivalency towards perfect competition is not readily 
available.   
To help me move forward, here is an essential intermediate result: given the exist-
ence of an optimal solution of a math program MP, one can separate the optimal solution 
into any two partial results, say x* and y*. Then by fixing x* in MP, he can get a second 
math program, say MPx; it readily follows that y* is an optimal solution of MPx.  To put it 
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This intermediate result can be proved by contradiction: if y* is not an optimal solution of 
MPx and the feasible region (given x*) is not empty because y* is one of feasible solution 
of MPx, there must exist another y’ ≠ y* such that f(x*, y’) <  f(x*,y*) and (x*, y’) is also 
feasible. This violates the statement of (x*,y*) being one optimal solution of the problem 
MP.   
Now, turn back to the B-TGSEP, and suppose that I solved it to the optimal and 
have an optimal solution: 
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By fixing the transmission expansion solution, 𝑥1
𝑜∗, in the central planning problem, it 
should be clear to readers that the following is true (note the terms in red): 
 
( )* * * * *1 1 1




, , , ,  is the optimal solution of
Minimize ( ) ( ) ( )
s.t. ( )
( ) ( )
, ; 0 1
1
i
b s b s o
i i i i
b T b s T s o T o
i i i i i i
i i
b b s s o o
i i i i i i i i








x x x x x
c x c x c x
A x A x A x b
A x A x b























In other words, the B-TGSEP problem, an MIP, can be recast as follows, a Stackel-
berg-Game (or leader-follower game): 
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Now, readers may have noticed that the math program in the parenthesis is a linear program: 
a linear generation-storage expansion planning problem; and thus, there exists an equiva-
lent perfect competition equilibrium among each player (the first result I proved in this 
appendix).  Thus, by substituting the math program inside the parenthesis by the equilib-
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Then I can conclude the following is true: the TGSEP with binary transmission expansion 
decisions (B-TGSEP) is equivalent to a situation where transmission expansion planner is 
maximizing the societal welfare anticipating that all players react perfectly competitively 
to the transmission expansion decisions; in other words, transmission expansion planner is 
a societal planning leader.  The meaning of the assumption that all players are in perfect 
competition is two-fold: it requires not only perfect competitive short-run markets, but also 





Appendix B – Network Reduction Procedure 
This appendix demonstrates the network reduction procedure that I performed to 
produce the 300-bus network used in Chapter 3 and the 361-bus network used in Chapter 
6. This network reduction procedure adopts the algorithm developed in Zhu and Tylavsky 
(2018). For a general review of network reduction methods, also see Zhu and Tylavsky 
(2018).  The general steps involved in executing this method are as follows: 
1) Read Inputs: The inputs include a power flow case, the original network, and a set 
of buses the user wants to preserve; hereafter, preserved buses.  The power flow 
case records the withdraws/injections and power flows on transmission lines.  The 
original network records the rating, the impedance, the from-bus, and the to-bus of 
each transmission line; furthermore, it records if any bus is a generator bus, a load 
bus, or the slack bus.   
2) Network Reduction One: The algorithm preserves all transmission lines that di-
rectly connect the preserved buses. For other lines, the algorithm creates “equiva-
lent” lines and associated impedances based on Ward’s equivalent circuit calcula-
tion (Ward, 1949); no rating is provided. For details of how equivalent lines are 
created, please see Zhu and Tylavsky (2018).  Importantly, there is no membership 
of which lines are aggregated into which equivalent line. 
3) Network Reduction Two: The algorithm preserves existing lines and generates the 
new equivalent ones again; however, in this step of the network reduction, trans-
mission lines between a larger set of buses are preserved, which is the union of 




4) Shortest-Path Finder: For a given generator bus, the algorithm executes the shortest 
pathfinder to find which preserved bus is the closest in the second reduced network.  
The closeness of two buses is defined as the electrical distance, where the definition 
can be found in Allen et al. (2008) and Shi et al. (2012). This step creates a mem-
bership between the generator buses and the preserved buses.  
5) Generators Replacement: Return to the first reduced network: the generators and 
associated injections are moved to the closest preserved bus identified in step 5. 
6) Load Redistribution: The algorithm recalculates the load on every bus, such that 
power flows on the preserved lines are the same as the original power flow case.  
Again, there exists no membership between the original load buses (and withdrawal) 
and the preserved bus. 
7) Output Report: The outputs include: the reduced network (obtained in step 2), gen-
erator bus – preserved bus membership, and finally, recalculated load on each bus. 
Now, the network reduction procedure followed in this thesis is slightly different due to 
the critical role of the membership between the original load buses and the preserved buses. 
This membership is essential for the calculation of how the load is distributed from the 
balancing authority area (BAA) level to the reduced network. Suppose load distribution 
factor of the original network is called ODa,i’, where a is the index of BAA and  i’ is the 
index of the original bus.  Further assume I have a membership between the original bus to 
the preserved bus is available and call it MBi.i’, where i is the index of the reduced network 
bus.  The load distribution factor of the preserved network PDa,i  can be calculated as: 
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To construct the membership MBi,i’, instead of completely following the algorithm 
above, I modified step 3 and 4 of the algorithm: by providing the union of generator buses 
and load buses to the algorithm while it produces the second reduced network in step 3, the 
membership between the generator buses plus the load buses and the preserved buses will 
be created in step 4. Step 6 is, thus, ignored. 
Importantly, load replacement using PDa,i cannot guarantee the power flows on the 
preserved lines are identical between the reduced network and the original network; this 
necessitates the quality assurance procedure for network validation.  For example, in this 
thesis, I constructed  and checked a map of reduced network with generators, load pockets, 
which is provided in (Xu and Hobbs, 2018).  Furthermore, I also performed the product 
cost modeling to make sure the power flows pass the sanity check; e.g., California is im-
porting on path 66, also known as California Oregon Intertie (COI), etc. 
The details of 300-bus network reduction can be seen in Ho et al. (2016), and the 
details of the 361-bus network can be seen in Xu and Hobbs (2018).  In principle, I pre-






Appendix C – Generation Aggregation 
This appendix documents the generation aggregation procedure I followed in this 
thesis. The generator aggregation is a two-step process: (1) identifying which generators 
can be aggregated as one; (2) calculating the operation parameters of the aggregated gen-
erators from individual ones. 
In the database of this thesis, for generators to be aggregated as one (step 1), gen-
erators must have the following parameters in common; I also call them the aggregation 
criteria: 
1) State ownership: they must be owned/contracted by companies in the same state. 
2) Balancing Authority Area membership: they must be in the same balancing author-
ity area. 
3) Generating Technology 
4) Bus: they must be located on the same bus on the reduced network. Such member-
ship is obtained from the network reduction procedure (See the previous appendix). 
5) Fuel: for two generators to be aggregated into one, they must use the same fuel; 
e.g., two coal plants that are both using Wyoming coal are eligible to be aggregated 
into one if they also satisfy other aggregation criteria. 
6) Time-series: for two units to be aggregated into one, they must share the same 
availability time series. It is usually the case that they are generators of the same 
dam, wind farm, or solar farm.  
7) Must-run status: A must-run unit can only be aggregated into another must-run unit.  
In my aggregation process, an original generator is a must-run unit if it is a co-




The second step is to calculate the aggregated parameters from the individual ones.  I fol-
low the principle of capacity-proportional output; i.e., if two generators are aggregated, 
they are always dispatched in proportion to their maximum capacity.  With this general 
principle applied, I set the detailed rules as follows:  
1) Maximum run (in MW): the sum of all capacities of generators being aggregated 
into the same one. 
2) Average Heat Rate (in MMBTU/MWh): the average heat rates of different genera-
tors are aggregated using the capacity weighting method.  For example, if a 1 MW 
generator with heat rate at 7 MMBTU/MWh is combined with a 2 MW generator 
with heat rate at 7.5 MMBTU/MWh, the resulting heat rate is 
 
1 MW 7 MMBTU/MWh 2 MW 7.5 MMBTU/MWh
7.3 MMBTU/MWh





The average heat rate used in aggregation is measured when the generator is at the 
maximum output. 
3) Minimum Run (as a fraction of the maximum capacity): I used the maximum of all 
minimum runs of the generators being aggregated into one.  For example, if a 1 
MW generator with 0.5 MW (50%) minimum run is aggregated with a 2 MW gen-
erator with 0.5 MW (25%) minimum run, the result minimum run (as a fraction of 
maximum run) is 50%.  Otherwise, if the minimum run is set at 25% and the ag-
gregated generator is operated at 0.75 MW, according to the capacity-proportional 
output principle, the first generator will be operated at 0.25MW, violating its min-




4) One-minute Ramp Rate (as a fraction of the maximum capacity): I used the smallest 
of all generators being aggregated. The reason is similar to the calculation of the 
minimum run. 
5) Start-up cost ($/MW of maximum capacity): I used the capacity-weighted value. 
6) Variable Operation and Maintenance (VOM) cost ($/MWh): I used the capacity 
weighted. 
7) Planned Outage Rate (%): I uniformly set it to 2% for all generators. 
8) Forced Outage Rate (%): I used the capacity-weighted value. 
9) Minimum Downtime (hour): I used the longest minimum downtime of all the gen-
erators being aggregated into the same one; the rationale follows the example of the 
calculation of the minimum run. 
10) Minimum Uptime (hour): I used the longest minimum uptime of all the generators 
being aggregated into the same one; the rationale follows the example of the calcu-





Appendix D – Simulation Period Selection 
In this appendix, I demonstrate the procedure of the operation period selection (in 
this appendix, the Procedure).  The Procedure aims to select the representative 
hours/days/weeks for the operation simulation in JHSMINE (see Chapter 2) and is an ex-
tension of the method developed in Xu and Hobbs (2018).  In this appendix, the word 
“period” can be “hour,” “day,” or “week,” depending on whether the reader or I am select-
ing “hour,” “day,” or “week.”  Also, note that all notations only apply within this appendix. 
For general references on period selection, I refer readers to Nahmmacher et al. (2016) and 
Poncelet et al. (2017). 
Three processes form the base of this Procedure: (1) the clustering, (2) the random 
sampling, and (3) the result filtering. The clustering method is to cluster all periods (index 
p) into N groups, based on a specified distance metric (Dp1,p2), which the Procedure adopts 
to characterize the dissimilarity between different periods.  Each group n will have a dif-
ferent size, noted as Sizen.  For instance, the Procedure can cluster 365 days in one year 
into 2 groups, with Size1 = 200, Size2 = 165.   
With all period groups established, the random sampling picks one period from 
each group to form a sample (index m) and then repeats this procedure M times.  The third 
step is to filter the M samples to select the best one: by assuming the sampled period in 
each group will repeat Sizen times, the Procedure re-constructs the whole year for each 
sample m. Then for each sample, a criterium Cm is calculated. Out of the M samples, the 
Procedure picks the one with the minimum Cm. The details of the Procedure are as follows.  




1) Time-series: Vp,t,s, 0 – 1 values standing for the profile of the time-series s at the 
time t of  the period p. The time t is the hour index of the day/week p; i.e., t ∈ [1, 
24] if p is a day, while t ∈ [1, 168] if p is a week.  For instance, when I select days, 
V1,2,3 = 0.5 means: at the 2
nd hour of day 3, the 1st time series has a value at 0.5.   
2) Weight of the time-series Ws.  For instance, W1 = 1 and W2 = 0.5 means the first 
time series is as twice important as the second one. 
3) Period Type: choices include (a) hour, (b) day, or (c) week. 
4) Time-series Distance metric: choices include (see details at the end): (a) Euclidean 
distance, (b) Manhattan distance (also known as City-Block distance), (c) Histo-
gram-based distance, and (d) Cumulative-histogram-based distance. For choices (c) 
and (d), a total number of bins is needed for the histogram construction. Note that 
the inverse of the cumulative histogram is the classic duration curve. 
5) A number of the representative period, i.e., a number of clusters, N. Each period is 
indexed with n = 1 … N.   
6) Clustering method. choices include (a) K-medoid clustering and (b) Hierarchical 
Clustering (James et al., 2013). For choice (b), the Procedure needs a specified tree 
cut method. 
7) Number of random samples, M. 
8) Criterium of the “best” sample. Choices include (a) total weighted deviation of 
means; (b) total weighted deviation of means and standard deviations, (c) total 






After reading the inputs above, the Procedure performs the following steps. 
1) For each time series s, each period p, the Procedure constructs a histogram Hp,s,b, 
and a cumulative histogram CHp,s,b.  Note b is the index of blocks of the histogram.   
2) For each time series s, between each period pair p1 and p2, a distance TSDs,p1,p2 is 
calculated.  E.g., suppose there exist two (2) time series, and we are selecting days 
from 365 days; there will be 2 ∙ 365 ∙ 365 = 266450 elements in this TSDs,p1,p2 matrix, 
as TSDs,p1,p2 is a distance matrix, it is symmetric. 
a. Euclidean distance: 
( )
2
, 1, 2 1, , 2, ,s p p p t s p t s
t
TSD V V= − ;  
b. Manhattan distance: 
 , 1, 2 1, , 2, ,s p p p t s p t s
t
TSD V V= − ;   
c. Histogram-based distance: 
 , 1, 2 1, , 2, ,s p p p s b p s b
b
TSD H H= − ;   
d. Cumulative-histogram-based distance: 
 , 1, 2 1, , 2, ,s p p p s b p s b
b
TSD CH CH= − .   
3) The distance between the days are calculated as 
 
1, 2 , 1, 2p p s s p p
s
D W TSD=  .   
4) Use the selected clustering method to cluster the periods based on Dp1,p2, the general 
outputs of this step include: 
• N clusters, with each size being Sizen;  
• A membership between periods and clusters, MBn,p;  




5) Randomly select one period from each cluster and repeat this procedure M times. 
6) For each sample m, the Procedure constructs a sampled year as if the sampled pe-
riod from cluster n repeats Sizen times.  For instance, suppose there are two groups 
with Size1 = 200, and Size2 = 165; one day from each group is sampled, and thus a 
sample has two days, A and B. Then a sample year is constructed, with 200 days 
being identical to day A and 165 identical to day B.   
7) For each sample year m, each time series s, calculate the mean (means,m), standard 
deviation (stds,m), yearly histogram (YHb,s,m), and yearly cumulative histogram 
(YCHb,s,m). 
8) The criterium is calculated as follows, where the superscript pop stands for the pop-
ulation.  
a. Total deviation of means: 
 ,
pop
m s s m s
s
C W mean mean= − ;   
e. Total deviation of means and standard deviations: 
 ( ), ,pop popm s s m s s m s
s
C W mean mean std std= − + − ;   





m s b s m b s
s b
C W YH YH= − ;   





m s b s m b s
s b
C W YCH YCH= −    
9) Pick up the sample with the minimum criterium. The Procedure ends here. 




1) Time-series: renewable and hydro time series data are from the WECC common 
case 2026 (WECC, 2016a); Load data are from the WECC storage report (Xu and 
Hobbs, 2018); all of the time series are normalized to 0-1. 
2) Time series weight: Weights of load time series are an average load of each balanc-
ing area; the weight of each of the other time series is the total nameplates of the 
existing generators using time series. For example, there are two (2) generators, 1 
MW and 2 MW, using time series s1, the weight is 1 MW + 2MW = 3 MW. 
3) Period Type: Day. 
4) Time-series distance metric: Histogram-based distance with the total bin number B 
= 50. 
5) Cluster number: N = 4. 
6) Cluster method: K-medoid. 
7) The number of random samples, M = 100,000. 
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